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INTRODUCTION

Any experienced litigator knows how frustrating-and hence important-the rules governing the timing of appeals can be. The hardship cuts both ways: a party unable to appeal immediately from an
erroneois decision faces litigating the rest of the case before the
grievance can be heard; a party receiving a favorable interlocutory ruling that is immediately appealable faces the expense, delay, and risks
of appellate review before a final resolution at the trial level.
In federal court, the final judgment rule requires parties to wait
until the conclusion of the proceedings at the district court level
before appealing to the circuit court of appeals.' While delaying appellate involvement until after final judgment is appropriate in most
2
circumstances, some interlocutory orders warrant immediate review.
The vexing question is how to distinguish those interlocutory orders
that are worthy of immediate review from those that are not.
The current regime of statutory, rule-based, and judge-made exceptions to the final judgment rule is under attack. 3 Critics decry the
regime's incoherence and the burdensome litigation that certain exceptions-such as the collateral order doctrine-create. 4 Many also
1 The "final judgment rule" derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), which provides that the federal circuit courts of appeals have jurisdiction only over "final decisions" of the district courts. The rule reflects a narrow construction of the statute;
except in rare circumstances, a district court's decision or order is generally not final
unless it "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
2 An "interlocutory order" is an order that does not resolve (and hence, end)
the entire litigation before the district court. For the purposes of this Article, "interlocutory orders" include the narrow set of orders falling within one of the "interpretive doctrines" discussed in Part I. See infra text accompanying notes 35-69. Such
orders are deemed "final decisions" under § 1291 and hence immediately appealable,
even though they do not terminate the entire litigation before the district court.
3 See, e.g., Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, DiscretionaryAppellate Review
of Non-Final Orders: It's Time To Change the Rules, I J. App. PRAc. & PROCESS 285, 291
(1999) (stating that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the present appealability
regime); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PrTr. L. REv. 717, 729, 748 (1993) (suggesting that there
is a consensus among scholars that the final judgment rule and its exceptions are in
need of refining and reform).
4 See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The CollateralOrderDoctrine: A New "SerbonianBog"
and Four Proposalsfor Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1998) (criticizing the
Supreme Court's collateral order doctrine jurisprudence as confusing and contending that it has created an unacceptable amount of litigation); Eisenberg & Morrison,

2001]

DISCONTENT

AND

INDISCRETION

contend that the exceptions are inadequate because they fail to capture numerous orders that will inflict severe irreparable harm unless
immediately reviewed. 5 Moreover, the existing regime inhibits the development of the law on various issues that often are resolved in inter6
locutory orders and tend to evade review after final judgment.

supranote 3, at 291 (characterizing the current scheme as "freakish and inconsistent
in application" and decrying the collateral litigation it spawns); Lawyers Conference
Comm. on Fed. Courts and the Judiciary, The Finality Rule: A Proposalfor Change,
JuDGEsJ., Fall 1980, at 33, 35 [hereinafter Lawyers Conference Comm.] (stating that
the current exceptions to the final judgment rule have developed in an ad hoc and
confusing manner); Martinean, supra note 3, at 748, 773-74, 785 (contending that
the current exceptions are in need of clarification and expressing concern about the
amount of litigation caused by judge-made exceptions to the final judgment rule);
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1166 (1990) (echoing others who have described the law in this
area as an "unacceptable morass" of doctrines and other exceptions); John C. Nagel,
Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudencewith DiscretionaryReview, 44 DuKE L.J. 200, 201 (1994) (lamenting the lack of clarity in the current regime
and the effort spent arguing about appealability).
5 See, e.g., Michael J. Davidson, A Modest Proposal:Permit Interlocutory Appeals of
Summary Judgment Denials, 147 MI. L. REv. 145, 212-15 (1995) (advocating discretionary appeal of denials of summary judgment in part to avoid the delay and expense of
preparing for and participating in trial when summary judgment should have been
granted); Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 351, 352-53 (1961)
(suggesting that the current regime is flawed because certain orders that impose
hardships are not appealable immediately); Jordon L. Kruse, Comment, Appealability
of Class Certification Orders: The "MandamusAppeal" and a Proposal To Amend Rule 23, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 704, 705 (1997) (advocating discretionary review of class certification
orders to alleviate the potential hardship caused by the final judgment rule); Randall
J. Turk, Note, Toward a More Rational FinalJudgment Rule: A Proposal To Amend 28
U.S.C. § 1292, 67 GEo. LJ. 1025, 1026 (1979) (stating that the current set of exceptions "fails to effectively or consistently afford appellate review in all hardship cases").
6 See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 291 (criticizing the current regime
because it denies review of interlocutory decisions that would aid in the development
of the law); Kenneth S. Gould, FederalRule of Civil Procedure23(W): Interlocutory Appeals
of Class Action Certification Decisions, 1 J. App. PRAc. & PROCESS 309, 310-11 (1999)
(stating that one of the reasons Rule 23(f) was adopted was to enable circuit courts to
develop clear certification standards); Solimine, supra note 4, at 1182 (arguing for
increased interlocutory review under § 1292(b) in part because issues typically arising
in pretrial matters are likely to evade review); see also FED. R. Crw. P. 23(f) advisory
committee's note (1998) (suggesting that Rule 23(f) may be utilized to provide appellate review where a class certification decision "turns on a novel or unsettled question
of law"); 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcTiCE AND PROCEDURE § 3907,
at 280 (3d ed. 1992) ("Some matters of procedure, such as discovery, may elude review on appeal from final judgments; if the courts of appeals are to participate in the
process of developing the law, interlocutory appeal may prove the only effective
means available.").
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The fashionable response to these perceived woes is discretionary
interlocutory review. 7 Discretionary review vests in the circuit courts
unfettered authority to decide which interlocutory orders to review.
Commentators favor this approach for a variety of reasons, including
that it avoids potential interpretive problems and litigation over reviewability associated with mandatory review. 8 Moreover, discretionary review allows circuit courts to intervene when orders contain
probable errors that may cause irreparable harm if not immediately
corrected. Likewise, circuit courts can employ discretionary review to
address substantive areas where development of the law is needed. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by selecting only those interlocutory orders that are truly worthy of immediate review, circuit courts
are able to limit the impact of interlocutory review on their already
strained dockets. 9 Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for discretionary review of grants or denials of class
certification motions, represents the first foray into unfettered discretionary review at the circuit level.' 0 Additional reform is largely attain7 Over the last quarter century, many commentators have called for discretionary review to replace and/or supplement the current exceptions. See, e.g., ABA
COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE

COURTS § 3.12, at 21 (1977) [hereinafter ABA COMM'N] (stating that final judgment

rule should remain intact, but advocating discretionary review of all interlocutory orders); Edward H. Cooper, Timing asJurisdiction:Federal Civil Appeals in Context, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 157, 157-64 (proposing the eventual elimination
of the current exceptions and replacing them with pure discretionary review resulting
from district court certification or independent circuit court acceptance of review);
Davidson, supra note 5, at 214-15 (advocating that circuit courts be granted the authority to review denials of summary judgment on a discretionary basis); Eisenberg &
Morrison, supra note 3, at 301-02 (proposing that the Supreme Court adopt a rule
allowing discretionary appellate review of non-final orders); Martineau, supra note 3,
at 776-88 (advocating that the final judgment rule and the right to appeal thereafter
remain intact, but advocating discretionary review of all interlocutory orders); Nagel,
supra note 4, at 201 (agreeing with other commentators that the federal courts should
adopt a discretionary review model similar to that in the Wisconsin state court system); Turk, supra note 5, at 1040 (advocating adoption of another subsection of
§ 1292 that would allow a circuit court to choose to review various orders). A small
number of commentators have proposed abandoning or limiting appeals of right and
adopting a discretionary regime for both interlocutory and final orders. See infra note
33.
8 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 287, 306 (arguing that
mandatory criteria set forth in a statute or rule cannot significantly control essentially
discretionary decisions). "Mandatory review" is review the circuit court is obliged to
undertake.
9 Id. at 287.
10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) as amended became effective December
1, 1998, providing as follows:
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able, since rulemaking now can be utilized to alter the current
regime."
Discretionary review, however, is not the answer. First, the current regime is in far better shape than commonly appreciated. The
existing exceptions to the final judgment rule, although narrow, are
clear, coherent, and produce limited collateral litigation. In addition,
discretionary review-whether generally or in category-based rules
like Rule 23(f)-will not result in dramatic increases in the correction
of errors that threaten to inflict irreparable harm nor enhance significantly the development of legal standards in areas that have traditionally evaded appellate review. Furthermore, discretionary review is
more problematic than its advocates foresee: it will impose substantial
new burdens on circuit courts and litigants, and will grant to the circuit courts a new kind of power that threatens the integrity of the
courts' error correction and lawmaking functions. On balance, any
benefits of discretionary review are outweighed by the added burdens
and dangers.
There is a superior approach to reform. Because the current regime is working well, it should not be dismantled. Rather, rulemaking
should be utilized to supplement the current exceptions with narrowly
drawn categories of mandatory review. Properly targeted, these categories of review will enhance error correction, reduce irreparable
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a
district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal
does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the districtjudge or the
court of appeals so orders.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f). The circuit courts also have discretion to decide whether to take
an appeal of an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994), but only after the district
court has certified the order for immediate appellate review. Likewise, under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, circuit courts have the authority to
deny appeals (after a final decision below) to incarcerated persons seeking habeas,
relief, but only if the applicant has failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1996).
11 In 1990, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, to allow
the Supreme Court to prescribe rules that define when a district court ruling is "final"
for the purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5115 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(e)) ("Such rules [of procedure] may
define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under
§ 1291 of this title."). In 1992, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), pursuant to
which the Supreme Court may prescribe rules in accordance with the Rules Enabling
Act that provide for appeals of interlocutory decisions not otherwise available under
§ 1292. SeePub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506. Rule 23(f) was promulgated pursuant
to the Court's § 1292(e) authority.
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harm, and promote needed development of the law to the extent
practicable, while avoiding the pitfalls of discretion.
Part I of this Article reviews the current regime, including the
final judgment rule and the existing exceptions. It then details why
the existing exceptions, although affording very limited opportunities
to appeal, are clear and not the source of significant collateral litigation. Moreover, it discusses why the current regime, on the whole,
draws sensible distinctions between those orders that are appealable
and those that are not.
Part II critiques discretionary review. It demonstrates that a discretionary regime will not live up to expectations regarding error correction and the development of the law, will impose significant
burdens on the circuit courts, and will threaten the integrity of the
courts' error correction and lawmaking functions. It also shows why
category-based discretionary review-such as Rule 23(f)-largely suffers from the same ills as general discretionary review.
Part III offers an alternative approach to reform. Fundamental
reform is neither necessary nor advisable. Rather, strategic use of
mandatory review is the best way to maximize error correction, irreparable harm avoidance, and development of the law, without intolerably burdening the circuit courts. Specifically, rulemaking should be
utilized to provide for mandatory review of interlocutory orders confronting "problem areas"-such as class certification and certain privilege issues-that have received insufficient appellate attention and in
which errors are probable and often cause significant, irreparable
harm. When these categories cannot be narrowed sufficiently to avoid
overburdening the circuit courts, district court certification, rather
than circuit court discretion, provides the most fair and effective
mechanism for weeding out orders that are not worthy of immediate
appellate attention. These and other consistent reforms offer the
greatest benefits for litigants and ultimately, the federal courts.
I.

THE ADEQUACY OF THE CuRRENT REGIME

The current regime governing the appealability of district court
orders consists of the final judgment rule and a number of judgemade, statutory, and rule-based exceptions. For the last twenty years,
this regime has come under heavy and consistent attack. For example, in 1984, Professor Rosenberg wrote that this area is an "unacceptable morass," and a "kind of crazy quilt of legislation and judicial
decisions." 12 Professor Carrington likewise lamented the "uncon12

Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the FederalFinality-AppealabilityProblem, LAW & CON-

TEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 171, 172.
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scionable intricacy" of the federal courts' finalityjurisprudence. 1 3 In
its 1990 .report to Congress, the Federal Courts Study Committee expressed similar concerns, noting that this area "has produced much
purely procedural litigation."1 4 In their recent article, Howard Eisenberg and Alan Morrison observed "widespread dissatisfaction with the
law regarding appeals from non-final orders.' u5 They went on to describe the current regime as "freakish and inconsistent in its application," and as the cause of an unacceptable amount of collateral
16
litigation on the issue of appealability.
Some of the exceptions to the final judgment rule have created
significant confusion in the past. Today, however, this regime works
better than its critics acknowledge. Obviously, no operative rule or
standard is entirely clear or without nuances in application.' 7 Yet the
existing exceptions are governed by relatively clear rules or standards
that make the outcome of appealability questions predictable and create insignificant collateral litigation. Also, although the opportunities
for appellate review of interlocutory orders are extremely limited, the
regime embodying these exceptions usually draws sensible distinctions
between those district court decisions that are appealable and those
that are not. Although there are good reasons to seek modest reforms
of interlocutory review, serious trouble within the current regime-in
theory or practice-is not one of them.

13 See Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 165, 165-66.
14 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM.,REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 95-96 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT]. Ultimately the Committee's frustration
with the existing regime led it to recommend "that Congress consider permitting the
rule-making process to refine and supplement definitions of appellate jurisdiction
under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072." Id. This report ultimately led to the
passage of § 2072(c). For a discussion of the background and history of this portion
of the FCSC Report, see Martineau, supra note 3, at 719-26.
15 Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 291.
16 Id. (stating that the current regime "leads to protracted collateral litigation on
questions of 'finality' and the courts of appeals' jurisdiction to review non-final orders"); cf.19 JAMES WM. MooR ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 202.02 (3d ed.
1999) (stating that the doctrinal confusion surrounding finality exists mainly around
the edges). Other commentators have offered similar criticisms. See supra note 4
(listing commentators).
17 The Supreme Court has recognized as much, stating that prior finality decisions cannot be explained with "unerring accuracy," and that such decisions cannot
.provide an utterly reliable guide for the future." See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
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The Current Regime

Congress's general grant of jurisdiction to the federal circuit
courts of appeals, embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, provides that "[t]he
courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States." 18 In interpreting
"final decisions," the Supreme Court has articulated the "final judgment rule." 19 Pursuant to this rule, there is no final decision until
there is a "decision by the district court that 'ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."' 20 Parties therefore may appeal only at the very end of the
litigation in the district court or, in other words, after the district
court has determined the rights of the parties and granted all corresponding relief. In this way, the rule prevents appeals from decisions
1
that are "tentative, informal or incomplete." 2
The final judgment rule promotes efficiency and fairness in a
number of ways. By precluding appeals of nonfinal determinations, it
prevents "piecemeal adjudication," which reduces delays for the par18 Section 1291 is the principal source of appellate jurisdiction in both the civil
and criminal contexts. This Article will focus on the application of § 1291 in the civil
context and the exceptions to the statute that apply in civil cases. Appeals to the
Federal Circuit are expressly exempted from § 1291, but such appeals are governed
by a parallel rule containing identical language. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
19 The final judgment rule has also been called the "final decision rule" and the
"final order rule." For a discussion of the statutory antecedents to § 1291, see Martineau, supra note 3, at 726-29. The term "final decisions" was first included in the
Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891), which established the Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals. See id. at 728-29. This term replaced language limiting appeals to those
sought from "final judgments and decrees." See id. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated
early in this century that the "words 'final decisions in the district courts' mean the
same thing as 'final judgments and decrees' as used in former acts regulating appellate jurisdiction." In reTiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 36 (1920). Nevertheless, long before the
Evarts Act, the Supreme Court had held that "final judgments and decrees" should be
given a practical interpretation and that, in certain narrowly confined circumstances,
an appeal could be taken in advance of final judgment or the absolute end of the
litigation at the district court. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203-04
(1848) (holding that an order setting aside deeds and directing the defendant to
immediately deliver property to the plaintiff was a final, appealable order, even
though a final accounting and distribution of funds relevant only to other defendants
remained).
20 Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521 (1988) (quoting Catlin v.
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
21 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) ("The effect
of the statute is to disallow appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or
incomplete. Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not one of intervention.
So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no
intrusion on appeal.").
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ties and the trial court during the litigation, avoids gaming the system,
and ensures that all issues will be consolidated in a single, final appeal.2 2 Likewise, it reduces appellate court interference in the district

courts' management of pending litigation. 23 Moreover, it saves enormous costs by preventing interlocutory appeals of alleged errors that
24
later become harmless or moot.

Yet, the final judgment rule also imposes significant hardships.
Because trial court errors that otherwise would be dispositive must remain uncorrected until after the litigation, parties victimized by such
errors will have to bear the cost of litigating matters to their conclusion before having the opportunity to appeal.25 In addition, erroneous decisions prior to the entry of final judgment may, as a practical
matter, inflict harm that is irreparable or incurable after final judgment.26 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has concluded that, in en-

acting § 1291, Congress made a policy determination that, on

22 See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (declaring that
the final judgment rule avoids the delay and excessive costs that repeated appellate
interruptions would cause); Eisen, 417 U.S. at 170 (stating that the final judgment rule
prevents "the debilitating effect onjudicial administration caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy"); Radio
Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945) (emphasizing that the final
judgment rule is supported by considerations such as avoiding economic waste and
delayed justice). It is worth noting that the Supreme Court recognized this underlying purpose-preventing expense and delay-for requiring finality prior to the enactment of § 1291, when the current statute's predecessor limited appeals to those from
"final judgments and decrees." See Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 318
(1830) (stating that appeals prior to final judgment would cause great delays and
.oppressive expenses").
23 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as
well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system."); Solimine, supra
note 4, at 1168 ("Any other rule potentially undermines the authority and independence of trial judges, who may otherwise exercise their discretion to alter a prior
decision, absent an appeal.").
An., supra note 6, § 3907 (describing how settlement and
AL
24 See 15A WRIGHT
other intervening events that moot issues save the time of the appellate courts and
parties).
25 See Kruse, supranote 5, at 711-12 (stating that the finaljudgment rule, despite
strong rationales supporting the doctrine, can result in severe hardships).
26 See Martin H. Redish, The PragmaticApproach to Appealability in the Federal Courts,
75 COLUm. L. REv. 89, 89-92 (1975) (arguing for a more practical approach to finality
because strict adherence to the final judgment rule often will preclude review because, by that time, it will be of little or no avail).
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balance, the benefits of deferring appeals until after completion of
27
the litigation at the trial level outweigh the costs.
The final judgment rule is the dominant rule of appellate jurisdiction in the federal courts. 2 8 Although there are exceptions to the
rule which provide for immediate appeal of orders that do not end
the litigation, only a small percentage of all interlocutory orders fall
within one of these exceptions. 29 Thus, the vast majority of such or30
ders are not appealable immediately under the current regime.
Most state court systems apply their own brand of the final judgment
rule.3 1 The most notable exception is New York, where, as a practical
matter, virtually any trial level decision or order, no matter how early
32
or tentative, is appealable immediately as of right.
Few have advocated abandoning the final judgment rule. 3 In-

deed, I am not aware of anyone who advocates that Congress adopt an
27 See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) ("[T] here has been a
firm congressional policy against interlocutory or 'piecemeal' appeals and courts have
consistently given effect to that policy."); see also Carson v. Am. Brands Inc., 450 U.S.
79, 84 (1981).
28 See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE § 4.1 (1983). Most
state court systems have a similar rule. Id. § 4.2.
29 See RICHARD POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 72-73 (1985) (discussing a sample of appellate court opinions that indicated that twelve percent of
appeals were not appeals after final judgment).
30 See MARTINEAU, supra note 28, § 4.3.
31 See id. §§ 4.1, 4.10.
32 See id. § 4.12 ("New York places virtually no restrictions on the right to appeal."); David Scheffel, Comment, InterlocutoryAppeals in New York-Time Has Come for
a More Efficient Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 607, 613-20 (1996) (describing New York's
interlocutory review regime and, in particular, how judicial interpretation of N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5701 (a) (2) has resulted in an appeal of right from virtually any interlocutory
order); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5701 (a) (2) (iv)-(v) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (providing
for appeals of right from orders that involve some part of the merits or affect a substantive right).
33 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 293, 301-02 (stating that most
commentators assume that appeals of right from final judgments will continue to exist
and advocating discretionary review only for interlocutory orders). The few commentators that have suggested abandoning the final judgment rule have done so as part of
larger proposals to rid the federal courts of all appeals of right. See, e.g., Carleton M.
Crick, The FinalJudgmentas a BasisforAppeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 563 (1932) (discussing
possible ways to replace the final judgment rule if it is discarded); Harlon L. Dalton,
Taking the Right To Appeal (More orLess) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 93-96, 106-07 (1985)
(concluding that appeal of right should be scrapped and restored in a number of
cases). Also, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested in a 1984 speech that "the time has
come to abolish appeal as a matter of right from the district courts" and to move
instead to an entirely discretionary system. Judith Resnik, PrecludingAppeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 605-06 (1985) (quoting then-Justice Rehnquist's Address at the
seventy-fifth anniversary of the University of Florida College of Law and Dedication of
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appealability regime like New York's. There is general agreement
that, on balance, the policies underlying the final judgment rule justify the costs it-may impose in most cases.34 The debate focuses instead on the various exceptions to the final judgment rule.
There are several types of exceptions applicable to civil litigation
in the federal courts. They may be judge-made, statutory, or rulebased, but all allow for immediate appeal of orders that do not end
the litigation before the district court and therefore are not appealable under the final judgment rule. I categorize these exceptions as
(1) interpretive doctrines, (2) certification exceptions, (3) categorybased exceptions, and (4) review by extraordinary writ.
1. Interpretative Doctrines
Although the final judgment rule generally precludes appeals
prior to the termination of the district court proceedings, the Supreme Court has held that a few types of decisions or orders are final
for purposes of § 1291 before the end of the litigation. These various
"interpretive doctrines" reflect the Court's willingness to adopt a practical interpretation of "final decisions" in a few narrowly confined circumstances where, as a practical matter, an order or decision
constitutes a final determination even though it does not terminate
35
the litigation before the district court.
Bruton-Greer Hall (Sept. 15,1984)). Professor Martineau and others who have advocated significant reforms have strongly criticized such proposals. See, e.g., Martineau,
supra note 3, at 775-76.
The drawbacks [to such a proposal], however, far outweigh the advantages.
First and foremost, the proposal would eliminate the right to appeal a final
judgment. This right has been a basic part of the American judicial process
since colonial times and has been part of the federal judicial system since it
was established in 1789 ....
To do away with this right other than for the
most compelling reasons cannot be justified.
Id.
34 See, e.g., Martineau, supranote 3, at 771 (recognizing that, although significant
reform is needed, the final judgment rule "has continued in existence because in
most cases it serves the purposes of some or most litigants and prospective litigants,
their lawyers, the trial court, the appellate court, and ultimately the public").
35 Since these doctrines constitute alternative interpretations of § 1291, they are
not technically "exceptions" to that provision or the final judgment rule. See Swint v.
Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1995) ("The collateral order doctrine is best understood not as an exception to the 'final decision' rule laid down by
Congress in § 1291, but as a 'practical construction' of it.") (quoting Digital Equip.
Corp. v. Desktop Digital, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). Nevertheless, for ease of reference, I shall refer to
them as exceptions.
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The oldest example of such a doctrine that still receives attention
originated in Forgay v. Conrad.36 In this 1848 decision, the Supreme
Court held that an order setting aside deeds and directing the immediate delivery of property is a final, appealable order.3 7 The Court
noted that while the order was not final in the "strict, technical sense
of that term," it would give "final" a "more liberal and . . .a more

reasonable construction." 38 The order in question had conclusively
resolved all issues as to these particular defendants, and the case was
only pending to allow the assignee to perform a final accounting and
distribution of funds, which would have no effect on the defendants
seeking appeal.3 9 Moreover, the Court noted that the defendants
would face irreparable injury if, while waiting to appeal until after the
court confirmed the accounting, the property was taken from their
40
possession and sold.
Today, the Forgay doctrine remains viable in theory, although it is
almost never used as a basis for appeal and is rarely addressed or even
mentioned by the circuit courts. 4 1 The courts that have recently dis36 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
37 See id. at 203-04. The appellants were defendants in a lawsuit brought by an
assignee in bankruptcy for recovery of rents from property allegedly fraudulently conveyed to the defendants by the debtor, Thomas Banks. Id. at 202. The lower court
found that the property was fraudulently conveyed and ordered that defendants deliver the property to the assignee/plaintiff. Id. at 203. The court also ordered one of
the defendants to pay $11,000 and dismissed all other matters without prejudice,
ordering defendants to pay costs. Id. at 202-03. The defendants appealed that portion of the order which required defendants Ann Fogarty and Samuel Forgay to return two lots in the city of New Orleans and "sundry slaves" to the assignee for the
benefit of the debtor's creditors. Id. at 203. The Court concluded that the order
directing Fogarty and Forgay to return the property to the assignee was final and
appealable. Id. at 204.
38 Id. at 203.
39 See id. at 204.
40 See id.
41 See Martineau, supra note 3, at 738-39. (recognizing that the Forgay rule is not
a major exception to the final judgment rule). Indeed, research has revealed only
nineteen federal decisions between October 1995 and October 2000 that have cited
Forgay. Of these, thirteen did not apply or discuss it. Three circuit courts addressed
the possible application of Forgay and concluded that the exception did not apply. See
Petties v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2000); RMT, Inc. v. BHAT
Indus., Inc., No. 98-1573, 1999 LEXIS 5649, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 1, 1999); Clev. Hair
Clinic v. Puig, 104 F.3d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1997). In only three cases discussing Forgay
have circuit panels concluded that the exercise of appellate jurisdiction was proper.
See Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Centra, Inc., 151 F.3d 780, 785 (8th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Davenport, 106 F.3d 1333, 1334 (7th Cir. 1997); OB/GYN Solutions v. Six, 80 F.3d
452, 455 (11th Cir. 1996). However, only one of these panels relied solely on Forgayas
the basis for appellate jurisdiction. See Davenport, 106 F.3d at 1334-35 (agreeing with
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cussed the doctrine tend to oversimplify it,42 but this is of little practical consequence. In the last five years-since September 1995-only
one circuit court has actually relied on Forgayas the sole basis for exercising appellate jurisdiction. 4 3 Resort t6 this doctrine is no longer
both parties that it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal under Forgay that the defendant's home be turned over and sold). In the other two cases, there were alternative
avenues available for interlocutory review, but the courts utilized Forgay for the proposition that finality was to be given a more flexible or reasonable interpretation. See
Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d at 785; OB/GYN Solutions, 80 F.3d at 455.
42 A few recent circuit opinions have suggested that the doctrine provides for an
immediate appeal of an order requiring delivery of property or sale of property prior
'to final judgment, if that order would subject a party to "irreparable harm." See, e.g.,
Davenport 106 F.3d at 1335 ("The doctrine has been judicially shaped to allow the
immediate review of orders directing delivery of property where such an order would
subject the losing party to irreparable harm."); see also RMT, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
5649, at *2 (rejecting the application of Forgay because appellant failed to allege any
threat of irreparable harm in connection with payment of attorneys' fees as sanctions); Lawyers Conference Comm., supra note 4, at 33, 36 (suggesting that an immediate appeal is available upon the prejudgment transfer of property to prevent
irreparable harm). The courts' focus on irreparable harm oversimplifies the doctrine. A close reading of Forgayreveals that the threat of irreparable harm was not the
sole determining factor leading the Court to conclude that the underlying order was
immediately appealable. The Supreme Court also emphasized the fact that, aside
from a final accounting by the bankruptcy trustee, nothing remained for the lower
court to do. See Forgay,47 U.S. at 204. While the Court discussed irreparable harm, it
did so primarily in its admonishment to the lower courts to refrain from ordering the
delivery of property before all issues before it have been resolved. See id. at 205.
Indeed, one year after Forgay, the Court rejected the contention that finality can
be found in any order that threatens irreparable injury. See Barnard v. Gibson, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 650, 657-58 (1849). Moreover, in a much more recent case involving a
pre-judgment transfer of property and a pending accounting, the Court, relying on
Forgay, emphasized the distinctiveness of the property transfer and the unresolved
accounting, rather than the threat of irreparable harm in addressing finality for purposes of reviewing a state-court decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 126 (1945) (concluding that the rationale
of the Forgay line of cases is that "ajudgment directing immediate delivery of physical
property is reviewable and is to be deemed dissociated from a provision for an accounting" and that "such a controversy is a multiple litigation allowing review of the
adjudication which is concluded because it is independent of, and unaffected by, another litigation with which it happens to be entangled"). Thus, while the Forgay
Court discussed the harm resulting from orders requiring turnover of property in
circumstances in which the court could wait until all issues have been decided, the
threat of irreparable harm should not be viewed as an independently decisive basis for
its determination that the order at issue was final in nature. SeeForgay, 47 U.S. at 204;
cf. 15A Wmci-rr Er AL., supranote 6, § 3910, at 310 (discussing the Court's reasoning
in Radio Station WOWbut warning that it would "be a mistake to extrapolate for appeals within the federal system a test that ignores the element of hardship").
43 See Davenport, 106 F.3d at 1334 (stating that neither party disputed jurisdiction
under Forgay); see also supra note 41.
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necessary in most circumstances in which it might otherwise apply because there is now easier access to appellate review in the bankruptcy
and receivership context, 4 4 and outside of that context, orders trans45
ferring property prior to the entry of judgment are rare.
The Supreme Court established another interpretive doctrine in
Moses H. Cone MemorialHospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,46 holding
that an order staying a federal diversity suit pending the completion
of a declaratory judgment action proceeding in state court is a final
decision within the meaning of § 1291.47 The district court had issued
the stay because the federal and state actions involved an identical
issue of arbitrability.48 The Supreme Court found that the stay had
ensured that there would be no further litigation in federal court because the state court's judgment would have a preclusive effect on any
such litigation. 49 Thus, the stay constituted a final, appealable order
because Mercury Construction was "effectively out of [federal] court,"
and the stay order "amount[ed] to a dismissal of the suit."5 0
44 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 1292(a) (2) (1994); see also infra notes 70-76, 85 and
accompanying text (discussing these exceptions). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b) may also provide a vehicle for review in certain contexts in which a party might
otherwise have relied on Forgay to seek an immediate appeal. See infra notes 77-81
and accompanying text.
45 Indeed, the Forgay Court criticized the trial court for issuing such a decree and
counseled trial courts to wait until the end of the entire proceeding before ordering
the transfer of property. See Forgay, 47 U.S. at 205-06.
46 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
47 See id. at 9. Moses H. Cone had entered into a contract with Mercury Construction Corporation. Id. at 4. After a dispute over claims under the contract arose,
Cone filed a complaint in state court seeking a declaratory judgment that there was
no right to arbitration. Id. at 4-5. Mercury responded by filing a complaint in federal
court, premised on diversityjurisdiction, seeking an order compelling arbitration. Id.
at 7. The district court stayed the federal court action, concluding that the state and
federal actions involved the same issue of arbitrability of claims. Id.
48 See id. at 10.
49 See id.
50 Id. After concluding that the stay order is final within the meaning of § 1291,
the Court held, in the alternative, that the stay order fit into the Cohen exception (or
collateral order doctrine) to the final judgment rule. Id. at 11 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). The Court concluded that the order
satisfies all three elements of the doctrine. Id. at 12-13. The court reasoned that the
stay "amounts to a refusal to adjudicate on the merits" and therefore is separate from
the merits, and, because of the preclusive effect of the state court judgment, would be
'entirely unreviewable if not appealed now." Id. at 12. After questioning why the
district court chose to stay the case rather than dismiss it, the Court also concluded
that the "practical effect of his order was entirely the same [as a dismissal]" and, thus,
is sufficiently final to satisfy the other prong of the doctrine. See id. at 13. Because the
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The Moses H. Cone Court carefully circumscribed the rule to apply
only to stay orders that put a party effectively and permanently out of
federal court 5a-where "the object of the stay is to require all or an
52
essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state forum."
Given the narrowness of the doctrine, circuit courts rarely have applied or even discussed it.53 Recently, however, the Supreme Court
recognized a limited extension of the doctrine, relying on Moses H.
Cone for the proposition that an abstention-based remand orderwhich the Court found to be the functional equivalent of an absten4
tion-based stay order-is a final decision under § 1291.5
Court's collateral order doctrine analysis is merely an alternative basis for appeal,
Moses H. Cone contains its own, independent exception to the final judgment rule.
51 See id. at 10 n.11.
52 Id. In addition, the Court distinguished this case from those invoking the
"death knell" doctrine, an interpretive doctrine the Court rejected in Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469-70 (1978). See id. The Court distinguished the
likely, practical effect of ending the suit that is the basis of the death knell doctrine
from the "legal effect" that the stay order in this case had on the plaintiffs right to
proceed. See id. The Court concluded by noting that it holds "only that a stay order is
final when the sole purpose and effect of the stay are precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court." Id.
In a later case, the Court refused to extend the reasoning in Moses H. Cone to
circumstances in which a district court denies a motion to stay or dismiss a federal
action on abstention grounds while a similar suit is pending in state court. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277-78 (1988). Focusing
on the requirements of the collateral order doctrine (the alternative basis for appeal
in Moses H. Cone), the Court concluded in Gulfstream Aerospace that such a denial is
"inherently tentative" and therefore cannot be appealed immediately because it does
not conclusively resolve the disputed question. Id.
53 While Moses H. Cone has been cited over 3000 times, online research conducted through October 2000 reveals fewer than seventy published and unpublished
decisions that have addressed its rule regarding appealability. See Martineau, supra
note 3, at 743 (stating that this doctrine is a narrow exception of limited
applicability).
54 See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-15 (1996). The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that an abstention-based remand
order is appealable under § 1291. See id. at 715. The Court first reiterated that a
decision is generally appealable under § 1291 only "if it 'ends the litigation ofn the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute thejudgment.'" Id. at 712
(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). However, the Court then
stated that "the application of these principles to the appealability of the remand
order before [it] is controlled by [the Court's] decision in [Moses H. Cone]." Id. After
a review of both bases for appealability in Moses H. Cone, the Court concluded that the
district court's remand order based on Burford abstention is "in all relevant respects
indistinguishable from the stay order.., appealable in Moses H. Cone." Id. at 713-14.
The Court also distinguished the remand order at issue from other, unappealable
remand orders-such as those that remand based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction-governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994). See id. at 711-12.
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In other contexts, the Court has held that a few types of orders
are "final decisions" under § 1291 prior to finaljudgment. For example, certain contempt orders-which may arise out of ongoing civil
litigation-are "final decisions" because contempt proceedings are
sufficiently independent from the underlying action and result in
sanctions that require immediate review. 55 Likewise, the "Perlman
doctrine" allows a third-party intervenor claiming privilege to appeal
immediately from an order enforcing a subpoena for the information

55 Federal courts distinguish between civil contempt orders issued against parties
and all other contempt orders; the latter are appealable immediately, the former are
not. See, e.g., Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-35 (1988) (distinguishing civil from
criminal contempt orders); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1966)
(distinguishing civil from criminal contempt orders); 15B WRirHT ET AL., supra note
6, § 3917 (explaining the rules governing the appeal of contempt orders). The categorization of civil or criminal contempt hinges upon the "character and purpose" of
the sanction imposed. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441
(1911). A contempt order is civil in nature when the sanction is remedial or intended
to coerce the contemnor to do what she has refused to do. See id. at 442. In contrast,
if the sanctions imposed are punitive-designed to punish a past wrong-rather than
coercive, the order is criminal in nature. See id. at 442-43.
All contempt orders are immediately appealable final decisions except civil contempt orders issued to parties in the pending proceeding. See Appeal of Licht &
Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 568 (1st Cir. 1986) ("A nonparty witness may refuse to comply with a discovery order, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order,
which is considered a 'final judgment' under Section 1291. A party, however, may
appeal only an order of criminal contempt before final judgment, not one of civil
contempt.") (citations omitted). Criminal contempt orders are appealable immediately because they are the result of criminal proceedings separate from the original,
underlying civil proceeding and impose a punishment for a past wrong that cannot be
corrected later. See Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enter., Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 398
(5th Cir. 1987). Nonparties may appeal from civil contempt orders because such orders conclusively resolve the issue with regard to the nonparty, the contempt proceeding against the nonparty is sufficiently separate from the merits of the underlying
dispute betWeen the parties, and the nonparty will not have access to appeal after final
resolution of the main proceeding. See U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1988); Lawyers Conference Comm., supranote
4, at 37 ("Contempt orders against nonparties, whether civil or criminal, are regarded
as final and immediately appealable."). Courts do not permit parties to a pending
action to appeal immediately a civil contempt order for two reasons. First, parties
have the opportunity to appeal a civil contempt citation after the final decision. See
IBM Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1974). In addition, a civil
contempt penalty against a party is closely related to the underlying action. See id.
The courts' characterization and disparate treatment of different kinds of contempt
orders has been the subject of some criticism. See, e.g., Joan Meier, The "Right" to a
Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 93-99 (1992).
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against another party, because the intervenor has no other means to
56
prevent such discovery.
The Supreme Court also has recognized that an order ending the
litigation on the merits is appealable immediately, even though a collateral issue-such as the award of attorneys' fees or the taxing of
costs-remains unresolved, as long as the resolution of that issue
would not moot or otherwise revise the decisions embodied in the
order.57 The Court most recently traced the history of this doctrine
in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 58 in which it held that the district

court's decision on the merits was a "final decision" under § 1291,
even though the plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees had not yet been
decided. 59 At first blush, this doctrine does not seem to contradict the
56 See generally Pelman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). In Perlman, the Court
reasoned that the third party's ability to protect his rights would be thwarted if he
could not appeal immediately. Id. at 13. The cases since Perlman have identified two
reasons for allowing such interlocutory appeals. First, courts have stated that interlocutory appeals are appropriate in these circumstances because a later appeal is impossible; a court order that forces someone to testify or produce evidence is "effectively
final" with respect to another nonparty (the intervenor claiming privilege) who is
otherwise powerless to prevent compliance with the order. See, e.g., Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1940) (stating that efficiency concerns must not
outweigh the ability to appeal a final order); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d
695, 696-97 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that the Perlman doctrine exists to protect the
rights of appeal of otherwise powerless parties). For example, the intervenor cannot
force the other party to resist discovery through risking contempt. See id. at 697. Second, courts have made clear that permitting immediate appeal under the Perlman
doctrine is appropriate because the intervenor's motion is a "collateral matter" and is
"distinct from the general subject of the litigation." See Cogen v. United States, 278
U.S. 221, 222-23 (1929); see also United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 309 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
57 See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199-203 (1988).
58 See id.
59 See id. at 199-200 ("A question remaining to be decided after an order ending
litigation on the merits does not prevent finality if its resolution will not alter the
order or moot or revise decisions embodied in the order. We have all but held that
an attorney's fees determination fits this description.") (citations omitted). The
Court held that attorneys' fees are not part of the merits of the action to which they
pertain because an award of fees does not remedy the injury giving rise to the action.
See id. at 200. The Court recognized, however, that there may be circumstances in
which the underlying substantive law makes plain that fees are to be part of the merits
judgment. See id. at 201. Nevertheless, the Court adopted a bright-line rule-to create operational consistency and aid in the smooth functioning of the judicial systemthat particular fee awards are not to be viewed as part of the merits. See id. at 202-03.
This latter holding in Budinich (the Court's categorization of all attorneys' fees awards
as collateral from the merits) has been the subject of some critical commentary. See,
e.g., Martineau, supra note 3, at 744-45 (criticizing the Court's "arbitrary abandonment" of its previous efforts to classify attorneys' fee requests and awards).
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final judgment rule, since courts often enterjudgment following a verdict and before performing certain other tasks, such as taxing costs.
Nevertheless, the recognition of finality in this circumstance is properly characterized as an exception to the final judgment rule in its
strictest form, because it allows an appeal while the district court retains unfinished business beyond the mere execution of the judgment. Although this "full resolution of the merits doctrine" remains a
viable exception, its direct effect in the attorneys' fees context has
been somewhat limited by recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil
60
and Appellate Procedure.
The interpretive doctrine that has produced the most litigation is
the "collateral order doctrine" or "Cohen rule." The Supreme Court
first recognized this doctrine in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp.61 In that case, the Court found that a district court's denial of a
defendant's motion to require a plaintiff to give security for reasonable expenses was appealable immediately as a "final" order under
§ 1291, even though it did not end the litigation before the trial
court. 62 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have parsed the Cohen

rule, articulating three criteria to satisfy the doctrine. An order that
does not end the litigation below is nevertheless appealable as a collateral order if it: (1) conclusively determines the issue and is not subject
to revision; (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from
60 See FED. R. App. P. 4(a) (4) (iii); FED. R. CIv. P. 54(d); FED. R. Civ. P. 58 (1993
amendments). Rule 54(d) (2) now provides that, unless the substantive law clearly
provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees and related nontaxable expenses as damages in the action, parties must seek such fees and expenses via motion filed and
served no later than fourteen days after the entry of judgment. Under Rule 58, the
district court shall enter judgment upon a verdict, or upon another decision of the
court that denies all relief or awards a sum certain or other specified relief to parties
seeking it. The entry of judgment "shall not be delayed, nor the time for appeal
extended, in order to tax costs or award fees," but the court is permitted to order that
a timely motion for the award of attorneys' fees under Rule 54(d) (2) has the same
effect under Rule 4(a) (4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as a timely
motion under Rule 59 (for a new trial or to amend the judgment). Such an order
tolls the time for appeal of the judgment until after the motion for attorneys' fees or
related costs is decided. See 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 202.02.
61 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
62 See id. at 545-47. The Court reasoned as follows:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case
is adjudicated. The Court has long given this provision of the statute this
practical rather than a technical construction.
Id. at 546.
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the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable after appeal from the final judgment. 63 If these three requirements are satisfied, the order is "final" for purposes of § 1291, and the circuit courts
may not deny review of the matter. 64 Although the Supreme Court
has addressed the collateral order doctrine many times in the last
twenty-five years, it has found that it applies to only a few types of
orders in civil matters. 65 It has rejected its application in a far greater
66
variety of circumstances.
63 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). The doctrine does
not allow appeal of even conclusively resolved decisions that are related to an ongoing
controversy over the merits, or in other words, are but mere "steps towards final judgment in which [such decisions] will merge." See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
64 See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court
concluded (in the criminal context) that a pre-trial order denying a motion to dismiss
an indictment on double jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable because it satisfies the first two prongs of the doctrine-it is a final decision addressing an important
issue separate from the merits of the action-and satisfies the third prong because the
very protection the clause affords would be irretrievably lost if the case were allowed
to proceed to trial. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1977). In contrast, the Court held that an order denying a motion for class certification is not
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it fails all three
prongs: a certification decision is always'subject to revision and therefore is not final;
it is inherently tied to the merits because it is "'enmeshed in the factual and legal
issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action,'" and such an order is subject to
effective review following final judgment. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469
(quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)).
65 See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
144 (1993) (applying doctrine to order denying motion to dismiss state agency based
on Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)
(applying doctrine to order denying qualified immunity defense advanced by a state
official in a civil rights action); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742-43 (1982) (applying doctrine to order denying defense of absolute immunity in civil rights action);
Helstoki v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1979) (applying doctrine to order denying
the guarantees of the speech or debate clause); Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village
of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (applying doctrine to order denying stay of injunction prohibiting Nazi party from marching in Skokie). The Court also found that the
collateral order doctrine was satisfied in Moses H. Cone, although as an alternative
basis for appeal. See supra note 50. In Quackenbush, the Court likewise analyzed appealability under the collateral order doctrine, although essentially held that it would
allow an appeal of an abstention based remand order because of the holding in Moses
H. Cone. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999) (rejecting
application of doctrine to order granting sanctions against party's attorney); Johnson
v.Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995) (rejecting application of doctrine to order denying summary judgment based on genuine dispute of material facts over whether police officers are entitled to qualified immunity); Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n,
514 U.S. 35, 43 (1995) (rejecting application of doctrine to order denying summary
judgment on issue of municipal liability); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,
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Finally, in the 1960s and 1970s, several circuit courts recognized
another, potentially expansive interpretive doctrine known as the
"death knell doctrine." 67 They determined that immediate review is
appropriate when an interlocutory order would have the practical effect of terminating the litigation. 68 In 1978, however, the Supreme
Court rejected this doctrine, declaring that "the fact that an interlocutory order may induce a party to abandon his claim before final judgment is not a sufficient reason for considering it a 'final decision'
within the meaning of § 1291."69 Thus, the death knell doctrine is
undeniably dead.
511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (rejecting application of doctrine to order vacating voluntary dismissal and rescinding settlement agreement); Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S.
495, 498 (1989) (rejecting application of doctrine to order refusing to enforce forum
selection clause); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529-30 (1988) (rejecting
application of doctrine to order denying motion to dismiss pursuant to forum non
conveniens principles); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S.
271, 287-88 (1988) (rejecting application of doctrine to order denying abstentionbased stay in federal proceedings); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,
480 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1987) (rejecting application of doctrine to order denying
mandatory intervention but granting permissive intervention); Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985) -(rejecting application of doctrine to order
disqualifying a party's counsel); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368,
370 (1981) (rejecting application of doctrine to order refusing to disqualify opposing
party's counsel in a civil case); Coopers &Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 464-65 (rejecting application of doctrine to order denying class certification).
67 See, e.g., Hooley v. Red Carpet Corp. of Am., 549 F.2d 643, 644-46 (9th Cir.
1977); Ottv. Speedwriting Publ'g Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th Cir. 1975); Hartmann
v. Scott, 488 F. 2d 1215, 1223 (8th Cir. 1973); Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 370 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966).
68 See Eisen, 370 F.2d at 121. The court stated that "[w ]here the effect of a district
court's order, if not reviewed, is the death knell of the action, review should be allowed." Id. For example, the Second Circuit held that a denial of class action certification is appealable because, in the absence of class treatment, no lawyer would
undertake such a costly case, and thus, the denial spelled the death kneil for the
action. See id. For a detailed discussion of the history of the death knell doctrine, see
15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3912.
69 Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 477. The Court indicated that the death knell
doctrine defies congressional intent by vesting in appellate courts the discretion to
permit interlocutory appeals under § 1291. See id. at 474. It further stated that such
an approach to finality is inappropriate because it "reduced the finality requirement
of § 1291 to a case-by-case determination of whether a particular ruling should be
subject to appeal." Richardson-Merrel4 472 U.S. at 439 (describing the thrust of the
Court's ruling in Coopers & Lybrand). For further discussion of the circuits' use of the
death knell doctrine in the context of class certification decisions, see Michael E.
Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding To Decide: Class Action Certification and
Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals UnderRule 23Wl, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1531, 1552-54 (2000).
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Certification Exceptions

2.

The second type of exception to the final judgment rule provides
for immediate review of otherwise unappealable decisions when the
district court certifies an appeal. Currently, the two such "certification
exceptions" are embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b) of
70
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 1292 (b) provides that a district courtjudge may certify an
appeal from orders in civil actions not otherwise appealable under
§ 1292, provided that the order "involves a controlling question of law
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and
the judge finds that an immediate appeal may "materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation." 7 1 District courts exercise
broad (but not unlimited) discretion in determining whether certification under § 1292 (b) is appropriate. 72 However, even if the district
court grants certification, the appellate court must decide whether to
accept review. 73 The statute sets no standards to guide the appellate
court's exercise of this discretion, although some circuits have held
that review should be granted only in big or exceptional cases. 74
Predictably, parties face a significant hurdle in convincing a district court judge that a decision should be reviewed immediately, and
thus, judges rarely grant certification under this provision. 75 Actual
70 Rule 54(b) does not use the term "certification," but I include it in this category because, like § 1292(b), Rule 54(b) requires a party to receive permission from
the district court before seeking appellate review of an order.

71

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).

72 There is some dispute in the circuits over the scope of the first and third elements of this exception. See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1172-73. For example, the
circuits disagree whether an order can "involve a 'controlling question of law'" if its
disposition would not lead to reversal of a final judgment on appeal. Id. at 1172 &
nn.45-46 (discussing cases). The more significant dispute between the circuits, discussed below, involves whether certification under this provision should be reserved
only for big or exceptional cases. See id. at 1172-74, 1193-96.
73 The courts of appeals have absolute discretion to decide whether to accept an
appeal under § 1292(b). See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 475. Their refusal thus
may be for any reason, including docket congestion concerns. See id.
74 See, e.g., Milbert v. Bison Lab., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 1958) (stating
that Congress intended § 1292(b) to be used rarely, and thus, review should be
granted only in exceptional cases); see also Solimine, supra note 4, at 1172-74
(describing the narrow construction some circuit courts have given this exception).
Professor Solimine criticizes those circuits that have placed this judicial gloss on the
statute, without basis in his view, and advocates greater utilization of this exception.
Id. at 1193-96.
75 See Kruse, supra note 5, at 717-18 (stating that trial court "veto power" has
severely limited the potential effectiveness of this section as a "safety valve from the
rigors of the final judgment rule"); see also Redish, supra note 26, at 108-09 (same);
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appeals are even rarer, because the appellate courts refuse to accept
76
review of a significant percentage of certified orders.
Rule 54(b) provides the other basis for a district court to permit
an immediate appeal of an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order. Rule 54(b) was adopted to address the potential for unnecessary
delay for parties who have received a final adjudication on some or all
of their claim(s) in multiple claim and multiple party actions, while
other, unresolved claims proceed to finaljudgment. 77 The rule therefore provides that, when more than one claim or more than one party
is involved in an action, the district court may direct the entry of final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties,
upon the "'express determination that there is no just reason for delay' and 'an express direction for the entry of judgment."' 78
Unlike § 1292(b), the appellate court does not have the discretion to deny review of a Rule 54(b) appeal. It will review for abuse of
discretion the district court's order to determine whether there was
Solimine, supranote 4, at 1173-74 (discussing data and stating that district judges use
this exception sparingly).
76 See Solimine, supranote 4, at 1173-74 ("Perhaps the most telling characteristic
of section 1292(b) appeals, however, is how few certified appeals are accepted by the
circuit courts."); see also Martineau, supra note 3, at 733 (stating that, because this
section requires permission by both the district and circuit courts, it is the most limited of the exceptions to the final judgment rule). Professor Solimine summarized
some of the data that has been collected on the use of § 1292(b) by district and circuit courts as follows:
During the 1960s, it was reported that approximately 53% of over 1000 applications were accepted. These figures average out to be roughly fifty acceptances per year. More recent data presents an even more chary attitude
by appellate courts ....
[W]hile the number of applications filed in the
appellate courts has increased three-fold since the 1960s, the number of acceptances (i.e., the number transferred to the regular appellate docket) has
less than doubled. In the 1980s, the acceptance rate has been about 35%.
The number of acceptances represents about 0.3% of the appeals terminated on the merits.
Solimine, supra note 4, at 1174 (footnotes and citations omitted).
77 See MARTINEAU, supra note 28, § 4.5 (stating that the rule was promulgated to
avoid confusion and potential hardship to the litigant whose claims have been resolved early in a complex case).
78 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956). In Sears, the Supreme Court confirmed that this rule does not violate § 1291 because it "merely administers that requirement in a practical manner in multiple claims actions and does
so by rule instead ofjudicial decision." Id. at 438. The Court further noted that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for more liberal joinder of parties and
claims than had previously existed, and Rule 54(b) merely addresses that situation
rather than altering the historical requirement of finality in the traditional, single
claim context. See id. at 432-33.
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no just reason to delay the appeal and review de novo whether multiple claims are presented. 7 9 The Supreme Court has made clear that
as long as dismissed counts are capable of being decided independently from the remaining counts in the case, they are appealable,
even if they are based on facts underlying the remaining counts.8 0 As
with § 1292 (b), permission to appeal immediately under Rule 54(b) is
8
rarely granted by district courts. '
3.

Category-Based Exceptions

The third type of exception to the final judgment rule includes
statutes or rules of procedure that provide for immediate review of
particular categories of orders. Some categories address certain substantive areas of the law, while others are transubstantive, premised
instead on the type of remedy or relief embodied in the order.
Section 1292(a) contains the most prominent examples of category-based exceptions. Subsection 1292(a) (1) authorizes interlocutory appeals from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
82
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.
Subsection (a) (2) provides for immediate appeal of orders "appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to
take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof. '8 3 Finally, orders or
decrees in admiralty proceedings that determine "the rights and liabilities of the parties" are appealable immediately under subsection
(a) (3).84
Other statutes provide for review of categories of interlocutory
orders. For example, certain bankruptcy orders are immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 85 In addition, orders denying
79 See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel 424 U.S. 737 (1976), for a general
discussion of the distinction between § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b).
80 See Sears, 351 U.S. at 427.
81 Indeed, the Supreme Court suggested that Rule 54(b) certifications should be
infrequent, noting that "sound judicial administration does not require that Rule
54(b) requests be granted routinely." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S.
1, 10 (1980).
82 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1994). This is intended to carve out a very narrow
exception to the final judgment rule. See Carson v. Am, Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84
(1981). The statute was implemented because of a need "to permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence."
Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955).
83 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2).
84 Id. § 1292(a)(3).
85 Appellate jurisdiction over appeals from bankruptcy courts is conferred upon
the district court or a bankruptcy appellate panel by 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). The
statute provides that the "courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
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(but not granting) motions to compel arbitration are appealable
86
under § 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Finally, Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the
newest category-based exception to the final judgment rule. It provides for discretionary review of a discrete category of interlocutory
orders: orders granting or denying class certification motions. As discussed previously, the circuit courts' sole and unfettered discretion to
accept or deny review makes Rule 23(f) unique among the existing
87
exceptions.
final decisions,judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b)
of this section." Id. Although the language of § 158(d) is similar to that contained in
§ 1291, courts have allowed interlocutory appeals under this section liberally, recognizing that "certain proceedings in a bankruptcy case are so distinct and conclusive
either to the rights of individual parties or the ultimate outcome of the case that final
decisions as to them should be appealable as of right." In re Mason, 709 F.2d 1313,
1317 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, courts are more lenient in determining what constitutes a
final order in the bankruptcy context. See, e.g., In re Spillane, 884 F.2d 642, 645 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding that an award of attorneys' fees is appealable immediately); In re
Moody, 817 F.2d 365, 366 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a turnover order is appealable
immediately); In re Kaiser, 791 F.2d 73, 74 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that an order
declaring property part of bankruptcy estate is appealable immediately). Factors that
courts look to in deciding the finality of a bankruptcy order include: (1) the extent to
which the order leaves the bankruptcy court nothing to do but execute the order; (2)
delay in obtaining review would prevent the aggrieved party from obtaining effective
relief; and (3) a later reversal on that issue would require recommencement of the
entire proceeding. See, e.g., In re Apex Oil Co., 884 F.2d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1989).
86 See 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1994). Section 16 provides, among other things, that an
appeal may be taken from an order refusing to stay an action during the pendency of
arbitration, denying a petition to order arbitration, denying an application to compel
arbitration, and granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against arbitration.
See id. § 16(a)(1)-(2).
87 Indeed, the Advisory Committee's note accompanying Rule 23(f) states, in
part, that the "court of appeals is given unfettered discretion whether to permit the
appeal, akin to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting on a petitionfor certiorari." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note (emphasis added). The advisory
note goes on to state that "permission to appeal may be granted or denied on the
basis of any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive." Id. The note
justifies this expansion of the opportunities to appeal as follows:
An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff With a situation in
which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judg.ment on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller
than the costs of litigation. An order granting certification, on the other
hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability. These concerns can be met at low cost by establishing in the court of appeals a
discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases that show appealworthy certification issues.
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4. Review by Extraordinary Writ
The fourth exception to the final judgment rule is review by extraordinary writ. The federal appellate courts derive their authority to
issue extraordinary writs from the All Writs Act.8 8 Today, the same

standards govern the two primary writs-mandamus and prohibition 8 9-and the circuit courts rarely use the term prohibition alone.
As a technical matter, these writs provide a means of review that is not
an "appeal," but rather an original proceeding a petitioner brings in
the appellate court seeking a directive to the trial judge to enter or
vacate a particular order.90
The Supreme Court has made clear that such authority shall be
used only in "extraordinary circumstances."9 1 The two requirements
for issuance of a writ of mandamus are: (1) a showing that the petitioner has no other adequate means to obtain the relief sought; and
(2) a showing that petitioner's right tO the writ is "'clear and indisputable." 92 The circuit court articulations of what constitutes a "clear
and indisputable" right to the writ vary to some degree, but virtually
all suggest that some blatant or unconscionable misstep by the district
court is needed. 93 For example, some circuits have echoed the Supreme Court's admonition that the district court's order must have so
far exceeded the proper bounds of judicial discretion as to be "legitiId. Finally, although the Rule provides for unfettered discretion, the note suggests
that permission to appeal be granted when the class certification decision "turns on a
novel or unsettled question of law," or when the decision is "likely dispositive of the
litigation." Id.
88 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994). The All Writs Act provides that federal courts "may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id. The term "in aid of' allows exercise ofjurisdiction not only when (appellate) jurisdiction has already been obtained,
but also when an "unauthorized action by the lower court might defeat or impair the
court's jurisdiction." See MARTINEAU, supra note 28, § 19.2, at 285.
89 SeeJAcK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.3, at 594 n.29 (1985).
90 See 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 204.01.
91 Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). "[I]t is clear that only exceptional
circumstances amounting to ajudicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation
of this extraordinary remedy." Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United
States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)); see also United States v. Amlani, 169 F.3d 1189, 1193
(9th Cir. 1999) (stating need for exceptional circumstances to justify issuance of a
peremptory writ of mandamus).
92 Kerrv. U.S. Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (quoting United States v. Duell,
172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899)).
93 Se , e.g., Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Assoc., Inc., 228 F.3d 782, 783 (7th Cir.
2000); In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 250-52 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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Other courts have held

that some shocking abuse of discretion, exercise of power in excess of
jurisdiction, or other outrageous behavior by the trial court is needed
to grant the writ. 95 Only the Ninth Circuit consistently articulates a
standard that suggests something less than exceptional circumstances
may be sufficient to justify issuing the writ.9 6 In practice, however, the
97
Ninth Circuit rarely finds that the writ is justified.
Because of the variety of circumstances in which extraordinary
relief may be needed, and because issuance of the writ depends substantially on the particulars of each case, the governing standards defy
94 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995); see also In
re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 656 (1st Cir. 1993); In re Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 917
F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir. 1990).
95 See, e.g., In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The writ
of mandamus is a drastic remedy that a court should grant only in extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to ajudicial usurpation of power.") (citing Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996))); In re Sealed
Case No. 98-5062, 141 F.3d 337, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (granting the writ where district
court acted beyond its authority to transfer case); Williams-El v. Hawk, No. 94-5341,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14217, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (issuing the writ where
district court was without authority to transfer claims to Superior Court); Boughton v.
Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 751 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that exercise of the writ is
appropriate "only in exceptional circumstances to correct 'a clear abuse of discretion,
an abdication of judicial function, or the usurpation of judicial power'") (quoting
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Ctr. Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358, 361 (10th Cir.
1964))).
96 In Bauman v. United States District Court, the Ninth Circuit set forth five factors
to consider in determining whether mandamus jurisdiction is proper: (1) the party
seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the
relief he or she desires; (2) the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not
correctable on appeal; (3) the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law; (4) the district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent
disregard of the federal rules; and (5) the district court's order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression. 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir.
1977). One commentator has argued that the factors set forth in Bauman do not
reflect the Supreme Court's holding in Wills that mandamus should not be employed
as a substitute for appeal. See Kruse, supra note 5, at 723. He notes that the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits have applied the Bauman test and issued writs of mandamus to overturn class certification orders. Id. at 724-27 (discussing In re Bendectin Prods. Liab.
Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); and In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269 (11th Cir.
1988)). Nevertheless, the other circuits generally articulate far more stringent
standards.
97 A review of published and unpublished cases available on Lexis and Westlaw
indicates that, in a recent years, the Ninth Circuit has issued the writ on average about
twice a year. See infra notes 164-69 (listing all cases from September 17, 1995 to
October 1, 2000 in which the circuit courts have issued the writ).
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precision.9 8 Nevertheless, circuit courts do not retain unfettered discretion to decide whether to issue the writ. The Supreme Court can
review an issuance or refusal to issue for abuse of discretion and has

overturned circuit court decisions in both circumstances. 99
B.

ClearRules, Little CollateralLitigation

Perhaps cognizant of the constant criticism, the Supreme Court

recognized over a decade ago the need for predictability and limiting
principles in its finalityjurisprudence. 10 0 Today, contrary to common
belief, the existing exceptions are relatively clear and easy for federal
courts and litigants to understand and apply. They therefore produce
little controversy or collateral litigation in the circuit courts.
A number of the exceptions are so unambiguously narrow, or so
rarely utilized, that they cause few application problems. Among
these are the Forgay,'0 ' Moses H. Cone,10 2 and Perlman 0 3 doctrines.
Section 1292(b) also produces few appeals and minimal litigation at
98 See Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1570-72 (stating that mandamus is
governed by standards, and standards require intense factual inquiries and cannot be
stated with precision).
99 See, e.g., Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 808-10 (1989) (reversing a
refusal and issuing the writ); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (reversing
an issuance of the writ).
100 See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988) (stating that
the application of§ 1291 should be consistent and uniform); see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I
do think.., that our finalityjurisprudence is sorely in need of further limiting principles."). In Budinich, the Court elaborated: "The time of appealability, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear ....
Courts and litigants are best
served by the bright-line rule .... " Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202.
101 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (explaining that the Forgay doctrine is exceedingly narrow because orders transferring property prior to final judgment usually are othenvise appealable). Although it has little practical significance,
Forgay still receives more than its share of critical commentary, perhaps because it is
viewed as the case that planted the seeds for more troublesome interpretive doctrines,
like the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court and circuit courts have misapplied and misused the Supreme Court's language in Forgay, including the Court's
occasional suggestion that it would apply a "practical interpretation" of final decision
to address "irreparable harm." See, e.g., Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
152-53 (1964) (relying on Forgay as it adopted a balancing of hardships approach in
determining whether an order that did not end the litigation on the merits was final).
As I discuss in the next subpart, Forgay,properly construed, is even more narrow and
should apply only when there is a prejudgment transfer of property that effectively
ends the litigation on the merits (at least as to the victimized party in question). See
discussion supra note 42; see also Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848)
(finding finality in the context of an order that transferred property and resolved all
of the issues as to the particular defendant and left for the court only the ministerial
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the circuit level because district court judges are hesitant to certify
appeals, and circuit courts have discretion to deny review and often
do, without comment.10 4 Similarly, district courts rarely grant Rule
54(b) severance, and once granted, severance is rarely disputed at the
10 5
circuit level.
Other exceptions with somewhat greater potential application
similarly provide clear guidance and produce limited collateral litigation. These include the exception for certain contempt orders,1 0 6
task of readjusting accounts of other parties). Nevertheless, Forgay, as currently understood and applied, creates almost no interpretive problems or litigation.
102 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing how rarely applied this
doctrine is and how little it is cited as a potential source of appellate jurisdiction). In
practice, this doctrine has proven to be both narrow and relatively easy to apply.
103 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Some commentators have criticized
the Perlman doctrine's lack of clarity. See, e.g., Michael R. Lazerwitz, Comment, The
Perlman Exception: LimitationsRequired by the FinalDecision Rule, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 798,
802-05 (1982) (arguing, for example, that the doctrine is unclear because the Court
has not resolved whether it applies only to constitutional privileges or all claims of
privilege). In practice, however, the doctrine confined narrowly to the circumstance
in which a third-party intervenor seeks to prevent discovery aimed at another based
on some claim of privilege. Because the circumstances giving rise to the doctrine are
rare, it rarely produces litigation or controversy.
104 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (indicating that although there
are a few differences among the circuit courts with regard to the standards governing
certification, the number of appeals under § 1292(b) is minute). Of course, the certification and petition processes themselves impose some burden on the parties and
courts.
I agree with Professor Solimine that the circuit courts should grant review under
§ 1292(b) more often, and that the certain circuit courts that will grant review only in
exceptional or big cases are limiting the doctrine inappropriately. See supra note 74
and accompanying text. Moreover, the three standards set forth in the rule have not
been defined with precision. See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1192. Nevertheless, administering the rule consumes little of the circuit courts' time.
105 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The lack of circuit level review of
Rule 54(b) certifications is likely due to the deferential standard set forth by the
Court in Curtis-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980). The Court
concluded as follows:
[T] he discretionary judgment of the district court should be given substantial deference, for that court is "the one most likely to be familiar with the
case and with any justifiable reasons for delay." The reviewing court should
disturb the trial court's assessment of the equities only if it can say that the
judge's conclusion was clearly unreasonable.
Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956) (citation omitted)). While some have criticized the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sears-affirming
that the rule does not conflict with the final judgment rule-the rule itself spawns
little controversy or litigation.
106 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. There is little litigation over the
issue of appealability of such orders because the basic rules are clear. Nonparties can
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§ 16 of the Federal
Arbitration Act,10 7 and the "full resolution of the
08
doctrine.'
merits"
Still other exceptions initially created interpretation problems
that are now largely resolved. For example, there remain few disputes
over which types of orders qualify as orders "granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve
or modify injunctions" under § 1292 (a) (1). The Supreme Court has
construed this category strictly; for instance, temporary restraining orders are not "injunctions" under this section. 10 9 In addition, preliminary orders that are not expressly injunctive, but which produce
potentially injunctive effects, are appealable only if they relate to the
merits of the action and will inflict serious harm that is preventable
only by immediate appeal. 110 While the circuit courts occasionally
appeal contempt orders issued against them, whether civil or criminal; parties may
only immediately appeal criminal contempt sanctions. While the finer distinctions
between civil and criminal contempt may not be entirely clear, it is an issue that is
litigated rarely. Moreover, in its recent decision in Cunningham v. Hamilton County,
the Supreme Court indicated that it will not extend the exception for contempt orders to non-contempt sanctions, such as discovery sanctions under Rule 37(a). 527
U.S. 198, 204-10 (1999).
107 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
108 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court's central aim in
Budinich was to create a "bright-line rule" that attorneys' fee awards are distinct from
the merits, and therefore, a full resolution of the merits of the controversy prior to
the award of fees is immediately appealable. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
486 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1988). As discussed previously, changes to the Rules of Civil
and Appellate Procedure allow district courts some flexibility in determining whether
the judgment on the merits and an award of attorneys' fees should be consolidated
for purposes of appeal. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
109 See MARTn mAU, supra note 28, § 4.4, at 50-51; see also Carson v. Am. Brands,
Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (stating that § 1292 (a) (1) is intended to carve out a very
narrow exception to the final judgment rule).
110 See Carson, 450 U.S. at 84-85 (holding that an order that has the "practical
effect" of an injunction may be appealed pursuant to § 1292 (a) (1) only if it relates to
the merits of the action and has "serious, perhaps irreparable consequence[s]" effectively challenged only by immediate appeal); Switz. Cheese Ass'n v. E. Home's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966) (holding that an order denying plaintiff's summary
judgment motion in an action seeking a permanent injunction is not appealable
under § 1292(a)(1) because the order merely decided that there were unresolved
issues of fact and therefore related to procedural matters not touching on or deciding
the merits of the claim). Because Carson focuses on the limited application of
§ 1292 (a) (1), a few courts have questioned whether the requirements of Carson apply
to orders that explicitly grant, deny, or modify injunctions, in addition to those with
the practical effect of an injunction. See, e.g., Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 195
(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bayshore Assocs., 934 F.2d 1391, 1396 (6th Cir.
1991). Nevertheless, these and other circuit courts have confirmed that the standards
enunciated in Carson,do not apply to orders that explicitly address motions for pre-
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must address issues of interpretation, these disputes occur around the
margins; the vast majority of the time, whether an order is appealable
under § 1292(a) (1) is not genuinely disputed.'
Among the exceptions to the final judgment rule, the collateral
order doctrine and mandamus review have had the most troubled history. The circuit courts and, at times, the Supreme Court, have
treated the collateral order doctrine and mandamus review unevenly
and twisted them in ways that defy recognition. Nevertheless, in recent years, courts, and in particular the Supreme Court, have brought
order and predictability to these doctrines. Today, these exceptions
are governed by clear rules or standards and do not produce excessive
litigation on the issue of appealability.
1. The Collateral Order Doctrine
The collateral order doctrine is the most maligned of the exceptions. 112 Indeed, in its 1990 report to Congress, the Federal Courts
liminary injunctions. See, e.g., Nationsbank Corp. v. Herman, 174 F.3d 424, 427 (4th
Cir. 1999); Sherri A.D., 9.75 F.2d at 203; Bayshore Assocs., 934 F.2d at 1396; EEOC v.
Kerrville Bus Co., 925 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1991); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346, 1351 (10th Cir. 1989); I.A.M.
Nat'l Pension Fund Benefit Plan v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 21, 24 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1174 (7th Cir. 1984).
111 For example, while there is no easily articulated formula for which orders that
are not facially injunctive have the "practical effect" of injunction under Carson, decisions illuminate the distinction. Compare United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 422 &
n.7 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a "gag order" restricting extrajudicial discussion of a
case involving the State Commissioner of Insurance in Louisiana did not have the
"practical effect" of an injunction because it in no way addresses the merits of the
case), with Consol. Edison Co. v. United States, No. 99-6239, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
9967, at *5 (2d Cir. May 11, 2000) (concluding that an order denying discovery does
not have the "practical effect" of an injunction because it does not grant or withhold
substantive relief), and United States ex reL Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., 201 F.3d
277, 283 (4th Cir. 1999) (declaring that a writ of mandamus directing insurance carriers to make overpayment determinations had the "practical effect" of an injunction
because the order released funds to defendants who were accused of disposing of
assets previously). Besides these types of cases on the outer edges, this exception
creates little collateral litigation on the issue of appealability.
112 Many commentators have contended that the collateral order doctrine is unclear and its application unpredictable. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 4, at 548-606
(describing in detail the history of, and problems with, the collateral order doctrine);
Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 286 (pointing to the collateral order doctrine
as the reason the federal courts' finality jurisprudence is not working well); Martineau, supranote 3, at 773-74; Solimine, supranote 4, at 1187-88; Nagel, supra note 4,
at 208-09 (contending that the collateral order doctrine has been applied inconsistently and produced mixed results); see also Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1549
("The collateral order doctrine has had a tortured history.").
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Study Committee held out the doctrine as the prime example of the
113
problems then existing in the federal courts' finality jurisprudence.
Such criticism may have been warranted a decade ago, but the collateral order doctrine is now both coherent and easy to apply.
Undeniably, the doctrine has had a troubled history. Although
the Supreme Court often has repeated that the doctrine must be construed narrowly and its three prongs applied strictly, it has produced
significant litigation on the issue of appealability since Cohen was decided in 1949.114 Moreover, the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine inconsistently. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.115 contains the
most egregious example. In that case, the Court relied on Cohen but
abandoned strict adherence to its three prongs. 1" 6 Instead, the Court
adopted a balancing test-weighing the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review against the "danger of denying justice"-to find appealable a pretrial order that the Jones Act supplied the exclusive
remedy for the estate of a seaman." 7 The Court later limited Gillespie

113 See FCSC REPORT, supra note 14, at 95-96 ("Decisional doctrines-such as
'practical finality' and especially the 'collateral order' rule-blur the edges of the
finality principle, require repeated attention from the Supreme Court, and may in
some circumstances restrict too sharply the opportunity for interlocutory review.").
Thus, the confusion surrounding the collateral order doctrine in the late 1980s
played a significant role in the movement for reform that led ultimately to the adoption of §§ 2072(c) and 1292(e).
114 SeeAnderson, supranote 4, at 548-606 (tracing the history of the doctrine); see
also cases cited supra notes 65-66 (listing collateral order doctrine decisions since
1975). Commentators have decried the volume of litigation. See, e.g., Anderson,
supra note 4, at 540 (stating that the doctrine has caused a litigation explosion and
imposed significant costs and delays); Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 286
(contending that even after the Supreme Court has narrowed the doctrine, battles
over the doctrine will continue to consume federal judges' time); Martineau, supra
note 3, at 773-74 (stating that the three-part collateral order doctrine test has multiplied litigation because, in each case, it must be tested by a court of appeals); Nagel,
supra note 4, at 208-09 (contending the doctrine has been costly).
115 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964). 116 See id. The Court found that the circuit court had properly exercised jurisdiction over an appeal from a partial dismissal on the pleadings in ajones Act case, even
though the court conceded that the dismissed claims were not severable or separate
from the rest of the underlying action. Id.
117 See id. at 150, 152-54.
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to its facts. 11 8 Yet it has, on other occasions, applied the doctrine

somewhat unevenly.1 19
Furthermore, in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1985 Mitchell v.
Forsyth decision, the doctrine looked potentially unwieldy. 120 In Mitchell, the Court held that a denial of a government official's defense of
qualified immunity is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.1 2 1 The Court had no trouble finding that the first (conclusiveness) prong of the test was satisfied. 122 As to the third (effective
unreviewability) prong, the Court found that the decision to deny immunity was effectively unreviewable because qualified immunity, like
123
absolute immunity, is an immunity from suit, notjust from liability.
Thus, this denial would be effectively unreviewable on appeal because
the right at stake-not to be subjected to suit-would be irretrievably
lost if the official were required to proceed through the litigation (dis124
covery, trial, etc.) before appealing the decision.
118 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978) ("If Gillespie
were extended beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291 would be stripped of all
significance."); see also Anderson, supranote 4, at 554 (criticizing the Gillespie court's
ad hoc balancing approach). I disagree with Professor Anderson that Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), "resurrected" Gillespie. See Anderson, supranote 4, at 554.
While Mitchell may have been wrongly decided due to possible misapplication of the
doctrine's second and third prongs, see discussion infra note 125, the Court did not
reduce the doctrine to an ad hoc balancing of hardships like it had in Gillespie.
119 See generally Anderson, supra note 4, at 551-76 (contending that there was an
enormous amount of inconsistency in the Supreme Court's approach to the doctrine
from the 1960s to the 1980s).
120 472 U.S. 511 (1985). Indeed, Mitchell marked both the high point and the end
of a period of expansive use of the doctrine. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 551-76
(describing the expansion of the collateral order doctrine from 1963 to 1988 and
contending that Mitchell constituted the "highwater mark").
121 See 472 U.S. at 530. Prior to Mitchel; the Supreme Court had held that denials
of substantive claims of absolute governmental immunity are appealable under the
doctrine. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43 (1982) (hearing the President's immediate appeal regarding his entitlement to absolute immunity); Helstoski
v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 (1979) (holding that a member of Congress was entitled
to immediate appeal of the court's denial of his motion to dismiss).
122 See Mitchell; 472 U.S. at 527.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 526-27.
The entitlement [to qualified immunity] is an immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Accordingly, the
reasoning that underlies the immediate appealability of an order denying
absolute immunity indicates to us that the denial of qualified immunity
should be similarly appealable: in each case, the district court's decision is
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
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The Court's treatment of the second prong-the "separate from
the merits" requirement-proved most controversial. 125 In order to
determine whether an official is entitled to immunity, the district
court must inquire whether the right asserted by the plaintiff was
clearly established at the time of the official's actions and whether a
reasonable person would have realized that he was violating that
right. 126 This inquiry is inherently related to the merits of the action,
requiring an analysis of the particular circumstances to determine the
27
applicability of the right and whether it was clearly established.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the second prong was satisfied because the issue of immunity is "conceptually distinct" from the merits.128 This constituted a significant and unclarified dilution of the
129
separability requirement.
Today, a few unresolved issues remain with regard to the limits of
the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court has yet to define
adequately what "conceptually distinct" from the merits means, although it recently sought to clarify the distinction between "facts and

Id. (emphasis omitted).
125 See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1188 ("The Mitchell opinion has been persuasively criticized.") (citing commentators); see also Anderson, supra note 4, at 570
("The Mitchell Court eviscerated the separability requirement. . . ."). Professor Anderson also criticizes the Mitchell Court's approach to the third prong. See Anderson,
supra note 4, at 574 (stating that the Court's decision to loosen the "effectively unreviewable" requirement lacked clarity because the Court failed to explain the policy
justification for the decision).
126 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528; Solimine, supra note 4, at 1187-88 ("Qualified
immunity should be granted as long as the defendant's actions do not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.").
127 See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1187-88.
128 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527-28.
[A] claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated. An appellate court reviewing
the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether
the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a
question of law ....
Id. (citation omitted). As Professor Anderson points out, the Court had earlier found
that an order denying a double jeopardy claim satisfies the second prong, even
though the determination of whether the same conduct is the basis of both prosecutions arguably is inherently entangled with the merits. See Anderson, supra note 4, at
557 (discussing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977)). This treatment of
the second prong opened the door for similar treatment qf qualified immunity.
129 See Anderson, supra note 4, at 570-72.
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law" discussed in Mitchell.13 0 Moreover, in a few recent decisions, the
Court has breathed new life into the requirement that the issue or
underlying interests at stake be "important."1 3 1 While the Court suggests that an interest must be sufficiently important to justify immedi130 SeeJohnson v.Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (holding that Mitchell is limited
to pure questions of law with regard to qualified immunity). In Johnson, the qualified
immunity issue on which the defending police officers sought appellate review was
one of fact, namely, whether the evidence presented at the summary judgment stage
was sufficient to create a triable issue. Id. The Court held that an order that denies
summary judgment because the record reveals genuine issues of material fact with
regard to qualified immunity (whether the officers violated clearly established law) is
not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because, unlike the pure legal
question in Mitchell, such a fact-based inquiry is not "conceptually distinct" from the
merits. See id. at 313-14. Thus, Johnson clarifies some of the doctrinal problems of
Mitchell's treatment of the second prong created in the qualified immunity context,
although at least one commentator has suggested that this distinction may prove unworkable in practice. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 592-94.
131 See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 878-79
(1994) (emphasizing that importance is a consideration in all three elements of the
doctrine); Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 502 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("The importance of the right asserted has always been a significant part of our collateral order doctrine."). The Justices' subjective assessment of what constitutes an "important" interest should not play a significant role in the analysis, because it promises
both unpredictability and confusion. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 588. The danger
should not be overstated, however. For example, in DigitalEquipment Corp., the Court
ultimately found that the order at issue did not survive the third prong of the collateral order doctrine, even if "importance" were removed entirely from the analysis.
DigitalEquip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 881-82. Moreover, I disagree with Professor Anderson
that the Court elevated this factor to primacy in PuertoRico Aqueduct & Sewer v. Metcalf
&Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). See Anderson, supranote 4, at 588 (contending that the importance of the claimed right became the prime consideration). In
fact, the Court discussed the importance of a state entity's dignitary interest not as an
independent factor, but rather as a response to appellee's contention that Eleventh
Amendment immunity is not a "right not to stand trial" and therefore does not satisfy
the doctrine's third prong. See P.R. Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146 (concluding that the
collateral order doctrine applies to such claims for immunity because, "to prevent
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals," the Eleventh Amendment protects states from suit and notjust liability). Finally, in Cunningham v. Hamilton County, the Court's most recent foray into the collateral order
doctrine area, the unanimous Court undertook an analysis of the three prongs of the
doctrine without discussing the importance of the underlying interests at stake. 527
U.S. 198, 203-10 (1999).
The "importance" inquiry may play a dispositive role only in the rare circumstance in which the three prongs otherwise clearly are satisfied and the Court believes
that application of the doctrine in that circumstance would pose too many practical
problems. For example, if orders denying protection for allegedly privileged communications, see discussion infra note 154, otherwise satisfy the doctrine's requirements,
allowing appeals of such orders may prove sufficiently troublesome that the Court
perhaps would refuse to apply the doctrine on "importance" grounds.
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ate review under the doctrine, it has not articulated standards for
13 2
determining which interests might satisfy this requirement.
Nevertheless, despite its tortured history and a few remaining, unresolved issues, the collateral order doctrine has emerged as a relatively clear and well-defined exception that leads to predictable
results. Since the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court has focused on two
unambiguous limiting principles that have largely clarified the doctrine and drastically limited its potential application.
First, the Court has repeated many times that the collateral order
doctrine is to be applied on a category-wide basis, and thus, an order
will be appealable under the doctrine only if every order addressing
the same issue or rejecting an alleged right satisfies the doctrine's
three prongs. The Court began emphasizing the category-wide approach when rejecting the "death knell" doctrine in Coopers &
Lybrand.l3 3 The Court refused to recognize that doctrine in part because it would reduce the finality requirement to a case-by-case determination of whether a particular ruling should be appealable.1 3 4 In
three later decisions, the Court reiterated this principle while refusing
to extend the collateral order doctrine to new classes of orders. 3 5 In
the Court's most recent collateral order doctrine decision, the Justices
again emphasized the "category-wide" principle in holding that orders
imposing sanctions on attorneys for discovery violations are not appealable under the doctrine. 13 6 In discussing the second prong, the
Court stated that "[p] erhaps not every discovery sanction will be inextricably intertwined with the merits, but we have consistently eschewed
132 SeeAnderson, supranote 4, at 589-90; Solimine, supra note 4, at 1191 (discussing Lauro Lines in which Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, suggests a functional approach to the collateral order doctrine that emphasizes the importance of

the right).
133 See 437 U.S. 463, 474-77 (1978).
134

See id. at 473. The Court further stated as follows:
[A] lowing appeals of right from nonfinal orders that turn on the facts of a
particular case thrusts appellate courts indiscriminately into the trial process

and thus defeats one vital purpose of the final judgment rule--"that of maintaining the appropriate relationship between the respective courts ....This
goal, in the absence of most compelling reasons to the contrary, is very
much worth preserving."

Id. at 476.
135 See DigitalEquip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 867-68; Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486
U.S. 517, 529 (1988); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439 (1985); see
also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996) (stating that the right to appeal
must be determined by focusing on the category of order appealed from and cannot
depend on the facts of a particular case).
136 See Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 205-06.
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a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently
collateral." 137 The categorical approach severely limits the potential
application of the doctrine because individual orders that would appear to satisfy the requirements of the doctrine, when viewed in isolation, are unappealable if any order addressing the same issue would
138
not satisfy the requirements.
Second, the Court now has defined the circumstances in which it
would be willing to recognize that the third requirement-the "effectively unreviewable" prong-is satisfied. In earlier decisions, the
Court suggested that it might extend the notion of effective unreviewability to orders that, although reviewable after final judgment,
cause some irreparable harm in the interim or would be unlikely, as a
practical matter, to be corrected after final judgment.139 Beginning
with Coopers & Lybrand and then repeatedly in decisions thereafter,
140
the Court has stated that the third prong is, in fact, far narrower.
137 Id. at 206 (citing Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868; Richardson-Merrell 472
U.S. at 439). For example, a district court might impose sanctions for unexcused
delay in responding to discovery requests, which has nothing to do with the merits of
the underlying controversy. Nevertheless, the Court held that no order imposing discovery sanctions on an attorney is appealable under the collateral order doctrine,
because some such orders address the merits. See id. at 205-06.
138 Thus, those who suggest that the Court's approach to the collateral order doctrine requires a case-by-case analysis of appealability are mistaken. See, e.g., Eisenberg
& Morrison, supra note 3, at 286 (assuming that battles over application of the doctrine will continue to consume too much time after Cunningham because the Court
simply was attempting to decide, on a "case-by-case" basis which orders are immediately appealable). Moreover, I disagree with commentators who have suggested that
Cunningham did nothing more than decide the narrow question of appealability in
the context of attorney sanction orders. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3,
at 286. On the contrary, the unanimous Cunninghamdecision reiterated that the collateral order doctrine is to be applied categorically-a reaffirmation that unambiguously and significantly restricts the potential application of the doctrine in other
contexts.
139 See, e.g., Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964) (abandoning
the three-pronged framework for a balancing of hardships approach to finality).
140 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978) (stating, in rejecting the death knell doctrine, that "the fact that an interlocutory order may induce
a party to abandon his claim before final judgment is not a sufficient reason for considering it a 'final decision' within the meaning of § 1291"); see also Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981) (rejecting the argument that a showing of irreparable harm, even when resulting from an erroneous decision, is sufficient
to satisfy the third prong of the collateral order doctrine). Indeed, even in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., in which the Supreme Court referred to irreparable
effects, the Court required more than mere irreparable harm; it was concerned that
the rights conferred by statute, if applicable, would have been completely lost. See 337
U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Thus, while the Court's recently expressed requirement that an
asserted right face destruction if not vindicated before trial sharpens the analysis
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An order must do more than threaten irreparable harm to be "effectively unreviewable"; it must implicate a right of the party seeking an
immediate appeal that would be, by definition, "irretrievably lost" absent such an appeal. 14 1 Other recent decisions have made this stringent standard even clearer: the third prong is only satisfied where the
order at issue addresses "an asserted right the legal and practical value
of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial."142

Since the mid-1980s, the Court has been unyielding in its adherence to this narrow view of effective unreviewability. 143 Indeed, the
under the third prong, it is not inconsistent with Cohen. Cohen was intended to be a
very narrow decision, though it suffers from a lack of clarity. SeeAnderson, supranote
4, at 545 ("The Cohen decision appears to have been intended as a very narrow decision, but the seeds of later confusion and protracted procedural litigation were sown
by the lack of clarity in the Court's stated reasoning."). Cohen and the collateral order
doctrine therefore cannot be construed as opening the door to immediate appeals of
orders that merely may cause irreparable harm. But see Martineau, supra note 3, at
742-43 (recognizing that more recent decisions seem to have narrowed the third
prong, but suggesting that the mere threat of the loss of a legal right is sufficient to
satisfy the third prong and that Justice Jackson's opinion in Cohen created a judicial
exception to the final judgment rule that could cover virtually any order that might
cause irreparable harm).
141 See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988).
But the finaljudgment rule requires that except in certain narrow circumstances in which the right would be "irretrievably lost" absent an immediate
appeal, litigants must abide by the district court's judgments, and suffer the
concomitant burden of a trial until the end of the proceedings before gaining appellate review.
Id.; Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 376-77 (1987)
(holding that effective review would be irretrievably lost if petitioner had to wait until
final judgment).
142 Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)); see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 872 (1994) (indicating that the
identification of some interest that will be irretrievably lost is not enough to satisfy the
third prong; rather, a party must point to a right that unquestionably will be lost or
destroyed without immediate review); Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499
(1989) ("[W]e have insisted that the right asserted be one that is essentially destroyed
if its vindication must be postponed until trial is completed."); FirestoneTire & Rubber
Co., 449 U.S. at 376 (stating that the third prong has been satisfied when the order at
issue "involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which could be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial") (quoting United States v. MacDonald,
435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)).
143 For example, the Court recognized in Stringellow that a dispute over the right
to intervene usually must be resolved before trial if it is to have any practical significance because a judgment is not likely to be reversed on this basis. See 480 U.S. at
376-77. Nevertheless, the Court held that the denial of a motion to intervene does
not satisfy the third prong because the right to intervene is not destroyed-a challenge to the denial can be raised after trial, at least in theory. See id. Likewise, in
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Court has openly acknowledged that erroneous decisions often sound
the death knell for certain claims, yet absent the destruction of a
right, such irreparable effects are insufficient to satisfy the third
prong. 144 While district court orders rejecting defenses of double
jeopardy and immunity from suit will satisfy this stringent requirement, few others will.
These two recently emphasized limitations have created clarity
and predictability largely because they effectively preclude expansion
of the doctrine.1 4 5 It is hard to conceive of more than a handful of
orders not already classified as collateral that might satisfy these requirements.1 46 Indeed, since Mitchell, the Supreme Court has found
cases in which parties sought review of orders denying motions to dismiss or stay
based on improper forum arguments, the court held that the third prong was not
satisfied; even though, as a practical matter, the denial was unlikely to be corrected or
perfectly correctable on appeal from finaljudgment. See, e.g., Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at
500-01 (holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss based on a contractual forum
selection clause did not satisfy the third prong even though the right at issue cannot
be vindicated fully on appeal after final judgment); Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at
526-27, 529 (rejecting arguments that an order denying motions to dismiss based on
immunity from service of process, personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens
are appealable immediately, even though such an order is unlikely to be corrected
later). These decisions reflect not only the Court's unwillingness to predict how likely
error correction will be for a class of orders, but also its stubborn refusal to expand
the concept of a "right not to stand trial" beyond the double jeopardy and governmental immunity contexts.
144 See, e.g., DigitalEquip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 872.
145 See Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1548 (stating that more recently the
Court has "shown fidelity to the virtues of the final judgment rule by only rarely finding that the doctrine's criteria are met"); Solimine, supra note 4, at 1170-71 (recognizing that, since Coopers & Lybrand, the Supreme Court generally has required strict
adherence to the three prongs of the doctrine and that the collateral order doctrine
will not be a rich source of interlocutory appeals); cf Anderson, supra note 4, at
576-602 (contending that the doctrine remains unclear and inconsistent, while recognizing that the Supreme Court has demonstrated some retrenchment since Mitchell
v. Forsyth).
146 There are few types of interlocutory orders that will satisfy the second prong in
all circumstances, even under the Mitchell articulation, and fewer that can survive the
rigid requirements of the third prong. Professor Martineau has suggested that the
order at issue in Cohen would not be appealable under the Court's recent articulation
of the requirements of the third prong. See Martineau, supranote 3, at 742. He may
be correct, although the answer would depend on the characterization of the right at
issue. If the posting of a security requirement is analogous to a form of immunity
from suit-namely, prospective defendants in a shareholder derivative action have a
right not to have to answer for their conduct in any judicial proceeding unless the
complaining stockholder posts the required security-then Cohen likely would come
out the same way today. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (stating that
the question is whether the essence of the claimed right is a right not to stand trial).
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orders addressing issues other than immunity from suit satisfy the collateral order doctrine in only one context. 147
Yet these extraordinarily stringent limitations also produce principled distinctions between orders. First, what constitutes a "final decision" under § 1291 should be a categorical rather than ad hoc or
case-by-case determination. Whether an order is "final" does not depend on differing probabilities of error or hardship; thus, disparate
treatment of orders of the same type seems at odds with the statute.
Moreover, bright-line rules that draw categorical distinctions provide
predictability, which ought to be a guiding value in defining appellate
jurisdiction. 4 8 Likewise, the destruction of a right requirement distinguishes decisions that are truly final from those that are "merely"
harmful. Decisions on issues necessarilymooted by futher litigation are
truly final on those issues; 149 decisions that merely threaten to spell
Indeed, Professor Anderson argues that Cohen, sensibly construed, was premised
upon this type of mootness rationale. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 546-47.
147 See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714 (1996). Quackenbush
also may be characterized as embodying a different exception to the final judgment
rule, since the decision is premised primarily on Moses H. Cone. See supranote 54. I
disagree with Professor Anderson that the Court's treatment of the third prong in
Abney (double jeopardy) and Mitchell (qualified immunity) made the prong less stringent than first articulated in Cohen. See Anderson, sapra note 4, at 557-58, 574 (stating that the focus on the "right not to stand trial" in these contexts allowed the court
to circumvent Cohen's mootess rationale). On the contrary, it is out of respect for
the narrowness of the third prong-hence, the requirement that the issue would be
mooted automatically if not immediately appealable-that the Court turned to an
inquiry of whether double jeopardy and qualified immunity constitute immunity from
suit (being subjected to trial) rather than merely from criminal or civil liability. While
many have disagreed with the Court's characterization of qualified immunity as immunity from suit-and its characterization of other rights as not protecting against
subjection to suit-I have no doubt that the Court's demanding such an inquiry ensures that the third prong will remain exceedingly narrow. Requiring the inherent
destruction or mooting of a right rules out application of the doctrine in virtually all
non-immunity contexts.
148 See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988) (emphasizing the importance of "operational consistency and predictability in the overall application of Section 1291"); see also 15A WRIGrr ET AL., supra note 6, § 3901, at 27
(stating that the virtues of clarity with regard to rules governing appellate review are
manifest). Clarity and predictability serve a number of values, including making the
costs and length of litigation somewhat more foreseeable to the parties. Moreover,
because finality is a requirement for appellate jurisdiction (absent the application of
some other exception), clear rules reduce the chances of parties wasting resources on
appeals that are improper and waiving the right to appeal by falling to recognize that
an order is appealable.
149 Thus, Professor Anderson is correct that the third prong, as initially articulated
in Cohen, is aimed at addressing prejudgment decisions that affect rights that will be
mooted but for an opportunity for an immediate appeal. See Anderson, supra note 4,
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the death knell of the litigation or inflict some other form of harm
that is imperfectly reparable are not.150 Indeed, the definition of "final decision" cannot encompass orders that merely threaten to cause
irreparable harm if not immediately appealed. Such a construction
would make the final judgment rule "pretty puny," in the words of the
Supreme Court, given the limitless number of ways in which interlocu151
tory orders can inflict such harm.
at 548. In fact, the Cohen court relied on Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323,
324-25 (1940), in which it had stated-in finding that denial of a motion to quash a
subpoena duces tecum is not appealable-that it would depart from the final judgment rule only when the lack of immediate review meant no review. See Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Professor Anderson and I
disagree about whether the Court's recent collateral order doctrine jurisprudence has
been true to this requirement. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 548. He argues that
Mitchell and its progeny significantly dilute the mootness requirement. See id. Yet, the
Court's recent emphasis on the effective destruction of a right is premised on and
consistent with this mootness rationale. In addition, the Court applied this rationale
in Abney and Mitchell when it drew distinctions between rights not to be subjected to
suit or trial (which will be moot if not immediately appealed) and other types of
rights. See id.
150 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 872 (1994). Professor Anderson suggests that in some of the Court's more recent decisions, it has not
been clear about the role of irreparable harm. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 563.
For example, he suggests that one can infer from the Court's analysis in FirestoneRubber Co. that irreparable harm can justify a collateral order appeal in some circumstances. See id. Yet, the Court clearly rejected the appellant's contention that the
irreparable harm entailed by delayed review justifies immediate review. See Firestone
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981). Indeed, the Court suggested that, to
the extent a party might suffer severe irreparable harm, it could seek other extraordinary avenues to appeal, such as certification under § 1292(b) and mandamus review.
See id. In my view, the Court did not imply that some forms of threatened irreparable
harm may support a collateral order appeal in the'absence of a mootness problem.
151 See DigitalEquip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 872. Some have criticized the Court's formalism in this regard, arguing, for example, that there is little distinction between
those rights-such as immunity from suit-that the Court has determined would be
destroyed if no appeal were allowed, and those rights that will, as a practical matter,
be lost if an immediate appeal is not available-such as the contract-based right to
litigate in a chosen forum at issue in Lauro Lines or the forum-based objections raised
in Van Clauwenberghe. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 4, at 578-79 (criticizing as disingenuous the Court's attempts to distinguish the various forum-based rights asserted in
Van Clauwenberghefrom the immunity from suit cases); Solimine, supranote 4, at 1187
("A distinction between immunity from suit and entitlement to be sued only in a
particular forum, for example, is apt to be lost on the typical litigant. Both rights are
equally lost once denied and the case proceeds to trial in the forum not chosen.")
(citation omitted). In most cases, the harm of delayed review is the same, namely, no
review. Yet this is beside the point: delayed review of the denial of any right will mean
no review, as a practical matter, in most circumstances. That consequence of delayed
review therefore cannot serve as a basis for an exception to the final judgment rule.
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Finally, the Supreme Court's clear and principled application of
the doctrine has reduced disagreement and litigation over this exception. The members of the Court now appear largely in agreement
over its scope; for example, Cunningham v. Hamilton County' 5 2 was a
unanimous decision. Also, contrary to the suggestion of other commentators, there are few unresolved controversies and corresponding
litigation over the doctrine in the circuit courts.' 53 Research reveals
that the circuits are split over the application of the doctrine as to only
three types of orders: orders rejecting protection for allegedly privileged attorney-client communications; 54 orders refusing protection
Rather, whether an adverse determination with regard to an alleged right is "final"
requires that the right cannot be vindicated under any circumstances and despite any
expenditure or cost, if the litigation proceeds without correcting that determination.
In such a circumstance, and not others that may result in similar hardships, a determination as to a purported right will be "final" prior to the end of the litigation. The
nature of the right itself therefore is the key inquiry, not the practical consequences
of the unavailability of immediate, review.
Of course, the nature of the right is not easily determined in all cases. For example, some critics of the Mitchell decision, in addition to criticizing the Court for its
treatment of the second prong, have argued that the Court erred in determining that
qualified immunity is immunity from suit rather than merely immunity from liability.
See Anderson, supra note 4, at 577-78; Solimine, supra note 4, at 1188 (reasoning that
because the qualified immunity determination often requires extensive discovery,
"[i]t hardly sounds like an immunity from suit"). I tend to agree with the Court as to
the nature of qualified immunity, but the matter is open to debate. Likewise, the
Court's less generous characterization of other rights has come under attack. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 4, at 578 (criticizing the Court for characterizing immunity
from service of process as not conferring a "right not to stand trial" comparable to the
rights conferred by double jeopardy and qualified immunity protections). Even if the
Court has incorrectly characterized the right in certain circumstances, its overall approach to the third prong-attempting to distinguish between orders implicating
rights or protections that will be destroyed from those that are merely unlikely to be
corrected after final judgment-is sound.
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527 U.S. 198 (1999).

153 Cf. Anderson, supra note 4, at 603-04 (suggesting there are a number of unresolved issues in the circuits); Nagel, supranote 4, at 208-09 (stating that the collateral order doctrine "often is applied inconsistently.from circuit to circuit"); see also
Eisenberg & Morrison, supranote 3, at 286, 288 (suggesting that, in the wake of Cunningham, much remains unresolved with regard to the collateral order doctrine).
154 Discovery orders generally are not immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. See, e.g., Misc. Docket Matter #1 v. Misc. Docket Matter #2, 197 F.3d
922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999); Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 144 F.3d 418, 422 (6th Cir.
1998); In re Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Simmons v. City of Racine,
37 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1994); At. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine
Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 377 (11th Cir. 1989); Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
881 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1989); MA. Mortenson Co. v. United States. 877 F.2d
50, 51-52 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Garcia, 876 F.2d 254,
256 (1st Cir. 1989); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Mount Sinai Sch. of Med., 866 F.2d 552, 554
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for claimed trade secrets;' 5 5 and orders denying the appointment of
counsel. 156 Whether the collateral order doctrine applies in the privilege context is a close question. 157 However, there is little doubt that
the Supreme Court now would find that the trade secrets and appointment of counsel questions do not fall within the scope of the doctrine. 158 Outside of these areas, the circuit courts now invest little
time in resolving disputes over the applicability of the doctrine.
(2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 627-28 (3d Cir. 1988); Graham
v. Gray, 827 F.2d 679, 681 (10th Cir. 1987); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1087
(4th Cir. 1984). In a footnote in Cunningham, the Supreme Court seemed to agree.
See 527 U.S. at 204 n.4 ("[W] e have repeatedly held that a witness subject to a discovery order, but not held in contempt, generally may not appeal the order.").
Although the circuits appear to agree on this general rule, the Third Circuit has
held that the requirements of the collateral order doctrine are satisfied when a party
appeals a discovery order mandating disclosure of allegedly privileged communications. See In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 957-64 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Bacher v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52, 54-55 (3d Cir. 2000) (reaffirming Ford). Other circuit
courts have expressly disagreed. See, e.g., FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 458 n.2
(1st Cir. 2000); Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir.
1997); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 749-50 (10th Cir. 1993).
155 Compare Smith v. Bic Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that
orders denying protection for trade secrets are immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine), with MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116,
120 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the "general rule of nonappelability" applies to
trade secrets).
156 See Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reviewing the
"extensive debate" between the circuits over appealability of orders denying the appointment of counsel for a pro se litigant and ultimately siding with those circuits that
have found such orders unappealable under the collateral order doctrine).
157 Indeed, the Third Circuit makes a strong case that this category of orders satisfies the prongs of the doctrine. See Bacher,211 F.3d at 54 (finding an order rejecting a
claim of privilege to be collateral because it is final, completely separate from the
merits, protects important interests, and cannot be effectively reviewed after final
judgment because the communications already would have been disclosed) (citing
Ford, 110 F.3d at 958-64). But see Mark A. Kromkowski &JonathanJ. Van Handel, The
CollateralOrderDoctrine as Applied to Discovery Requests-The Third Circuit'sKelly v. Ford
Motor Co. (In Re Ford Motor Co.), 73 NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 1119, 1126-30 (1998)
(criticizing the Third Circuit's decision in Ford). With regard to the destruction of a
right, the Ford court noted that appeal after final judgment "cannot remedy the
breach in confidentiality occasioned by erroneous disclosure of protected materials ... [a]t that point ... the cat is already out of the bag." Ford, 110 F.3d at 963.
158 Orders denying protection for alleged trade secrets cannot satisfy the second
prong of the collateral order doctrine on a category-wide basis. Whether trade secrets
are discoverable will depend in some circumstances on determinations with regard to
the relevance of such secrets. Relevance determinations, in turn, often are inextricably linked to the merits of the underlying action. Likewise, orders denying the appointment of counsel cannot satisfy the third prong of the doctrine. Although the
denial of appointment of counsel may, as a practical matter, spell the death knell for
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Thus, despite its somewhat troubled history, the collateral order
doctrine has emerged as a straightforward and principled exception
to the final judgment rule, producing predictable outcomes and limited litigation. It no longer holds the threat of chaos and uncertainty
that sparked calls for reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
2.

Mandamus

In contrast to the collateral order doctrine, mandamus review is
only appropriate where some kind of blatant error is probable. Application of the collateral order doctrine depends only on a finding that
an order is collateral; its parameters therefore are susceptible to definition by a set of rules. The writ of mandamus, in contrast, depends
upon standards sufficiently flexible to allow courts to utilize it whenever extraordinary relief is needed.1 59 Although the Supreme Court
has declared that the writ should be granted sparingly,1 60 the circumstances warranting such relief are inherently case-specific and therefore are not susceptible to classification. Thus, mandamus review,
unlike collateral order review, must be governed by standards-rather
1 61
than rules-that cannot be articulated with precision.
Given the case-specific nature of this inquiry, there always will be
circumstances in which there is a genuine dispute over whether use of
the writ is an appropriate exercise of authority. Yet even though some
uncertainty is inherent, in recent years circuit courts have conformed
to the narrow parameters of extraordinary writ power. As set forth in
the previous Section, the circuit courts articulate somewhat differing
the litigation or lead to tactical and other litigation errors that are not perfectly correctable after final judgment, the right to counsel may be vindicated after final judgment, at least in theory. Delayed review does not "destroy" this right.
159 See Solimine & Hines, supranote 69, at 1572 (stating that mandamus review is
governed by standards, not rules).
160 SeefWill v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967) (stating that the writ of mandamus is a remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances); De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945) ("[W]hen a court has no
judicial power to do what it purports to do-when its action is not mere error but
usurpation of power-the situation falls precisely within the allowable use of [a writ of
mandamus].").
161 See Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1571 ("Rules are meant to be narrow
and precise, and in theory yield an answer quickly, and rather mechanically, once
applied to the facts of a case. Standards, in contrast, are broad and vague and inevitably require the decision maker to ponder and weigh the facts to reach a result."). As
set forth in note 91, supra, the Court has enunciated somewhat general standards for
mandamus review, including what conduct rises to the level of a "usurpation ofjudicial power."
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standards.' 62 In practice, however, all now tend to reserve the writ
power for truly extraordinary circumstances.
Despite concerns about the expansion or misuse of the writ
power, 163 circuit courts have issued the writ sparingly in recent years.
Research reveals that thirteen circuits issued the writ as to proceedings in district courts only sixty-four times in a five-year period between September 17, 1995 and October 1, 2000.164 This averages out
to less than one grantper circuitper year. Most of these writs were issued
in a few, discrete types of circumstances. For example, fifteen writs
address orders granting or denying remand to state court, abstention,
or transfer.' 65 Others address assertions of privilege or work-product
protection, 16 6 recusal and censure of judges or disqualifications of
162 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. Only the Ninth Circuit consistently articulates a standard that suggests something less than exceptional circumstances may be sufficient to justify granting the writ. In practice, however, the Ninth
Circuit rarely finds that the writ is justified. See supranote 97 and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Morrison, supranote 3, at 291 ("[T]he law on mandamus
as a substitute for interlocutory appeal is wildly inconsistent, contradictory, and outcome-driven."); Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1560-61 n.161 (discussing criticisms ofJudge Posner's use of the writ in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.); Charles Alan
Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 774-78
(1957) (expressing serious concerns about the potential overuse of extraordinary
writs); Nagel, supra note 4, at 210 ("Despite the drastic nature of a mandamus writ,
some circuit courts use it as a general method of hearing appeals of interlocutory
orders.").
164 Online research was conducted on a circuit-by-circuit basis, using a "terms and
connectors" search on both Lexis and Westlaw to find both published and unpublished opinions available on those services. Every circuit opinion mentioning "mandamus" or "writ of prohibition" during the relevant five-year period was reviewed to
determine if the writ issued. The searches captured thousands of cases and many
hundreds of refusals to issue the writ.
165 See In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1998) (remand); In re
Loudermilch, 158 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 1998) (remand); In re Sealed Case No.
98-5062, 141 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (transfer); In re Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., 123
F.3d 1407 (1lth Cir. 1997) (remand); In reDow Coming Corp., 113 F.3d 565 (6th Cir.
1997) (abstention); In re Excel Corp., No. 96-41220, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12792
(5th Cir. Feb. 19, 1997) (remand); In reLowe, 102 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 1996) (remand);
In re Chimenti, 79 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 1996) (remand); In re City of Mobile, 75 F.3d
605 (11th Cir. 1996) (remand); In re Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., No. 96-10743, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 24760 (5th Cir. June 28, 1996) (remand); Williams-El v. Hawk, No.
94-5341, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14217 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (transfer); In re
Skupniewitz, 73 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 1996) (remand); In re First Nat'l Bank of Boston,
70 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1995) (remand); In re Warrick, 70 F.3d 736 (2d Cir. 1995)
(transfer); In re Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995) (transfer).
166 See Baker v. GMC, 209 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2000) (work product doctrine and
attorney-client privilege); In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (attomey-client privilege); In re Medtronic, Inc., 184 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 1999)
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counsel, 167 and the failure of district courts to follow clear mandates
of the circuit courts. 168 The remaining grants tend to fall into a num69
ber of other categories.
(physician-patient privilege); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, No. 546, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12829 (Fed. Cir.June 5, 1998) (attorney-client privilege); In re GMC, 153 F.3d
714 (8th Cir. 1998) (attorney-client privilege); In re Long Island Lighting Co., 129
F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 1997) (attorney-client privilege); In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430
(6th Cir. 1997) (work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege); In re Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (attorney-client privilege);
Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456 (3d Cir. 1996) (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
167 See In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998) (recusal ofjudge); In re Barnett,
97 F.3d 181 (7th Cir. 1996) (disqualification of counsel); In re Edgar, 93 F.3d 256 (7th
Cir. 1996) (disqualification ofjudge); In reAntar, 71 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 1995) (recusal
ofjudge). In In re McByde, a writ of mandamus issued to prevent the chiefjudge of
the district court from reassigning cases away from a sitting district court judge as an
act of censure. 117 F.3d 208, 230 (5th Cir. 1997).
168 See Lindland v. USA Wrestling Ass'n., 228 F.3d 782, 783 (7th Cir. 2000); In re
FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 141 (2d Cir. 2000); Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 173 F.3d 713, 719
(9th Cir. 1999); In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 224 (3d Cir. 1998); In re
Willis, No. 98-2652, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16951, at *2 (7th Cir. July 21, 1998); In re
Phillips, 133 F.3d 770, 771 (10th Cir. 1998).
169 The Ninth Circuit has granted the writ three times to address discovery orders
in the context of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Calderon v. Hill, 120 F.3d
927 (9th Cir. 1997); Calderon v. Roberts, 113 F.3d 149 (9th Cir. 1997); Calderon v.
Nicolaus, 98 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1996). Two Ninth Circuit writs address the issue of
whether or not the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act stays initial disclosures
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) (1) where a motion to dismiss the
action is pending. See SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 189 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.
1999); Medhekar v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 99 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1996). Two writs address
whether members of the media have a constitutional right of access to court records.
See San Jose Mercury News v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1998). Of the remaining cases, fourteen
deal with extraordinary procedural issues. See In re United States, 197 F.3d 310 (8th
Cir. 1999) (holding mandamus appropriate to control subpoenas against high government officials); In re GrandJury Subpoena, 190 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding
mandamus appropriate where district court retook possession of documents, thereby
preventing attorneys from refusing production to stand in contempt and establish
appellate jurisdiction); In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding mandamus appropriate to vacate order authorizing sealed party to subpoena documents from Independent Counsel's office during ongoing investigation of
government official in light of grand jury secrecy rule); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding mandamus appropriate where district
court entered preliminary injunction without notice to major computer operating
system manufacturer preventing it from marketing its internet browser with its operating system); In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding mandamus appropriate to vacate discovery order where district court failed to consider
less intrusive means of obtaining information from Greek government officials); In re
Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding writ issued where district court in-
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Among the grants, few have caused controversy. Most appear
consistent with the Supreme Court's articulated standards, namely,
that mandamus be granted only when the district court has done
something egregious and the petitioner has no other adequate means
to obtain relief.1 70 Research reveals few circuit disagreements over
correctly held that inmate was entitled to be present at deposition in civil case
brought by the inmate); In reTerra Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
mandamus granted where party failed to make specific demonstration of facts warranting sequestration of fact witnesses); In re Wiesner, No. 97-5089, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28479, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 1997) (finding writ issued where district court
improperly "insulate [d] its decision imposing sanctions by conditioning an appeal on
petitioner seeking leave from another district court"); Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist. CL,
130 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding writ of mandamus appropriate to reverse discovery order where compliance with the order would force petitioner to violate Swiss
law); Taiwan v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding writ issued where
district court improperly compelled testimony of Taiwanese official without affording
requisite immunity); In reYamaha Motor Co., No. 518, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26595,
at *8 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 1997) (holding writ issued where district court erred in finding patent invalidation action justiciable because no real threat of suit existed); In re
Impact Absorbent Tech., No. 96-3496, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 35322, at *4 (6th Cir.
Dec. 18, 1996) (holding that district court clearly erred in finding personal jurisdiction over a defendant who had no minimum contacts in forum state); Univ. of Tex. v.
Vratil, 96 F.3d 1337 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that writ issued where district court
improperly ordered non-parties to respond to interrogatories); In re Collins, 73 F.3d
614 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that writ granted where district court abused its discretion in ordering that an inmate be allowed to attend depositions of prison officials in
connection with civil action where officials had established inmate as a high security
risk). Three other cases address petitions for writs of habeas corpus, and two deal
with other criminal issues. See In rejustices of the Superior Court, 218 F.3d 11 (1st
Cir. 2000) (habeas corpus); In rePage, 170 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999) (habeas corpus);
Calderon v. Kelly, 127 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 1997) (habeas corpus); Daniels v. U.S. Dist.
Ct., No. 94-70295, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38375 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 1995) (investigative
funds for death penalty case); Torres-Ruiz v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 120 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.
1997) (detained aliens). Three other cases deal with extraordinary issues in cases that
are either "complex" or class actions. SeeJackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130
F.3d 999 (l1th Cir. 1997) (holding that mandamus issued where district court allowed representative plaintiffs to solicit potential class members via communications
order prior to certifying a class); In re Chevron U.S.A., 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997)
(dealing with writ issued where district court improperly ordered trial of thirty plaintiffs' cases in a "complex" case consisting of 3000 claimants without determining the
"representativeness" of the thirty plaintiffs); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069
(6th Cir. 1996) (dealing with writ issued where district court failed to consider adequacy of representation or variances in state law in deciding class certification
motion).
170 A review of the aforementioned categories reveals that the writ usually is being
issued only when the petitioner has no other adequate means of relief. Also, in many
of the listed cases, the extraordinary and troublesome nature of the circumstances are
self evident. The facts in other cases reveal that the districtjudges' actions or missteps
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the use of the writ in parallel circumstances, few issuances that have
171
produced dissents, and no Supreme Court reversals.
Furthermore, much of the recent criticism of the circuit courts'
use of mandamus has focused on a small number of pre-Rule 23(f)
class action cases, most notably In re Rhone-PoulencRorer, Inc.172 These

controversial uses of the writ now appear isolated. Indeed, recent experience belies the contention that In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer and other
controversial uses of the mandamus in the class action context are
symptomatic of a general trend toward overuse or misuse of the writ.
In short, the standards governing mandamus are unambiguously
stringent, relatively easy to apply in most circumstances, and not a
source of costly collateral litigation. Writs are issued rarely, and, except for some questionable grants of petitions in isolated circumstances, circuit courts have not used writs to avoid the strictures of the
final judgment rule. Although one can hypothesize dangers of abuse
of mandamus, such dangers have not been realized.

were extraordinary or shocking. See, e.g., Barnett, 97 F.3d at 183-85 (granting the writ
after finding that neither the district court judge's opinion that remaining plaintiffs'
lawyers had abandoned the case nor his displeasure regarding the public criticism was
proper grounds for expulsion of the lawyers, particularly without affording them an
opportunity to speak and given that the bench trial in the case was almost completed); Daniels, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38375, at *1 (granting the writ after the district judge had denied petitioner investigatory funds to pursue his habeas petition
based upon the conclusion that the death sentence "is not different in kind from any
other punishment").
171 As set forth in notes 165-69, supra, most of the writs were issued in a few discrete circumstances. Only four of the cases produced dissents. See Baker, 209 F.3d at
1056; Hatcher,150 F.3d at 638; Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d at 442; Calderon, 127 F.3d at 787.
172 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Solimine & Hines, supra note 69,
1560-61 & nn.160-61 (discussing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer and citing to numerous
commentators who have criticized or agreed with Judge Posner's use of the writ in
that circumstance); Kruse, supra note 5, at 721-31 (criticizing several uses of mandamus in the class action context as defying the Supreme Court's articulated standards).
In addition to In re Rhone-PoulencRorer, the controversial use of the writ in Bauman v.
United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1997), in which the Ninth
Circuit adopted its five factor test, and In re Bendictin Product Liability Litigation, 749
F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984), occurred in the context of class actions and certifications.
There have been a few controversial uses of the writ outside the class action context.
For example, at least one court has articulated a standard for issuing a writ in the
privilege context that does not appear to comport with the traditionally stringent standards. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d
Cir. 1992).
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C. A Coherent Regime
The individual exceptions to the final judgment rule are relatively clear, produce predictable outcomes, and impose few burdens
on the federal courts. These exceptions, along with the final judgment rule, also form a coherent framework that generally draws sensible distinctions between orders that warrant immediate appeal and
those that do not. Although there are good reasons to expand the
current list of exceptions, the existing regime is a sound base on
which to build.
The current regime begins with the final judgment rule. Few dispute its wisdom.' 73 In most cases, the rule best serves the interests of
174
litigants, prospective litigants, and the trial and appellate courts.
Thus, piecemeal appeals generally should be avoided: unless there is a
substantial justification for creating piecemeal litigation-some justification beyond the typical hardships resulting from application of the
finaljudgment rule-appellate review should wait until the end of the
litigation in the district court. 75
Congress and the federal courts have sought to alleviate the harm
associated with the delayed review inherent in the final judgment rule
by fashioning exceptions in certain circumstances. 17 6 This accounts
for some of the category-based exceptions, the death knell doctrine,
the ad hoc balancing approach in Gillespie, and the once-expansive
application of the collateral order doctrine. However, critics often
suggest that all of the exceptions-or at minimum, all of the interpretive doctrines-exist to allow immediate review of district court errors
177
that otherwise will inflict significant hardships or irreparable harm.
173 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the few commentators
that have suggested the federal courts move to an entirely discretionary regime and
the responses to these commentators).
174 See Martineau, supra note 3, at 771 (recognizing that, although significant reform is needed, the final judgment rule "has continued in existence because in most
cases it serves the purposes of some or most litigants and prospective litigants, their
lawyers, the trial court, the appellate court, and ultimately the public").
175 This echoes the Supreme Court's admonition in Coopers that only compelling
reasons justify altering the relationship between the respective courts established by
the final judgment rule. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470 (1978).
176 When I refer to irreparable harm, I do so in a general rather than technical
sense. Irreparable harm may include any kind of harm, cost, burden, or hardship
that is imperfectly correctable (in whole or in part) after finaljudgment. The severity
of the harm or threatened harm and the level of irreparability (correctability) may
vary greatly from case to case, order to order.
177 See, e.g.; Lawyers Conference Comm., supranote 4, at 35 (stating that generally
the exceptions to the finaljudgment rule "involve situations in which a litigant may be
seriously harmed by an order entered during the course of litigation and for which
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From this perspective, the current mix of exceptions looks arbitrary
because it provides for immediate review of a select number of inter178
locutory decisions that may cause hardships but not others.
Yet, as the previous sections of this Article demonstrate, the mere
threat of hardship or irreparable harm is not the touchstone for any
of the existing interpretative doctrines, the certification exceptions, or
mandamus review.' 7 9 Such a threat is not enough alone because-as
reversal after final judgment would not be an adequate remedy"); Martineau, supra
note 3, at 738, 737-38 (suggesting that the courts have performed "legal gymnastics"
to recharacterize interlocutory orders that lead to harsh or irreparable results and
criticizing the current regime for providing appeals of right for entire categories of
orders within which some orders do not threaten such results); Solimine & Hines,
supra note 69, at 1548 (suggesting that the various exceptions to the final judgment
rule were fashioned to avoid undue hardship for particular litigants); Kruse, supra
note 5, at 712 (stating that "[a]s a response to the overall problem of hardship, both
the courts and Congress have developed exceptions to the final judgment rule that
allow interlocutory appeals when the technical requirements of finality have not been
met," but later conceding that the Supreme Court has rejected hardship as the touchstone for review of class certification orders); Nagel, supra note 4, at 203-04 (suggesting that the judicially crafted exceptions to the final judgment rule are traceable
to the concern about hardship and effective unreviewability); see also MARTINEAU,
supra note 28, § 4.1 ("To accommodate this need, the finality requirement has been
refined or exceptions created to avoid arbitrary harshness in particular cases or classes
of cases."); Anderson, supra note 4, at 543 ("The common policy underlying all...
statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule is that the error-correcting benefits of
immediate appeal from particular orders outweigh the general costs of piecemeal
appeal."); Nicole E. Paolini, Comment, The Cohen Collateral OrderDoctrine: The Proper
Vehicle for Interlocutory Appeal of Discovery Orders, 64 TUL. L. REv. 215, 230-34 (1989)
(suggesting that the crux of the collateral order inquiry is whether delayed review
would inflict irreparable harm).
178 SeeTurk, supranote 5, at 1026 ("[A]lthough the present patchwork of statutory
and judicial exceptions provides relief in a variety of situations, it fails to effectively or
consistently afford appellate review in all hardship cases.").
179 The certification exceptions and mandamus review certainly prevent the infliction of irreparable harm, but such harm avoidance alone is not the touchstone of
these exceptions. See Kruse, supra note 5, at 720 (stating with regard to mandamus
that hardship or inconvenience is not enough to support issuance of the writ); see also
supraParts I.A.1-.2 (discussing the certification exceptions' governing standards and
the standards for mandamus review). Likewise, the foregoing analysis of the collateral order and death knell doctrines demonstrates that the threat of irreparable harm
is not sufficient to convert an otherwise'nonfinal order into a final decision under any
of the interpretive doctrine. See supra notes 67-69, 139-44 and accompanying text.
Although some decisions have suggested that application 'of the Forgay doctrine
hinges on the threat of irreparable harm (that the property is likely to be sold before
appeal), Forgay is almost never utilized as an independent basis for immediate appeal.
See supranotes 42-45 and accompanying text. Moreover, a close reading of the Forgay
decision reveals that the Court found that the transfer order was final not simply
because of the threat that subject property would be sold before appeal, but also
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discussed more fully in Part II, infra-irieparable harm is a typical, not
exceptional, cost of delayed appellate review.' 8 0 By rejecting both the
death knell doctrine and extreme irreparable harm as the benchmark
for the third prong of the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme
Court made clear that irreparable harm or hardship is not the talisman of immediate review.' 8 a Likewise, by confining Gillespie to its
facts, and by emphasizing in Budinich and recent collateral order doctrine decisions that appealability must be governed by bright-line, categorical rules, the Court has demonstrated its unwillingness to allow
appellate courts to engage in an ad hoc balancing of hardships when
determining whether an interlocutory order is an appealable "final
decision."' 8 2 The threat of irreparable harm alone is not the sole basis for any-much less all-of these exceptions.
Rather, the certification exceptions, mandamus review, and the
existing interpretive doctrines address other extraordinary circumstances in which upsetting the balance struck by the final judgment
rule is warranted. The certification exceptions-§ 1292(b) and Rule
54(b)-provide for immediate review of interlocutory orders in two
defined circumstances in which the district court judge-who has
every incentive not to do so-has decided that appellate interference
before the end of the litigation is, on balance, warranted. 8 3 Mandabecause the merits of the controversy with regard to the particular defendants were
completely resolved. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
180 See infra Part II (discussing the limitless reach of irreparable harm).
181 See supra notes 67-69, 139-44 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 100, 118 and accompanying text. The Court did acknowledge
in Johnson v. Jones, that it would consider the competing considerations underlying all
questions of finality-"the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one
hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other"-in determining
whether collateral order treatment was appropriate. 515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995). In so
doing, however, the Court noted that it would not engage in any ad hoc balancing of
hardships, and it certainly did not indicate that it would be willing to abandon the
stringent requirements of the collateral order doctrine based on a balance of costs.
See id. Indeed, the court made this statement in the context of rejecting the contention that the collateral order doctrine applies, suggesting that this balancing may simply be another consideration in addition to the already stringent requirements of the
doctrine. See id.
183 These circumstances are, respectively, the presence of an unresolved, controlling question of law (and hence, a heightened chance of error) and the express determination that in multi-party or multi-claim litigation, an appeal of some fully resolved
claim or claims should be appealable immediately because there is no just reason for
delay. See supra notes 67, 72 and accompanying text. Indeed, there is no better person than the district court judge to determine whether the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional or compelling to warrant an appeal before final judgment, given
that, in doing so, the judge is yielding control of the litigation and subjecting one or
more of his or her determinations to scrutiny by an appellate panel.
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mus review is by definition reserved for the extraordinary: circuit
courts may utilize the extraordinary writ power to prevent district
courts from acting in ways that are truly abusive or blatantly erroneous
and where no other means exists for effective review of such an
84
action.
Although tougher to trace, the existing interpretive doctrines
likewise provide for review only in extraordinary circumstances.
These doctrines fall within three conceptually related subsets. Each
allows immediate review of categories of interlocutory orders that are
completely conclusive and separable from the unresolved matters, 8 5
and that, for some compelling reason-beyond the mere threat of ir86
reparable harm-should be viewed as "final."'
184 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
185 Conclusiveness and some form of separateness from the unresolved matters
are necessary but insufficient prerequisites for treating a decision as final while other
matters remain before the district court. The need for conclusiveness is obvious; a
decision cannot be "final" if it is tentative or until the'trial judge has no intention of
further considering the decision. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3907, at 276
("At a minimum, appellate review ordinarily should not occur before it is clear that
the judge had no intention of further considering the challenged ruling."). Separateness is related to conclusiveness; this requirement ensures that immediate appellate
review of an issue will not be affected by a later district court determination, is not a
mere step in a series of decisions leading to a single, final resolution, and avoids
duplicative appeals on the same issue. See id. § 3911 (discussing the separability requirement in the collateral order doctrine context and stating that this requirement
relates closely to the basic purposes of the final judgment rule); see also Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (stating that the requirement
of finality precludes immediate appellate considerations of decisions that are subject
to revision and are "but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge").
However, conclusiveness and separateness-without more-have never been deemed
sufficiently compelling to make a decision final.
186 A compelling justification common to many, but not all of the interpretive
doctrines, is the unavoidable specter of mootness; namely, the right or interest sought
to be vindicated necessarily will be mooted or entirely unreviewable after final judgment. This justification forms part of the basis for the Moses H. Cone doctrine, the
exception for certain contempt orders, the Perlmandoctrine, and the collateral order
doctrine. Again, tfiis mootness rationale is more stringent than the mere threat or
likelihood of irreparable harm. While irreparable harm obviously is a by-product of
the inability to appeal immediately circumstances where a right or issue necessarily
will be mooted, it also will result from many other prejudgment orders that do not
meet the mootness requirement. Indeed, in early decisions rejecting expansion of
the finality requirement into new areas, the Court made clear that the prospect of
mootness rather than mere hardship is needed. See, e.g., Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323, 324-25, 327 (1940) (holding nonfinal an order denying a motion to
quash made by persons served with subpoenas duces tecum because they had not
been held in contempt and exceptions to the finality requirement have been recog-
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The first subset of interpretive doctrines provides that an order is
a final decision because it has ended entirely the litigation on the merits, and, while other matters potentially remain to be resolved before
the district court, the resolution of additional business will not moot
or revise the "merits-ending" decision. The Supreme Court planted
the seeds of this subset of doctrines in Forgay,when it emphasized that
the trial court decree at issue in that case was final because it conclusively resolved all issues as to the relevant defendants, and the case
only remained open to allow the assignee to perform a final accounting and distribution of funds among the other parties. 187 Today, this
subset includes the Moses H. Cone and "full resolution of the merits"
188
doctrines.
nized only where strict adherence "would practically defeat the right to any review at
all").
187 See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
188 See supranotes 45-54, 58-59 and accompanying text. The orders addressed by
these doctrines are both conclusive and separate from the remaining proceedings,
and resolution of the remaining issues before the district court will not moot or revise
such orders. It makes sense to treat these kinds of decisions as final because they fully
resolve the merits, precluding piecemeal appeals of the merits determinations. Thus,
although there remains more to be done than "execute the judgment," allowing an
appeal upon the final resolution of the merits of the controversy substantially conforms to the primary aims of the final judgment rule. In addition, with regard to
abstention-based stay orders falling within the Moses H. Cone doctrine, immediate review is justified because the preclusive effect of the state courtjudgment precludes the
possibility of appeal after final judgment. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying
text.
The Supreme Court may have erred in characterizing attorneys' fee awards as
"nonmerits" decisions in Budinich. Nevertheless, the "final resolution of the merits"
doctrine does not defy the purpose of § 1291 simply because it creates the possibility
of more than one appeal. That possibility exists whenever an exception to the final
judgment rule applies and is always present anyway, since some aspect of the execution of a judgment may be appealed in certain circumstances. Rather, twe goal of
avoiding piecemeal appeals is more properly viewed as aimed at avoiding successive
appeals on decisions leading to a resolution of the merits of the action.
Finally, the "full resolution of the merits" doctrine-unlike the Moses H. Cone
doctrine-might appear to constitute a significant winnowing of the final judgment
rule, but in fact, its impact likely is limited. It does affect many civil cases since the
taxing of costs could occur in nearly every such matter. Yet the taxing of costs, which
is almost always a ministerial matter, is relatively unique. Besides allowing an appeal
prior to the taxing of costs, the primary effect of the doctrine is to allow an appeal
from a judgment entered on the merits prior to the award of non-sanction-based attorneys' fees, such as awards pursuant to statutory fee-shifting provisions. Such an
award is atypical. In addition, as previously discussed, rule changes facilitating a single appeal of the merits and attorneys' fee issues limit the potential effects of
Budinich. See supra note 60. Finally, pursuant to Rule 58, only the taxing of costs and
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The second subset includes orders that conclusively resolve a matter that is related to ongoing litigation on the merits, but is sufficiently
independent of the underlying litigation to be viewed as a separate
proceeding and is otherwise worthy of independent appellate review. 189 Contempt orders are one type of order falling within this
190
category.
The third subset of interpretive doctrines addresses certain
"nonmerits" orders that are separate and distinct from the unresolved
merits of the underlying claims. While the majority of nonmerits orders are not "final" until they merge into the judgment following the
the award of fees are mentioned as actions for which the entry ofjudgment shall not
be delayed.
189 Forgay likewise may be viewed as the forerunner of this set of doctrines because
of the Court's focus on the distinctiveness of the decree being appealed and its independence from the remaining accounting proceedings. See supra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text. Indeed, in the context of the finality provision governing the
appealability of matters from state courts to the Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257,
the Court found, in circumstances somewhat reminiscent of Forgay, that a claim for
delivery of property was sufficiently disassociated and independent from an uncompleted accounting that an immediate appeal with regard to the property was warranted. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 126 (1945). Of
course, the fact that an order resolves some claims on the merits and not others is
insufficient alone to warrant a finding of this type of separateness. Rule 54(b) may
apply in such a circumstance, but only at the discretion of the district court.
190 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Criminal contempt orders fit neatly
within this subset. Such contempt citations issue at the end of criminal proceedings
and subject the contemnor to criminal punishment. See, e.g., Hicks ex rel. Feiock v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1988). Thus, a criminal contempt citation is both conclusive and separate from the underlying civil action and, as a form of immediate
criminal punishment, requires immediate, independent appellate review. See Anderson, supranote 4, at 546 ("[W] hen a defendant is sentenced to punishment for criminal contempt of court, disallowing immediate appeal would force the defendant
either to capitulate or to serve the sentence; either way, an appeal of the contempt
order after final judgment would be moot.").
Civil contempt orders against nonparties likewise are worthy of exceptional treatment. In Cunningham v. Hamilton County, the Supreme Court distinguished civil contempt sanctions against nonparties from non-contempt sanctions against attorneys,
suggesting that nonparties' interests are separate from those of parties (and their attorneys) and that a nonparty must be able to appeal a civil contempt sanction immediately in order to avoid turning the materials over, incarceration, or steadily
mounting fines. 527 U.S. 198, 207-08 (1999) (quoting E. Maico Distrib., Inc. v. Maico-Fahrzeugfabrik, G.m.b.H., 658 F.2d 944, 949-50 (3d Cir. 1981)). Moreover, the
Cunningham Court suggested that nonparies may not appeal from ajudgment in the
underlying proceeding. See id. at 206 (citing Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987)).
Hence, civil contempt citations against nonparties are both "conclusive and separate,"
and require independent appellate review since no such review will be available after
judgment in the underlying proceeding.
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final resolution of the merits, some such orders must be viewed as
"final" because they touch on rights independent of the merits that
would be destroyed if not immediately corrected. The collateral order
and Perlman doctrines are the primary examples. 19 1
Unlike the certification exceptions, mandamus review, and the
existing interpretive doctrines, some of the category-based exceptions
function, in substantial part, to prevent or to alleviate the potential for
irreparable harm. 19 2 Yet even these exceptions-including the
§ 1292 (a) exceptions, the separate rules governing bankruptcy orders,
and Rule 23(f)-thus far have been limited to extraordinary circumstances. For example, they include orders addressing extraordinary
forms of relief, such as injunctions and the appointment of receivers,
or distinct and unique forms of civil litigation, such as bankruptcy proceedings and class actions. In these limited contexts, there is an uncommonly high probability that severe irreparable harm will result
from uncorrected errors. Consistent with the other exceptions, the
current category-based exceptions address rare circumstances in
which straying from the final judgment rule is warranted.
The current regime is imperfect. 193 Yet it is not merely a hodgepodge of exceptions that address some but not all forms of irreparable
harm or hardship. On the contrary, the regime generally draws sensible distinctions: the final judgment rule applies unless a rare, substantial justification supports, immediate review of an interlocutory order,
and the existing exceptions are supported by such justifications.
There are good reasons-such as preventing discrete forms of severe
irreparable harm and clarifying troublesome areas of the law-to add
191 Orders appealable under the collateral order and Perlman doctrines are both
"conclusive and separate," see supra notes 56, 142 and accompanying text, and worthy
of immediate appeal because they involve rights that will be destroyed-and not
merely threatened, imperfectly correctable, or likely to go unappealed-without an
immediate appeal.
192 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note (indicating that Rule 23(f)

can address concerns regarding severe forms of irreparable harm-death knell effects
and forced settlements-in the class certification context).
193 Indeed, some of the lines demarcating the boundaries of various exceptions
are controversial; for example, I agree with other commentators that the Court drew
the line between "merits" and "nonmerits" in the wrong place in Mitchell and perhaps
in Budinich. Likewise, perhaps there are yet-to-be-recognized interpretive doctrines
and other situations-besides those contemplated under § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b)in which district courts should have the discretion to certify immediate appellate review. Moreover, there are certainly other categories of orders besides those embodied in the current exceptions worthy of immediate review. Finally, as I discuss below,

although I believe class certification orders warrant immediate review, I am critical of
Rule 23(f) in its current form.
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exceptions, but in doing so, the existing, sound structure should not

be abandoned.
II.

Tim FoLLY OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

Among the many proposals to alter the current regime, discretionary review of interlocutory orders is the most popular. However,
while limited reform is warranted, discretionary review is the wrong
approach.
The American Bar Association (ABA) led the way in advocating
discretion. In its 1977 StandardsRelating to Appellate Courts, the ABA

Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration proposed that
appellate courts be given discretionary power to review interlocutory,
orders if immediate review would "(1) [m] aterially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings therein; (2)
[p]rotect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or (3)
[c]larify an issue of general importance in the administration of justice."1 9 4 Although this proposal contains guiding standards, the exercise of discretion would be unfettered because the appellate panel
need not articulate reasons for granting or denying immediate review. 195 Professor Martineau, John Nagel, and Eisenberg and Morrison have advocated that the federal courts adopt the ABA's
approach. 196 Other commentators have proposed similarly broad
grants of discretionary authority.197 Still others have called for discretionary review of discrete categories of interlocutory orders. 198 Rule
23(f), which became effective December 1, 1998, represents the first
foothold of circuit-level unfettered discretion in the federal system. 199
Discretionary review offers several purported benefits. First, such,
review avoids interpretive problems and collateral litigation that may
194 ABA COMM'N, supra note 7, at 21.
195 See id. at 29-30.
196 See Eisenberg & Morrison, supranote 3, at 298, 301-02; Martineau, supra note
3, at 776-89; Nagel, supra note 4, at 201.
197 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 7, at 157-64 (proposing the eventual elimination
of the current exceptions and replacing them with pure discretionary review resulting
from district court certification or independent circuit court acceptance of review);
Turk, supra note 5, at 1040 (advocating adoption of another subsection of§ 1292 that
would allow a circuit court to choose to review various orders).
198 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 5, at 214-15 (advocating that circuit courts be
granted the authority to review denials of summaryjudgment on a discretionary basis); Kruse, supranote 5, at 705 (advocating discretionary review of class certification
orders to alleviate the potential hardship caused by the final judgment rule).
199 See supra notes 10, 87 and accompanying text.
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result from the application of mandatory rules. 20 0 Moreover, as the
ABA standards suggest, discretionary review allows circuit courts to review orders that contain probable errors that may cause "substantial
and irreparable injury" if not immediately corrected. 20 1 Circuit courts
also can review interlocutory orders that address substantive areas
where development and clarification of the law is needed. 20 2 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, discretionary review appears to promote efficiency in a time in which there is general agreement that the
circuit courts continue to face a "crisis of volume." 20 3 By selecting
200 See Martineau, supra note 3, at 786 (stating that further exceptions to the final
judgment rule will "almost inevitably increase[ ] litigation over what is appealable of
right, whether final or interlocutory"). Professor Martineau further asserts that
"[e] ach exception will breed its own subset of doctrinal analysis, with narrow or broad
interpretations involving the same considerations that have made the current final
judgment rule and its exceptions so unsatisfactory both in theory and in practice." Id.
201 See ABA COMM'N, supra note 7, at 21. Professor Martineau advocates discretionary review in part because "Li]t is impossible to predict when in a particular case
the relative interests of the parties, the prospects for early termination of the case, or
the public significance of the case will dictate the advisability of an earlier rather than
later review of an interlocutory order." Martineau, supranote 3, at 775; see also FED. R.
Cirv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note (indicating that Rule 23(f) may be utilized to
grant-an appeal where the absence of immediate review will spell the death knell of
the litigation or force a settlement by exposing a defendant to potentially ruinous
liability).
202 See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 291 (criticizing the current regime
and advocating discretionary review because interlocutory review aids in the development of the law); Gould, supra note 6, at 310-11 (stating that one of the primary
reasons for the adoption of Rule 23(f) was to enable circuit courts to -develop clear
certification standards).
203 See Davidson, supra note 5, at 214-15 (advocating, in light of the caseload crisis, that circuit courts be granted the authority to review denials of summaryjudgment
on a discretionary basis); Eisenberg & Morrison, supranote 3, at 294, 301-02 (recognizing that the size of the circuit courts' workload is an important consideration that
weighs in favor of discretionary'appellate review of interlocutory orders); Martineau,
supra note 3, at 777-87 (using data from the Wisconsin state court system-which has
adopted the ABA's recommendations regarding discretionary appellate review-to argue that the workload in a discretionary interlocutory regime may be manageable);
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note (suggesting that the concerns
about increased review of class certification orders can be "met at relatively low cost"
by establishing in the court of appeals discretionary power to hear such appeals).
The crisis of volume in the federal courts of appeals has been a concern for many
years. See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUsTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 31-43 (1994) (summarizing the various studies and calls to
address the crisis of volume); Lawyers Conference Comm., supra note 4, at 33-34
(discussing the caseload crisis and the various calls for reform over the previous thirty
years). In its report to Congress in 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSG)
indicated that the total number of cases filed in the courts of appeals increased tenfold from 1958 to 1988. FCSC REPORT, supra note 14, at 5. Although the number of
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only those interlocutory orders that are truly worthy of immediate review, circuit courts are able to correct errors and develop the law,
while controlling the impact of interlocutory review on their
204
workload.
Yet discretionary review of interlocutory orders is neither needed
nor advisable. Many of the aforementioned proponents of discretion
seek to replace or largely displace the exceptions to the final judgment rule in part because of perceived problems with the current regime.20 5 As Part I demonstrated, however, the existing exceptions
work well.
Moreover, discretionary review will neither result in dramatic increases in the correction of errors that threaten to inflict irreparable
harm nor enhance significantly the development of legal standards in
underdeveloped areas. Indeed, if discretion were to replace the current exceptions, there would be even less meaningful and effective interlocutory review. Furthermore, discretionary review is more
troublesome than its proponents foresee. It will impose substantial,
new burdens on circuit courts and litigants, including an additional
step-petitions for review-in the appellate process. Discretion also
grants to the circuit courts a new kind of power that threatens the
integrity of the courts' error correction and lawmaking functions.
appeals (both civil and criminal) has continued to rise in recent years, the rate of
increase has slowed. For example, from 1995 to 1999, the number of cases filed in
the circuit courts increased from 50,072 to 54,693. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JudicialBusiness, available at FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 1999 REPORT tbl.1, http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbusl999/contents.html [hereinafter 1999 FJC REP.]. Appeals in
civil matters have leveled off, and actually declined slightly in 1999. Nevertheless, the
sheer number of appeals continues to pose significant challenges for the courts of
appeals, particularly since the number of federal circuit judges has not been expanded significantly for decades. Appeals in civil cases remains of primary concern
since the bulk of appeals to the circuit courts are in civil matters. See Charles W.
Nihan & Harvey Rishikof, Rethinking the Federal Court System: Thinking the Unthinkable,
14 Miss. C. L. REv. 349, 359 (1994) (stating that seventy-six percent of all appeals in
the federal system in 1990 were in civil matters).
204 See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 302 (stating that discretionary review ill impose only modest burdens on courts because there is no need to perform
research or determine whether an appeal is appropriate); Martineau, supra note 3, at
777 (arguing that one of the benefits of a discretionary system is that jurisdiction of
the appellate court is never an issue and no interlocutory appeal will ever be dismissed as premature). Proponents of discretion also contend that the savings to both
the courts and parties in terms of avoiding collateral litigation and full appellate review in circumstances in which it is not necessary outweigh any burden imposed by
the petition process. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 302.
205 See Cooper, supra note 7, at 157, 162-64; Eisenberg & Morrison, supranote 3,
at 291-92, 301; Martineau, supra note 3, at 773-75; Nagel, supra note 4, at 201.
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Category-based discretionary review, like that embodied in Rule 23(f),
suffers from many of the same ills.
A.

Error Correction

The final judgment rule ensures that the circuit courts will review
district court errors, if at all, after the litigation below has ended. Although there is general agreement that application of the rule is appropriate in most circumstances, 20 6 resulting hardships are
particularly acute when parties cannot seek immediate review of perceived errors that are likely to inflict severe irreparable harm unless
corrected prior to the final judgment. Because the existing exceptions undoubtedly capture only a small number of these kinds of errors, facilitating interlocutory error correction to prevent irreparable
harm is a central theme of proposed reforms, including discretionary
review. 20 7 For example, the ABA's proposal explicitly includes pro206 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
207 Other proposed reforms include: (1) significantly expanding the list of category-based exceptions to include other types of orders that would, if erroneous, inflict
irreparable harm; and (2) adding an exception which provides for immediate appellate review of orders that, if erroneous, would inflict irreparable harm or which are
otherwise effectively unreviewable on appeal. See, e.g., H.R. 3152, 100th Cong.
§ 702 (a) (1987) (containing proposed legislation that would have allowed an interlocutory appeal when it was "essential to protect substantial rights which cannot be effectively enforced on review" after final judgment); Lawyers Conference Comm., supra
note 4, at 35-38 (proposing a codified list of statutory and judicially created exceptions as well as other categories of orders worthy of immediate review); Note, Federal
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction:An Interlocutory Restatement, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1984, at 13, 81-82 (proposing a statutory scheme that would embody a certification procedure like that contained in § 1292(b) and interlocutory appeals of right
for a long list of orders to protect specific rights of the appellant "which cannot be
adequately enforced by review after final decision").
Advocates of discretionary review argue, convincingly, that these proposed solutions have serious flaws. By expanding the list of exceptions, the first proposal cannot
solve the problem of irreparable harm because there is no way, in advance, to anticipate all types of errors in interlocutory orders that will cause such harm. See Martineau, supra note 3, at 774-75 (endorsing the view that, given the variety of
circumstances in different cases, it is "impossible to identify in advance classes or types
of interlocutory orders that should be appealable immediately"); Nagel, supra note 4,
at 216 ("A broad discretionary exception avoids the difficult, perhaps intractable,
problem of defining in advance all the categories of orders that should be appealable
before final decision."). In addition, these proposals are likely to produce a substantial amount of additional work in the circuit courts, and these courts cannot handle
further, significant increases in their workload. See Martineau, supranote 3, at 773-74
(criticizing proposals to add more categories of "final orders" because they would
increase litigation and defeat one of the purposes of the FCSC, finding ways to manage the appellate workload); Nagel, supra note 4, at 220 ("Broad categories in
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tecting a party from "substantial and irreparable injury" as a reason
208
for granting review in a particular case.
Discretionary review, however, cannot result in correction of all
errors that threaten "substantial and irreparable injuries," even if discretion completely supplants the current exceptions. Additionally,
discretionary review will not even significantly enhance error correction. Indeed, it ultimately will harm the error correction function.
1. The Limitless Reach of Irreparable Harm
As the ABA standards indicate, discretionary review of interlocutory orders is aimed, in significant part, at reducing error-induced irreparable harm. Yet, contrary to what these standards suggest,
appellate review in every circumstance in which there is a threat of
"substantial and irreparable injury" is impossible.
The universe of interlocutory orders that cause or threaten to
cause irreparable harm is vast. Virtually every interlocutory order
threatens some type of irreparable harm. For example, any order that
allows legally insufficient claims or defenses to continue to trial erroneously expands the scope of discovery, or increases other pretrial
burdens will inflict irreparable harm by forcing the victims of the errors to expend additional resources and time (which will not be reimbursed upon reversal after final judgment).209
Moreover, other types of irreparable harm-in addition to increased litigation costs-are frequent byproducts of errors that are
not immediately reviewable. All of the following interlocutory orders
would inflict various forms of severe irreparable harm-"substantial
and irreparable injury"-if uncorrected before final judgment: an erroneous refusal to enter an order protecting privileged communications or trade secrets; an erroneous denial of a motion to dismiss that
forces the defendant to file an answer containing admissions that
mandatory terms would likely lead to substantial amounts of satellite procedural litigation construing the boundaries of these categories."). Moreover, the second proposed solution may promise even more collateral litigation, because "irreparable
harm," "effectively unreviewable," or comparable criteria defy exacting definition,
and the issue of whether such hardships are present may end up being litigated in
virtually every case. See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1211-12 (criticizing proposed legislation to allow interlocutory appeals where the circuit court determines that substantial rights could not be enforced effectively on appeal because it would create
interpretive problems and litigation).
208 See ABA COMM'N, supra note 7, at 21.
209 The original beneficiary of the error will suffer harm as well, if the erroneous
decision is reversed after trial, and the beneficiary spent extra time and money litigating the erroneous claims or defenses or conducting ultimately unhelpful discovery.
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cause public relations problems; an erroneous disqualification of
plaintiffs counsel that sounds the death knell of the litigation; an
inappropriately broad license to conduct discovery that reveals truly
irrelevant facts that may lead to other lawsuits; an erroneous denial of
summary judgment in a context in which the costs and risks of litigating through trial are so great that the defendant must, as a practical
matter, settle the case; and an erroneous dismissal of some claims or
theories that reduces scope of discovery or changes the litigation posture in ways that cannot be rectified later (particularly after trial,
where the appellate court is not likely to find harmful error). Far
from being rare, such hardships are common in many types of civil litigation. 210 Likewise, in nearly every case in which a party seeks discretionary review of an interlocutory order, it can argue in good faith
that it will suffer some kind of irreparable harm-such as forced settlement-unless it receives immediate review.
Thus, "substantial and irreparable injury" knows few bounds. It
cannot serve as a helpful or effective guideline for exercising discretion. Given the hundreds of thousands of civil cases proceeding in the
federal district courts, 21 1 and the potential for multiple, important interlocutory decisions in each case (particularly in large and complex
cases), if the risk of severe irreparable harm were the benchmark for
immediate appellate review, the number of potential interlocutory ap210 The Supreme Court offered a similar assessment in the collateral order doctrine context when it rejected irreparable harm as the touchstone for demonstrating
an order is effectively unreviewable:
A fully litigated case can no more be untried than the law's proverbial bell
can be unrung, and almost every pretrial order or trial order might be called
"effectively unreviewable" in the sense that relief from error can never extend to rewriting history. Thus, erroneous evidentiary hearings, grants or
denials of attorney disqualification, and restrictions on the rights of intervening parties may burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable
by appellate reversal of a final district courtjudgment; and other errors, real
enough, will not seem serious enough to warrant reversal at all, when reviewed after a long trial on the merits. In still other cases, an erroneous
district court decision will, as a practical matter, sound the "death knell" for
many plaintiffs' claims that might have gone forward if prompt error correction had been an option. But if immediate appellate review were available
every such time, Congress's final decision rule would end up a pretty puny
one, and so the mere identification of some interest that would be "irretrievably lost" has never sufficed to meet the third Cohen requirement.
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 872 (1994) (citations
omitted).
211 In both 1998 and 1999, there were over 250,000 civil cases filed in the United
States District Courts. 1999 FJC REP., supra note 203, at 16. This figure excludes
bankruptcy court filings, which exceed a million a year.
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peals would be overwhelming, even if the circuit courts had unlimited
resources. 2 12 Discretionary review therefore cannot promise a complete solution for, or even make a significant dent in, the mass of otherwise unreviewable orders that threaten to inflict irreparable harm.
2.

Probable Error

Because irreparable harm is an ineffective benchmark for determining when to grant leave to appeal, circuit courts exercising discretion will have to determine whether an order contains error or
"probable error."213 Certainly, not all interlocutory orders that
threaten to inflict irreparable hardship contain probable errors; probable errors therefore limit the universe of interlocutory orders appropriate for immediate review.2 1 4 Yet, this limitation is far from
sufficient to reduce the number of appeals to workable levels.
I am unaware of any study that has determined district court error rates in interlocutory orders in civil matters. The reversal rate
(most often after final judgment) for all matters in the federal courts
2 15 Of
is probably somewhere between fourteen and twenty percent.
212 I therefore disagree with those who suggest that severe hardships warranting
immediate review will be rare. See, e.g., Turk, supra note 5, at 1039 (stating that discretionary review can provide relief to litigants in those "rare cases" in which the unavailability of immediate review will result in severe hardship).
213 By "probable error," I mean legal or factual conclusions embodied in an interlocutory order that, upon first review, appear more-likely-than-not erroneous and
likely to lead to a reversal, vacation, or corrective remand (upon immediate appeal).
214 As discussed below, in certain circumstances, circuit courts may be willing to
accept review even if error is not probable. I believe this will be true only in a small
number of cases, however, since orders that are likely to be affirmed do not pose a
significant risk of inflicting unjustified hardships. Some supporters of discretionary
review have suggested that an evaluation of the merits to determine whether there is
an important issue is a factor circuit panels should consider in deciding whether to
grant review. See, e.g., Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1581.
215 See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 177 tbl.B-5 (1991)
[hereinafter 1990 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting a reversal rate-including outright reversals and corrective remands-in all matters of 13.6%); see also POSNER, supra note
29, at 68-69; Solimine, supra note 4, at 1177 & n.72 (citing several sources, including
Posner, for the proposition that the reversal rate in civil cases is somewhat less than
twenty percent). But seeJon 0. Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L.
REv. 629, 632 (1992) (studying the reversal rate in the Second Circuit from July 1989
to June 1991 and concluding that the court reversed in whole or in part twenty-four
percent of the total dispositions from the district court). Judge Newman's study of
Second Circuit reversals suggests that the rate of reversal in civil matters is greater
than the rate in criminal matters. See id. at 632-33 (finding that the Second Circuit
reversed district court dispositions in civil matters twenty-seven percent of the time,
while reversing in criminal matters only nineteen percent of the time).
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course, the reversal rate may not reflect the rate of error or probable
error. Yet, if the probable error rate in interlocutory orders even approaches the reversal rate-and it may be higher-the appellate
courts would be unable to review all orders containing probable errors that threaten to inflict serious irreparable harm.2 16 Moreover,
given the current docket congestion in the federal system, review of a
217
sizable percentage of such orders simply is not possible.
Although some parties will not seek immediate review of such orders, many will. If a disgruntled party foresees that an interlocutory
order will cause some type of irreparable harm to its interests, the
party, acting rationally, would petition for review if the potential
harm, discounted by the likelihood of affirmance (by denial of review
or on the merits), exceeds the cost of filing the petition and preparing
the appeal. When the party views the probability of error as high,
petitioning for review often will be worth the investment. Thus, the
circuit courts are likely to see significant numbers-many
thousands-of petitions for interlocutory review every year.2 1 8
In his article advocating that the federal system adopt the ABA's
model, Professor Martineau uses data from the Wisconsin state court
system-which adopted the ABA approach in 1978-to support his
contention that the number of petitions may be reasonable. 2 19 His
data, from 1988 to 1990 demonstrates that during that period, the
number of appeals of right in Wisconsin outnumbered petitions for
discretionary appeal approximately nine to one. 220 In their more re-

cent article, Eisenberg and Morrison discuss the Wisconsin experience
216 I do not suggest that the error rate can be determined from the reversal rate.
However, the rate of probable error in interlocutory decisions likely will be higher
than that of actual error because some decisions that appear to contain error at first
blush will be affirmed upon closer inspection.

217 In 1998 and 1999, there were over 250,000 civil actions filed annually in the
district courts. See 1999 FJC REP., supra note 203, at 16. If the district courts make
one or more important interlocutory decisions in a significant number of these cases
prior to settlement, abandonment, or final resolution (at trial or pre-trial), the number of currently unappealable probable errors must be staggering. The potential
number of such orders is particularly overwhelming when one considers that the circuit courts are struggling with their current caseload-slightly less than 55,000 total

appeals annually (civil and criminal) in 1998 and 1999. See id.
218 Of course, the group of potential petitioners would not include parties who,
faced with such a probable error, simply do not have the resources to prepare the
petition and appeal. In this respect, discretion likely would favor defendants, who
tend to have greater resources than plaintiffs.
219 See Martineau, supra note 3, at 784.

220

See id. Professor Martineau also noted that the Wisconsin courts construe final-

ity narrowly, and hence, there may be fewer appeals of right than in the federal system. See id. Of the petitions for review, the rate of acceptance (per year) by the
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from 1994 to 1997.221 During these years, the ratio of petitions to
222
appeals of right was about the same.
If the federal system experienced comparable petition rates in
civil matters, there would be roughly 4000 to 6000 petitions per year,
given current caseload levels.2 23 Reviewing even this number of peti-

tions would impose a fairly significant burden on the circuit courts, as
discussed below. Nevertheless, use of the Wisconsin rates, while helpful, may underestimate significantly the number of petitions in civil
cases in the federal system. The data, which includes petitions in civil
and criminal cases, does not reveal the various types of cases or the
nature of the parties proceeding through the Wisconsin system during
the relevant period. 224 I suspect that the percentage of larger, more
complex civil matters is greater in federal court, as are the resources
of federal litigants, particularly defendants. Larger, complex civil
cases are likely to produce more interlocutory orders, creating additional fodder for petitions, and litigants with greater resources are
more likely to take advantage of available avenues of appeal. Thus,
although the Wisconsin experience is worth considering, the data
from that system may not predict accurately how many petitions would
be filed if the federal courts adopted a similar regime.2 2 5 The number
of petitions in the federal system easily could exceed these
expectations.
Eisenberg and Morrison also contend that the circuit courts can
handle growth in interlocutory appeals because they will save time on
the back end of the process by reducing the number of appeals after
judgment is entered below.22 6 Some appeals after final judgment will
appellate courts varied from approximately twenty-two percent to thirty-three percent.
See id. at 782-83.
221 See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 299-301.
222 See id. The rates of acceptance of appeals also were about the same (twenty-two
percent to thirty-four percent) as the earlier period. Id.
223 This figure is based on the total number of civil appeals in the federal system.
See supra note 203 (indicating that the number of appeals in the federal system was
approximately 55,000 in 1999 and that appeals in civil matters make up approximately seventy-five percent of total appeals).
224 The data includes petitions in both civil and criminal cases, and does not indicate the number of petitions in civil matters only.
225 See Nagel, supra note 4, at 220 (advocating that the federal courts adopt Wisconsin's approach, but conceding that the Wisconsin numbers "tell little of what impact this discretionary scheme would have on the federal system").
226 See Eisenberg & Morrison, supranote 3, at 301 (stating that any increase in the
number of interlocutory appeals will be more than offset by decreases in appeals from
final judgments); see also Solimine, supra note 4, at 1178 (stating, in advocating increased use of § 1292(b), that an increase in interlocutory appeals may decrease the
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be averted, both directly and indirectly.2 27 However, there will still be

a substantial net gain in the number of attempted appeals (appeals of
right plus petitions for appeals). First, in a discretionary regime, there
will be the possibility of multiple appeals, reducing gains in foreclosing appeals after final judgment. Moreover, in the current regime,
final judgment will never be entered in most cases because two-thirds
will settle or be abandoned. 228 In many other cases that do reach final
judgment, an appeal on a particular issue will not be taken because it
has been mooted. Thus, in a discretionary regime, the circuit courts
will face probable errors that they never would have confronted in the
2 29
current regime.
Finally, in addition to this net gain in possible appeals, the added
work of reviewing petitions for probable error will further burden the
circuit courts. This would be true even if review of individual petitions
usually were not onerous. While petition review will not require the
drafting of opinions, it often will involve the remaining aspects of actual appellate review. 230 Many errors are subtle, involving the inapoverall federal court caseload by expediting resolution of cases and promoting development of the law).
227 For example, interlocutory review will directly avert an appeal after trial of a
denial of a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss or motion for summaryjudgment. Interlocutory review also will prevent a later appeal if it moves the parties towards
settlement.
228 See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., Explanation of Judicial Caseload Profiles, in
FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (1998) [hereinafter 1998 FCMS].

Nearly a

third are resolved prior to trial. See id. Less than five percent of civil matters proceed
to trial. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 215, at 212 (indicating that the trial rate has
hovered between 4.3 percent and five percent); see also THEODORE EISENBERG ET AL.,

7
(1995) (finding in a national study that 2.99% of all civil cases filed in both state and
federal court go to trial). I believe discretionary review will produce no net increase
in settlements. As Professor Solimine discussed in reviewing the settlement literature,
both certainty and uncertainty can promote settlements within individual cases. See
Solimine, supra note 4, at 1180-81. He argues, nevertheless, that certainty in the law
ultimately will promote more settlements. See id. at 1181. Enhanced clarity of legal
standards eventually would promote pre-trial resolutions, including settlements. Yet
the limited and uneven interlocutory review that will result in a discretionary regime
is unlikely to significantly enhance development of clear legal standards.
229 Eisenberg and Morrison, therefore, are incorrect when they state that, in most
cases, "the question is not whether, but when" the issues will reach the court of appeals. See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 301. Given the huge percentage of
cases that settle and number of issues that are mooted prior to an appealable final
judgment, most issues that would be raised in petitions for interlocutory review otherwise would never reach the appellate courts.
230 In criticizing proposals for abandoning appeals of right, Professor Carrington
makes a similar observation:
LITIGATION OUTCOMES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURT: A STATISTIcAL PORTRAIT
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propriate extension of a legal principle or a misapplication of the law
to a given set of facts. Careful review may be necessary to determine
whether there is probable error. Reviewing orders for possible abuses
of discretion will be particularly time consuming and ultimately may
involve a significant review of the factual record, if that is allowed at
23 1
the petition stage.
If the circuit courts fail to undertake such exacting petition review, they face risks on both sides. If they find probable error too
often, they will add too many appeals to their crowded dockets. If
they fail to spot probable errors, they will defeat the goal of prevent23 2
ing irreparable harm caused by erroneous interlocutory decisions.
All of this-the sheer number of probable errors in interlocutory
orders that threaten to inflict irreparable harm, the number of resulting petitions for review, and other workload pressures on the circuit
courts-demonstrates a relatively straightforward point: discretionary
interlocutory review cannot substantially alleviate the hardships associ[Elliminating the appeal of right is not likely to save a great deal of the
courts' energies since we presently give the right only casual respect. Unlike
discretionary review in the Supreme Court, which limits the range of issues
to be considered, discretionary review at the first level is not effective to foreclose channels of argument that an appellant might make. A first-level appellant will write about as much, and sound about the same, whether the
action sought is a reversal or a leave to appeal. The court cannot decide to
refuse leave to appeal without in fact deciding whether the appeal has merit.
Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REv.
411, 430 (1987). Professor Carrington goes on to state that no one "has or would
suggest that a court of appeals should deny leave to appeal from a legally incorrect
judgment of a district court." Id. I suggest, at least with regard to interlocutory discretionary review, that that is exactly what will happen in many circumstances.
231 For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with the assertion of Eisenberg and
Morrison that judges "should be able to read the papers quite quickly and make an
informed judgment about whether the case warrants an exception to the final judgment rule." See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 302. Class action decisions,
for example, are complex, highly fact specific, and almost always subject to an abuse
of discretion standard. See Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1575 & n.233 (citing
cases).
232 There is currently a proposal to amend Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to limit the length of petitions for permission to appeal (currently
governing petitions under Rule 23(f) and § 1292(b)) to twenty pages. Comm. on
Rules of Prac. and Proc. of theJud. Conf. of the U.S., ProposedAmendments to the Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civi and Criminal Rules of Procedure - August 2000, at http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/comment200l/amendments/ap.pdf. Although this page limitation will provide some benefit in terms of fewer pages to read, careful review of petitions and answers will still take time. Moreover, this number of pages may be
insufficient to explain the merits of immediate review in complex cases or where the
trial court's determination was based on a dense record.
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ated with the final judgment rule. Under a discretionary regime, the
circuit courts will be unable to review more than a small percentage of
probable errors in interlocutory orders that threaten to inflict irreparable harm.

3.

23 3

Even Less Review

One potential benefit of discretionary review is that the circuit
courts can screen out orders containing no probable errors. For example, if discretionary review were to replace many of the current exceptions, rather than merely supplement them, resources the courts
now expend on reviewing appealable orders containing no probable
errors could be reallocated to address probable errors in currently
unappealable orders. 234 The additional work associated with reviewing petitions would reduce the net savings, but, at least in theory, discretion could result in somewhat greater probable error review.
Such benefits will not be forthcoming. The circuit courts are
struggling to manage their caseload. Realistically, circuit court judges
will take into account that denying review means less work. If given
the choice, they will choose to review fewer orders than they are currently reviewing. Indeed, this would be consistent with the experiences of courts-including the Supreme Court and the Virginia
appellate courts-that exercise discretionary review in an environment of rising caseloads. 235 Likewise, current circuit court practices
233 See Dalton, supra note 33, at 72 (recognizing that certiorari-or discretionary
review-has never been a way of assuring error correction in individual cases).
234 There are significant obstacles in the way of implementing a purely discretionary interlocutory regime. Entirely replacing the current exceptions with discretionary
review cannot be achieved through rulemaking, since some of these exceptions-i.e.,
§ 1292(a), § 1292(b), and § 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act-are statutory. Capturing Congress's attention and convincing it to abrogate all or even some of these exceptions is unlikely. Moreover, because the interpretive doctrines provide for appeals
of right pursuant to § 1291, in order to replace these doctrines with discretionary
review, the rulemakers would first have to utilize their § 2072(c) authority to abrogate
the doctrines. Whether the Supreme Court would be willing to accept abrogation of
all of the existing interpretive doctrines is an open question.
235 See MarthaJ. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 11, 14 (stating that as appeals to the circuit courts have risen,
fewer and fewer of these cases are being heard by the Supreme Court); Edward A.
Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1646 (2000) (pointing out that the number of cases the
Supreme Court chooses to decide has declined since the early part of this century);
Graham C. Lilly & Antonin Scalia, AppellateJustice: A Crisis in Virginia?, 57 VA. L. REv.
2, 4 (1971) (identifying a significant discrepancy between the increases in total workload and petitions for review in Virginia and the grants of review from 1959-1969);
see also Bernard G. Barrow, The DiscretionaryAppeal: A Cost Effective Tool of Appellate
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suggest this result. During the last two decades, the circuit courts-on
their own initiative-have implemented various rules and practices to
reduce their work. 236 In addition, the circuit courts' surprisingly low
rate of review of orders certified under § 1292(b) suggests that the
circuit courts resist giving themselves more work, even when the total
impact on their caseloads would be minimal.23 7 Moreover, as discussed more fully below, review of class certification orders under
Rule 23 (f) has been sparse. Indeed, research reveals that from its effective date (December 1, 1998) to March 21, 2001, the circuit courts
have granted review under this provision only eighteen times. 23 8 Even
discounting the first six months after the rule became effective, that
amounts to less than one grantper circuitper year. Thus, while discretion

may provide the opportunity for more frequent review of probable
Justice, 11 GEo. MASON L. REv. 31, 35-36 (1988) (stating-in advocating reform-that
later history in Virginia confirms a strong inverse relationship between the total number of petitions for review considered by the state's supreme court and the percentage
of those granted).
The two studies of Wisconsin's discretionary system revealed that the courts of
appeals in that state granted review between twenty-two and thirty-four percent of the
time. See supranotes 220, 222. Again, I question whether the Wisconsin experience is
a helpful predictor of how the federal circuit courts might respond in a discretionary
regime. Unlike some of the other aforementioned courts and court systems, there is
no indication that the Wisconsin courts of appeals were experiencing similarly
strained dockets.
236 In the last three decades, the circuit courts have significantly altered their internal rules and procedures to facilitate speedier resolution of cases. See BAKER, supra
note 203, at 106-50 (describing various "intramural reforms" the circuit courts have
utilized to assist in managing their caseload, including limiting oral argument and
issuing fewer written and published opinions); Dragich, supra note 235, at 28-30 (discussing various internal reforms in the circuit courts, including eliminating oral arguments, investing less time studying the case, and writing fewer opinions). This trend
supports the hypothesis that, given the opportunity, circuit panels will avoid conducting a thorough appellate review. Moreover, as discussed previously, circuit courts
rarely choose to review district court orders via mandamus. See supra notes 164-69.
237 See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1174 (stating that the acceptance rate of certified
orders in the 1980s was approximately thirty-five percent). Professor Solimine's survey of one circuit's treatment of § 1292(b) indicated that parties' failure to comply
with the requirements of the statute was the basis for denial of a significant number of
appeals. See id. at 1199-1200. These procedural failings, however, did not explain
most denials. See id. at 1200-01 (stating that many denials were attributable to that
fact that the cases were not sufficiently "exceptional" to justify immediate review).
Professor Solimine ultimately concluded that there is a high level of reluctance
among circuit courts to accept appeals under the statute. See id. at 1201.
238 See infra notes 261-65 and accompanying text. During the same period, additional interlocutory review of class certification orders pursuant to § 1292(b) occurred four times.
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error in interlocutory orders, circuit courts are not likely to take advantage of that opportunity.
Discretion therefore is likely to result in less review. Under a discretionary regime, the circuit courts generally would limit their grants
to three types of interlocutory orders: those containing (1) obvious
and unburdensome errors; (2) probable errors in big or exceptional
cases; and (3) intolerable probable errors.
The courts are likely to grant review of obvious and unburdensome errors because such errors, by definition, will be easy to spot and
easy to correct. Review of this group may make sense given the low
transaction costs, but it is a limited universe of orders. Unfortunately,
however, the opposite is also true: courts are far less likely to grant
review when determining whether there is probable error is difficult
or where correcting such error will be burdensome. 239 In such circumstances, the court would have to invest more time to determine
whether the order contains probable errors and then would have to
240
expend significant time and resources correcting any such error.
Such disincentives are troubling because district courts are more likely
to make errors when the legal issues or application of legal principles
are difficult, and, as discussed in the next Section, they need greater
241
guidance in such areas.
239 In the context of crowded dockets, circuit judges would tend to avoid review
that would require significant amounts of additional work. See Mito Gulati & C.M.A.
McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157,

160-61, 173-74 (1998) (indicating that circuit judges may utilize the "judgment order" in hard cases to save judicial resources and avoid scrutiny). For example, circuit
courts may avoid review of more complex legal doctrines, heavily fact-based inquiries,
and determinations that involve several levels of legal or factual analysis.
240 In critiquing the practices of the circuit courts (in the mid-1980s) and calling
into question the propriety of abandoning appeals of right for a discretionary system,
Professor Carrington observed that appellate courts have removed themselves to
some extent from the "humdrum" work of reading transcripts and determining the
accuracy of the work done by the trial court. See Carrington, supra note 230, at
428-29. The courts are likely to exercise the same option in a discretionary interlocutory regime, in which avoidance is even easier.
241 Indeed, one of the bases for adoption of Rule 23(f) was to clarify the law with
regard to the standards for class certification. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's note. Yet class certification decisions are intensively fact-based and left to the
sound discretion of the districtjudge. See Kruse, supra note 5, at 705-10 (describing
the standards under Rule 23 governing class certification and notice, and stating that
the decision to certify the class is left to the discretion of the trial judge and involves a
practical application of the standards to the facts of the case). Circuit judges may
think twice about accepting review of such decisions, which will require a significant
amount of work and attention.
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The circuit courts also are likely to grant review of some probable
errors in certain big or exceptional cases-cases that are truly extraordinary in terms of participants, monetary or other stakes, regional or national impact, or public attention. 242 Granting review in
these cases may be appropriate, but it will not assist parties seeking
243
review in most cases.
Finally, the circuit courts are likely to limit their remaining grants
to probable errors they find to be intolerable, in other words, probable errors (or certain types of irreparable harm threatened by such
errors) that so offend a majority of the reviewing judges that they are
willing to increase their own workload to review them. Those probable errors that are not intolerable to the reviewing panel, or are not
intolerable enough to justify the added work, will go uncorrected.
4.

Intolerable Error and the Darker Side of Discretion

Up to this point, I have questioned the advantages and detailed
the potential costs of discretionary review. Having reached the conclusion that circuit courts are likely to limit their review in most circumstances to intolerable error, I now contend that discretion is
undesirable because it affords the circuit courts a new and dangerous
kind of power.
Much criticism already exists of various institutional changes circuits have adopted to allow greater control of their workload at the
expense of full appellate review. 244 These changes include submitting
242 Even if the probable error at issue in a big case is not troubling or particularly
interesting to the appellate panel, the panel may be willing to accept the burden of
review given the case's overall importance. Indeed, several circuits have suggested
that review of orders under § 1292(b) is only appropriate in big and exceptional

cases. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Although I agree with Professor
Solimine that this limitation is an inappropriate judicial gloss on § 1292(b), it evidences the circuit courts' willingness to become involved in certain aspects of big
cases proceeding in the district courts. See Solimine, supranote 4, at 1173. However,

the circuits' sparse use of Rule 23(f) suggests that simply because a case is a class
action does not mean that it is sufficiently big or exceptional to capture the circuits'

attention.
243 Such an investment of resources may make sense if it advances a case that will
affect many people, but it also may mean that the courts will be less likely to expend
resources reviewing probable errors in other cases.

244 See Carrington, supra note 230, at 424-28 (criticizing the changes in appellate
procedures-while noting that the caseload crisis cannot be blamed on the judiciary-and de-emphasis on ensuring that district court errors are corrected); Gulati &
McCauliff, supranote 239, at 160 (discussing the dangers to the integrity of the judicial function posed by the use or misuse of "short form" dispositions); Thomas Kallay,
The Dismissal of FrivolousAppeals by the CaliforniaCourts of Appeal, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 92, 92

(1979) (arguing that if a party can perfect an appeal as a matter of right, he should
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various types of matters to administrative prescreening, more frequent
denials of oral argument, greater use of summary affirmances and
judgment orders, and issuance of unpublished and nonbinding opinions. 245 Some commentators contend that such reforms give circuit

'246
courts something close or analogous to "certiorari power.
Discretionary review of interlocutory orders goes further: it is certiorari power. 24 7 There are few, if any, institutional constraints on its
exercise. 248 Such unfettered authority to decide whether to correct
reversible error departs from the traditional framework within which
the circuit courts have operated. The circuit courts-unlike the Su-

necessarily be entitled to the benefits of the entire deliberative process offered by the
forum to which he has taken his appeal). See generally Martha J. Dragich, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeals PerishIf They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions To
Explain andJustify JudicialDecisions Pose a Greater Threat, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995)
(concluding that the increased incidence of unpublished opinions, summary dispositions, and vacatur upon settlement has dire implications for the development of a
coherent body of law and would ultimately exacerbate the litigation explosion in the
federal courts); Donald P. Lay, A Proposalfor Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 34 Sw. LJ. 1151, 1153 (1981) (describing the significant danger of one-judge
opinions in circuits who decide no-argument cases without collegial conference of the
three judges meeting together and exchanging divergent views).
245 See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 239, at 159 ("Constrained by a lack of resources, the circuit courts have turned to shortcuts."); see also Dalton, supranote 33, at
63 & n.6 ("IT]he right to appeal has in practice begun to shrink to a mere formality
in many jurisdictions as appellate judges severely restrict oral argument, deliberate
alone, write skeletal opinions, write unpublished opinions, affirm without opinion,
and in some cases rule from the bench."); Kirt Shuldberg, DigitalInfluence: Technology
and Unpublished Opinionsin the FederalCourts of Appeals, 85 CAL.L. REV. 541, 543 (1997)
(examining the original justifications for limiting the publication of federal appellate
opinions, concluding that many of the limited publication/no citation plans currently
in use are suboptimal in light of modern day storage and research capabilities). For
example, the circuit courts now resolve far more appeals without opinions or in unpublished orders. See 1998 FCMS, supra note 228, at 49 tbl.S-3 (indicating that 78.1
percent of the opinions and orders filed in cases terminated by the circuit courts from
October 1998 to September 1999 were unpublished).
246 See generally William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273
(1996) (arguing for an increase in the size of the appellate system); Carl Tobias, The
New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264
(1996) (arguing that because judicial expansion. is a potentially ineffective and unrealistic solution to multiplying appeals, a national commission should be appointed
to evaluate the appellate system).
247 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's notes (stating that discretionary
review under Rule 23(f) is unfettered and akin to the Supreme Court's certiorari
power).
248 See Dalton, supranote 33, at 63 n.6 (describing various criticisms of changes to
appellate review, including the loss of checks on the appellate courts' power).
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preme Court-have always been courts of error. 249 As part of this corrective function, they have been obliged to determine whether there
is error and to correct reversible errors properly before them. 250 Indeed, some argue that this obligation is inherent in the traditional
25
notion of judicial review. '
It is unwise to abandon this tradition, even for interlocutory orders alone. What constitutes intolerable probable error is subjective
and unchecked by formal or informal constraints in a pure discretionary regime. 2 52 Circuit judges often will employ legitimate factors in
determining whether to grant review, such as determining whether
alleged errors defy newly-created circuit precedent or will result in
some kind of uncommonly severe irreparable harm. However, judges
also may employ other, troublesome considerations-consciously or
unconsciously-in deciding which probable errors to review. 253 For
example, judges may allow personal preferences regarding certain
outcomes, plaintiffs or defendants, or types of claims or defenses to
creep into their decision whether to grant review. In addition, circuit
judges may be more or less likely to tolerate errors made by particular
district courtjudges or magistrates. 25 4 Also, based on preference, per249 See Carrington, supranote 230, at 416 (stating that at the time of the Evarts Act
in 1891, the appellate courts were perceived as error correctors and that it was not
until later that they even took on their additional role as lawmakers).
250 Cf Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 239, at 174 (stating that, unlike the Supreme
Court, the courts of appeals do not have the power to deny review to a properly submitted claim of error); James Boyd White, What's an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1363, 1367-68 (1995) (arguing that the judicial opinion is a central and important
feature of the law).
251 See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 235, at 1713-26 (questioning whether the Supreme Court's unfettered discretion to involve itself or not involve itself in cases defies our traditional notions ofjudicial review and power, and discussing the views of
other commentators).
252 Cf Gulati & McCauliff, supranote 239, at 163,166 (commenting on the lack of
formal and external monitoring of the use of short form dispositions such as judgment orders).
253 See Nagel, supranote 4, at 220-22 (advocating discretionary review but conceding that discretion may lead to certain, isolated injustices).
254 See id. at 222 (conceding that appellate courts may be more receptive to requests for interlocutory review of orders issued by district court judges with an unfavorable history and may look less carefully at requests from cases before judges viewed
more favorably). In his early article warning about the increasing power of the federal circuit courts, Professor Wright expressed concern about appellate panels substituting their ownjudgment of what is just in a particular case for that of the trial judge.
See Wright, supra note 163, at 779-81. Although it is beyond dispute that one role of
circuit courts is to correct errors committed below, discretion would allow circuit
panels to decide, without constraints, whether and when to substitute their particular
brand ofjudgment for that of the district court with regard to interlocutory orders. If
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sonal experience, or even bias, judges may have a greater distaste for
certain types of irreparable harm than others.
The level of risk of improper use of discretion cannot be quantified. However, the circuit courts' treatment of petitions under
§ 1292 (b)-their only opportunity to exercise discretion prior to Rule
23(f)-may provide some tentative insights. 255 As stated above, the
rate at which circuit courts grant review of orders certified under
§ 1292(b)-fifty percent in the 1960s and only thirty-five percent in
the 1980s-is surprising low. 256 This rate is troubling because certified orders are likely to be worthy of immediate review. The certifying
judge is familiar with the case, and her determination that review is
warranted is inherently trustworthy, since she is voluntarily relinquishing control of the litigation, inviting further delay, and subjecting her
own order to possible reversal. 257 Because they need not state their
reasons for denying review, how individual panels decide whether to
accept review is largely unknown. 258 Given the trustworthiness of the
district court's determination, the low rate of grants, and the lack of a
discernable pattern of grants and denials, it is possible that inappropriate or undesirable criteria are being employed. 259
Studying the circuit courts' response to Rule 23(f)-the first
foray into unlimited and unfettered discretion-would be the best way
to test these hypotheses regarding discretionary review. At this stage,
however, Rule 23(f) is too new to support any definitive concluthe panel likes the result, even if the district court erred, it will let the order stand; if
the panel does not, it will take review. As Professor Wright argued, such unconstrained power to decide whether to interfere is troublesome for a number of reasons,
not the least of which is the creation of great uncertainty for parties and the district
courts. See generally id.
255 Again, however, review under § 1292(b) is not solely in the discretion of the
circuit courts, since the district court must certify the order before the circuit courts
can decide whether to review it. Thus, it is less "unfettered" than discretionary review
under Rule 23(f) or the other proposals.
256 See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also Solimine, supra note 4, at
1174.
257 See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1201-02 (arguing that more deference should be
afforded a district court judge's decision to certify an appeal).
258 See id. at 1202 (conceding that the circuit's reasoning for denying review is
largely unknown because such reasons are rarely articulated in published opinions).
259 In his thorough analysis of the circuit courts' treatment of orders certified
under § 1292(b) (prior to 1990), Professor Solimine concludes that the courts' reasons for denying review are largely unknown. See id. He does not conclude that the
circuits are employing illegitimate factors, although he does state that district court
certifications should be given greater deference and that docket concerns are not a
convincing reason to abandon such deference. See id. at 1201-02. The lack of deference and absence of articulated reasons for denying review are troubling.
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sions. 260 In addition, a thorough study of the courts' treatment of

Rule 23(f) petitions is difficult because circuit courts do not keep
records on the number of Rule 23(f) petitions filed, granted, or denied, and many dispositions without opinions-virtually all denials, I
suspect-are not accessible online.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting the potentially disturbing, albeit
inconclusive trend. Online research reveals that, as of March 21,
2001, circuit courts have granted review under Rule 23(f) in only eighteen cases: 2 6 ' the courts have (1) reversed or vacated class certification
in eleven cases; 262 (2) affirmed class certification in three cases; 263 (3)
26 4
reversed and remanded the denial of class certification in two cases;

260 During the hearings on Rule 23(f), at least a few commentators opposed to the
rule expressed fears regarding the effect of discretion (in addition to concerns about
cost, delay, and the need for appellate review). See infra note 296 and accompanying
text.
261 This research covered the period of the rule's effective date, December 1,
1998, to March 21, 2001. Online searches were conducted on both Lexis and
Westlaw, using various terms and connectors queries. For example, the following
terms and connectors search was performed on both services: "23(f) or interlocutory
and class and certifi" More general searches were performed to determine whether
there were other class certification determinations that received interlocutory review
during the relevant period. In addition to the eighteen cases in which review was
granted, these searches produced six cases in which Rule 23(f) was discussed, but
review ultimately was denied. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188,
1196 (9th Cir. 2000); Z-Seven Fund, Inc. v. Motorcar Parts & Accessories, 231 F.3d
1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000); Blaney v. City of Va. Beach, No. 99-7598, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18293, at *2 (4th Cir. July 14, 2000); Scott v. Dennis Reimer Co., 205 F.3d
1341, 1341 (6th Cir. 2000); Richardson Elecs., Ltd. v. Panache Broad, Inc., 202 F.3d
957, 959 (7th Cir. 2000); Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 1999).
262 See Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2001); Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 2001); In reLife USA Holding, 242
F.3d 136, 150 (3d Cir. 2001); Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 241 F.3d 417, 419 (5th Cir.
2001); Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 972 (5th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v.
Ky. Dep't of Corr., No. 98-6548, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26160, at *13 (6th Cir. Oct. 12,
2000); Carter v. West Publ'g Co., 225 F.3d 1258, 1267 (11th Cir. 2000); Lemon v. Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 139, 216 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2000); Rutstein
v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2000); Pickett v. Ia. Beef
Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2000);Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc.,
195 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 1999).
263 See Bertulli v. Indep. Ass'n of Cont'l Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 2001);
Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 298-99 (1st Cir. 2000); Blair v.
Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 1999).
264 See Wagner v. Prof'l Eng'rs, No. 00-15753, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2340, at *4
(9th Cir. Jan. 11, 2001); Culver v. City of Milwaukee, No. 98-2079, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26473, at *17 (7th Cir. Sept. 8, 1999).
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and (4) affirmed the denial of class certification in two cases. 26 5 Thus,
review of orders granting class certification outpaces review of orders
denying class certification fourteen to four, and reversals in favor of
defendants outnumber reversals in favor of plaintiffs eleven to two.

These early results establish neither the existence of bias among
circuit judges against plaintiffs or putative classes nor that most grants
or denials of review were inappropriate. Since the courts do not keep

track of grants and denials and need not give their reasons for grant266
ing or denying review, we probably will never know their reasoning.

Nevertheless, at a minimum, this trend suggests that certification
grants may be receiving closer scrutiny than denials. Indeed, at least
one circuit court has expressed skepticism toward class claims of irreparable harm. 267 Moreover, I am skeptical that, in over two years, the
circuits have been presented with so few class certification orders wor-

thy of review, particularly orders denying class treatment.
Thus, while the trend away from full appellate review in the fed-

eral circuits is troublesome, discretionary review of interlocutory orders should cause more concern. There is greater accountability
where review is mandatory but limited (such as no oral argument, no
opinion, etc.), including the risk of reversal, informal and formal peer

265 See Tumer v. Beneficial Corp., 242 F.3d 1023, 1028 (11 th Cir. 2001) (en banc);
DeBlasio v. Johnson, No. 99-7723, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23189, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept.
13, 2000).
During this period, the circuit courts also granted interlocutory review of four
other class certification orders pursuant to § 1292(b), one falling within each of the
aforementioned categories. See Perrone v. GMAC, 232 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2000)
(fourth category); Wash. v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 199 F.3d' 263, 270 (5th Cir. 2000)
(first category); Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, 186 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2000)
(second category); Williams v. Block, No. 98-55609, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8979, at *4
(9th Cir. May 3, 2000) (third category).
266 Some commentators who support discretionary review have suggested that circuit courts should demystify the process by explaining their reasons for denying review. See, e.g., Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1585-86; Nagel, supra note 4, at
217.
267 See Blair, 181 F.3d at 834.
[W] e must be wary lest the mind hear a bell that is not tolling. Many class
suits are prosecuted by law firms with portfolios of litigation, and these attorneys act as champions for the class even if the representative plaintiff would
find it uneconomical to carry on with the case. These law firms may carry on
in the hope of prevailing for a single plaintiff and then winning class certification (and the reward of larger fees) on appeal, extending victory to the
whole class.
Id. (citations omitted).
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review, and the possibility of misinterpretation in later cases. 268 There
are fewer institutional constraints to minimize inappropriate considerations when the courts exercise unfettered discretion to decide
whether to review an order.2 69 A circuit panel armed with such discretion can ignore reversible error for any reason, without comment, and
without downstream consequences.
If discretionary review of interlocutory orders were the only way
to enhance error correction, perhaps it would be worth these risks.
For example, if Rule 23(f) will facilitate correction of errors in class
certification orders that necessarily would go uncorrected otherwise,
the fact that reversals may favor defendants disproportionately might
be worth overlooking to ensure that some errors get addressed. Yet,
this simply means discretionary review ought to be considered in the
absence of other viable options. Since the foregoing analysis demonstrates that discretionary review will produce sparse error correction,
and the health of the current regime suggests the feasibility of a
mandatory approach, there are superior and more appropriate
alternatives.
B. Developing the Law
In addition to error correction, circuit courts serve the institutional function of developing law by articulating and clarifying legal
principles.2 70 Indeed, because the Supreme Court hears so few cases,
the circuit courts have become the federal system's primary source of
268 If the appellate panel does not like a result, it can accord less deference in a
discretionary regime because, in later cases, the court can avoid the burden of consistent, searching review simply by denying review.

269 In his 1957 article, Professor Wright warned against allowing circuit courts to
decide, in their discretion, whether to take review before final judgment and advocated instead legislation or rules imposing "tight conditions" for interlocutory review.
See Wright, supra note 163, at 777-78. Although his particular concern about the
misuse of extraordinary writ power has not come to pass, discretionary review would
provide even greater freedom to circuit courts to decide what interlocutory decisions

to review.
270 See MARTINEAU, supra note 28, § 1.9 (stating that the institutional function
serves the purposes of developing legal principles and enforcing them); Carrington,
supra note 230, at 417 (stating that modern theorists have distinguished between the
corrective and rule-directed or law-giving functions); Solimine, supra note 4, at 1175
(stating that appeals serve a number of values including permitting the law to be
developed in a way applicable to geographically dispersed courts); Wright, supranote
163, at 779 ("Everyone agrees, as far as I know, that one function of an appellate court

is to discover and declare-or to make-the law.").
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legal doctrine. 2 71 Such lawmaking occurs largely in appeals from final
judgments. Because of the limited opportunity for interlocutory review, some areas of the law that tend to evade review after final judgment have received inadequate appellate attention. 272 As reflected in
the ABA's proposal, 273 discretionary interlocutory review is supposed
to be utilized to develop the law in important areas. The need to clarify the law with regard to class actions was one of the reasons Rule
27
23(f) was enacted.

4

Discretionary review, however, will produce neither the amount
nor the type of appellate review needed to clarify the law in areas that
historically have evaded review. It also poses significant dangers to the
integrity of the lawmaking process and the role of precedent.
As discussed in the previous Section, circuit courts are likely to
grant discretionary review sparingly. 275 Sometimes they will grant review to address a novel or unresolved issue of law even if error below is
improbable; for example, circuit judges are likely to be interested in
issues arising in big and exceptional cases. 276 Because review means
increased work, however, circuit courts are likely to limit most of their
271 See Dragich, supra note 235, at 22 (stating that circuit courts have assumed a
large share of the lawmaking burden).
272 Although greater appellate attention does not guarantee clear governing principles, consistent review usually will foster clearer standards over time, at least within a
particular circuit. The standards governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions
provide a good example. Although preliminary injunctions are interlocutory, they
are subject to immediate appellate review under § 1292(a) (1). Given the significant
appellate attention this form of interim relief has received, the standards governing
the grant of such relief have become quite exacting. In contrast, the legal standards
governing class action certifications (which were not subject to interlocutory review
prior to Rule 23(f)) and various aspects of the attorney-client privilege are far from
clear and are wrought with inconsistencies. These two areas, unlike preliminary injunctions, have received little appellate attention because no interlocutory appeal has
been available. Significantly expanded interlocutory review in these areas eventually
would lead to needed clarification.
273 See ABA COMM'N, supra note 7, at 25 (including clarification of the law on
important issues as one of the reasons for granting discretionary review); see also Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 3, at 291 (advocating discretionary review in part
because interlocutory review aids in the development of the law).
274 See Gould, supra note 6, at 310-11 (stating that one of the primary reasons for
the adoption of Rule 23(f) was to enable circuit courts to develop clear certification
standards); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note (suggesting Rule
23(f) may be utilized to provide appellate review where a class certification decision
"turns on a novel or unsettled question of law").
275 See supra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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grants to circumstances in which review is unburdensome or the result
2 77
below is intolerable.
The universe of probable errors is vast. Given the small number
of decisions the circuit courts are likely to review, review in any one
area of the law will be sporadic. Even sporadic attention may be helpful in clarifying some aspects of the law. However, sporadic attention
is unlikely to produce significant and meaningful guidance, since such
guidance often requires working through doctrinal intricacies and varying circumstances.2 78 Pre-Rule 23(f) class certification orders provide an obvious example: although a few such orders received
appellate review-via mandamus, § 1292(b), and review after final
judgment-this amount of review was wholly inadequate to develop
guiding legal standards. If discretionary review is similarly sporadicand the small number of Rule 23(f) grants indicates that it might bethe law is unlikely to develop significantly.
In addition to sporadic attention is the problem of uneven attention. The circuit courts are likely to review obvious and unburdensome errors while avoiding harder questions that will require more of
their limited time and resources. 279 Serving the institutional function
therefore is less likely in areas in which review will be more difficult,
such as issues that require a detailed analysis of the factual record or a
careful balancing of multiple factors. If appellate judges seek to avoid
277 Professor Solimine's review of orders certified under § 1292(b) from 1987
through 1989 reveals that the district court decisions were affirmed approximately
half the time. See Solimine, supranote 4, at 1198. Despite the circuit courts' overall
reluctance to grant review under this section, their affirmance rate (once they do
grant review) might suggest that that my prediction is unwarranted. This rate may
indicate that the circuit courts are willing to take review even when error is not as
likely and, thus, more affirmances may result. Nevertheless, several factors may have
led to these results which will have limited or no effect on the exercise of unfettered
discretion outside the § 1292(b) context. First, as Professor Solimine discusses, some
circuit courts limit review to big or exceptional cases. See supra note 74 and accompa-

nying text. In such circumstances, courts may be more willing to take review, even if
error is not as probable. Moreover, the district court's determination that review is
warranted-because there is a controlling question of law over which there is substantial disagreement-may capture the circuit court's attention, even if error does not
appear probable. Finally, circuit courts are faced with far fewer petitions for review
under § 1292(b) than they would be under a discretionary regime. Confronted with a
far more overwhelming number of petitions, circuit courts will be more likely to limit
their grants of review to circumstances in which probable error is present.
278 For example, it is difficult to imagine that the existing, thorough body of law
governing preliminary injunctions would have developed without mandatory (and
hence consistent) appellate attention, which would not have occurred in a discretionary regime.
279 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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the burden of addressing difficult issues, they will not provide guidance in many areas where error is more likely, and hence, such gui28 0
dance is needed.
Furthermore, I suggest that the circuit courts often cannot develop the law by only correcting errors. In certain circumstances, this
institutional function is best served by affirmances. This is particularly
true with regard to determinations that involve the balancing of various factors, detailed factual analyses, or the exercise of discretion.
Often, the best guidance in such circumstances is an appellate affirmation of a district court's analytical approach to an issue or a confirmation that the lower court's approach fell within the proper bounds
281
of discretion.
Unlike mandatory review, which produces a mixture of affirmances and reversals (and, indeed, mostly affirmances), a discretionary regime will produce few affirmances. Some affirmances will
emerge from big and exceptional case review, and others will emerge
unintentionally because some probable errors turn out not to be error. Such affirmances will be uncommon, however, if the circuit
courts largely limit review to obvious and unburdensome errors and
28 2
intolerable probable errors.
In addition to being largely ineffective in serving the lawmaking
function, discretionary review is dangerous. In a mandatory regime,
in which circuit panels are obligated to conduct a review, there is institutional accountability: a decision is subject to peer review, is exposed
to possible reversal, and is either persuasive or binding in later
cases. 28 3 Because circuit precedent is binding in later cases within the

280 For example, in a purely discretionary regime, circuit courts would tend to
avoid review of class certification decisions because these decisions often involve difficult factual and legal issues. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
281 Also, error correction usually stops short of full, thorough review, because
once the appellate court identifies dispositive error, it need not review the remainder
of the district court's treatment of the legal issue in question. Affirmances, on the
other hand, often include review of many aspects of the district court's treatment of
the issue.
282 See Dalton, supra note 33, at 80 (citing to studies that suggest that courts exercising discretionary review have higher reversal rates than those that do not). Thus
far the trend in Rule 23(f) grants has been consistent with this hypothesis. Grants
have produced thirteen reversals and vacations, and five affirmances. See supra notes
261-65 and accompanying text.
283 Cf Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 239, at 174 (arguing that current short form
disposition practices allow circuit judges to avoid many formal and informal
contraints).
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circuit,28 4 eventually, in a mandatory regime, circuit judges must
reach or reaffirm legal conclusions and enforce legal principles contrary to their individual preferences. In a discretionary regime, on the
contrary, circuitjudges easily can avoid articulating, reiterating, or enforcing legal principles or conclusions they dislike by denying review.
Such avoidance weakens the coercive effect of existing circuit and Supreme Court precedent, not only by rendering its application "optional" in a particular case, but also because careful selection of orders
for review will allow astute circuit judges with particular agendas to
color the law more significantly. 28 5 The power to decide what to decide therefore weakens the influence of precedent and allows personal views and preferences to have a greater impact on the
28 6
application and substance of the law.

284 See Douglas A. Berman &Jeffrey 0. Cooper, In Defense of Less PrecedentialOpinions: A Reply to ChiefJudgeMartin, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 2025, 2031 n.20 (citing cases from
each circuit stating that panels lack the authority to overrule decisions by prior
panels, absent an intervening statute, Supreme Court opinion, or en banc decision).
285 For example, if several circuit judges disfavor class treatment of securities
claims, they may seek to take review of erroneous certification grants in securities
cases, while denying review of erroneous certification denials (and, of course, nonerroneous certification grants and denials). If successful, the reversals of the class certifications would comprise the principal source of law on these claims in the circuit.
This set of reversals is unlikely to be counterbalanced by affirmances after final judgment because, as set forth above, class certification decisions often evade review after
final judgment These reversals would stand alone, sending a signal to district court
judges regarding class treatment of such claims and fosters uncertainty about when
granting certification would be appropriate. In response, district court judges would
be more hesitant about granting certification in this area. Under a mandatory regime, circuit judges are unable to pick which set of orders to review. Although personal preferences regarding securities class actions will influence outcomes in some
cases, these circuitjudges are likely to encounter proper grants of class certification at
some point, which they must begrudgingly affirm. These grants would then form part
of the guiding law influencing district court behavior, along with the reversals.
One way to minimize this danger would be to separate petition review from merits review; one panel would decide whether immediate review is appropriate, while
another would address the merits if an appeal is granted. Although there may be
institutional pressures to avoid taking many cases, at least particular panels would not
be able to pick and choose among cases to further their own preferences.
286 See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 239, at 189-91, 194 (suggesting that the
power and influence of individual circuit judges in certain subject areas may be enhanced by procedures that allow otherjudges to opt out of providing reasons for their
decisions in such areas and that the ability to decide without providing reasons weakens precedent). In a recent article, Professor Hartnett expresses similar concerns
about the Supreme Court's modern exercise of its certiorari power. He argues that
certiorari's license to escape from the logistical implications of on-the-merits decisions has played a pivotal role in shaping substantive constitutional principles. See
Hartnett, supra note 235, at 1730-33 (casting doubt on Whether the Supreme Court
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For similar reasons, discretionary review may influence the deference circuit courts afford district courts. Ironically, while discretionary review does not subject an interlocutory order to automatic review,
it may allow circuit courts to accord less respect to trial court decisions. If an appellate panel has unfettered discretion to pick and
choose the issues it wishes to confrbnt, it can take aggressive action in
those circumstances without concern for the effects on other litigation
or their future workload. For example, it can essentially undertake de
novo (or otherwise nondeferential) review where it should have applied an abuse of discretion standard and need not fear that it will
have to apply the same type of rigorous review in other cases, since
future review is contingent upon later discretion. Thus, the power to
control what to decide creates control over how to decide.
Discretionary review of interlocutory orders therefore will produce limited benefits in terms of developing and clarifying of the law.
These limited benefits are largely outweighed by the dangers to the
lawmaking function. At a minimum, as a means of enhancing the institutional function, discretionary review is an unattractive alternative.
C.

Category-BasedDiscretionary Review

The ABA model and similar proposals call for general discretionary review of interlocutory orders. Under such a regime, which would
replace most or all of the existing exceptions, any interlocutory order
would be reviewable. Category-based discretionary review, like that
embodied in Rule 23(f), limits the exercise of discretion to a specific
type of order. Such review is intended to supplement, rather than
replace the current exceptions. Although the category-based approach constitutes a more modest type of reform than the general
approach, it suffers from many of the same drawbacks.
There are several important differences between these approaches. Unlike general discretionary review, the category-based approach has the potential to produce some collateral litigation over the
issue of appealability, specifically, whether the order in question falls
within the category covered by the rule. A small amount of such litigation already has emerged in the Rule 23(f) context.28 7 At the same
would have implemented the incorporation doctrine, as currently constituted, if it

were required to hear an appeal from every state judgment based on one of the incorporated amendments). Discretion to decide what to decide therefore has enabled
the Court to "intervene selectively and move the law in its preferred direction without
subjecting itself to an onslaught of cases." Id. at 1733.
287 See, e.g., Z-Seven Fund, Inc. v. Motorcar Parts & Accessories, 231 F.3d 1215,
1219 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that the district court's appointment of lead counsel is not immediately appealable under Rule 23(f)).

2001]

DISCONTENT AND

INDISCRETION

time, the category-based approach has some advantages. If the categories remain narrow, the number of petitions will be far smaller.
Moreover, a category-based rule may focus the circuit courts' attention on an issue or area of the law, which, along with fewer petitions,
could enhance acceptance rates. This may lead to greater error correction-and irreparable harm avoidance-in the particular category
and greater development of the law.
However, while greater acceptance rates are possible, current
practices suggest that circuit courts are likely to grant review infrequently. For example, even though high acceptance rates under both
§ 1292(b) and Rule 23(f) would have a marginal impact on the circuit
courts' overall workload, review is granted sparingly. 28 8 Sporadic
grants-addressing mostly unburdensome errors, orders in big cases,
and intolerable errors-will result in limited error correction and irreparable harm avoidance, and lead to limited development of the
law. Intolerable error review in this context imposes the same
dangers.
Several Rule 23(f) opinions attempt to articulate standards for
determining whether review should be granted. 289 In Blairv. Equifax
Check Services, Inc., Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
looked to the Rule's Advisory Committee note for guidance. 290 He
concluded that an appeal under the rule is appropriate when (1) the
denial of class status sounds the death knell of the litigation, (2) the
grant of class certification may have an in terrorem effects, forcing defendants to settle (even if the class's probability of success is slight),
and (3) an appeal may facilitate the development of the law.291 The
First and Eleventh Circuits, relying on Blair,have articulated similar
292
standards.
288 See supra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
289 In addition, commentators have offered proposed standards for guiding the
exercise of circuit court discretion. See, e.g., Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at
1574-96 (discussing a series of factors courts should take into account in light of the
history and purposes of Rule 23(f)).
290 See 181 F.3d 832, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1999).
291 See id. at 833-35. Judge Easterbrook cautioned, however, that courts should
not assume that denials of class certification sound the death knell, since firms bringing putative class actions often have sufficient resources to litigate individual claims to
their conclusion. See id. at 834. For further discussion and commentary on the Blair
criteria, see Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1592-96 (agreeing generally with the
criteria but advocating a finer delineation of the factors that should be taken into
account in the exercise of discretion under Rule 23(f)).
292 See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 283, 293 (1st Cir. 2000)
(adopting Blait's first two prongs but limiting the third to instances in which "an
appeal will permit the resolution of an unsettled legal issue that is important to the
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While these standards for exercising discretion may be appropriate, no formal or informal constraints stand in the way of later panels
ignoring them.

29 3

Indeed, the small number of grants of review

under the rule-eighteen-suggests that these standards are not being followed. One of the first two Blairconsiderations probably is present in a significant percentage of cases. 294 Given the severity of the
resulting harm, parties on the losing end of a class certification order
are likely to seek immediate review. Hence, contrary to articulated
particular litigation as well as important in itself and is likely to escape effective review" after final judgment); Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266,
1273-76 (11th Cir. 2000) (adopting the Mowbray factors and adding that circuit
panels also should consider the status and nature of the litigation before the district
court, whether there is a substantial weakness in the certification decision, and the
likelihood that future events may make appellate review more or less appropriate); see
also Kruse, supra note 5, at 738 (proposing that 23(f) contain certain factors for the
court to consider, including the hardship to the appellant without immediate appeal
and the cost of delay to the appellant without an immediate appeal verses the cost of
delay of trial for the appellee).
293 See supranotes 248-51 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of formal or
informal constraints on the exercise of discretion).
294 See Prado-Steiman,221 F.3d at 1273 (expressing concern about possible floodgates problems with such broad standards). Plaintiffs on the losing end of a certification decision often will be able to argue in good faith that the decision sounds the
death knell of the claims. See Kruse, supra note 5, at 704-05.
For the named plaintiff, who typically has a very small claim and is using the
class mechanism as a means of bringing suit, denial of class certification can
be disastrous. As a practical matter, without the possibility of class recovery,
it would often be economically infeasible for the plaintiff to bring an individual action.
Id. (citation omitted). Likewise, under Judge Easterbrook's articulation, any defendant in a significant class action should be able to demonstrate potential irreparable
harm because each would be exposed to significant litigation costs and risks, and
hence forced to consider settlement, if certification is granted. See Blair,181 F.3d at
834. Defendants usually will have no trouble making such a good faith argument: "If
we do not get immediate review, will have to settle this case because of the enormous
costs and risks of litigating such a large class-action through trial." Kruse, supra note
5, at 705 ("A hefty legal bill will result simply from the defendant's decision to litigate.
As a result, there will be incredible pressure to settle.") (citation omitted); see also id.
at 730 (arguing, in rejecting a more lenient approach to mandamus review, that a
showing of hardship or forced settlement is an inadequate limiting principle because
"every defendant challenging a class certification order could successfully make this
argument") (citation omitted).
If I am wrong, and the eighteen grants of review constitute a significant percentage of the total number of petitions, I still question why review should be discretionary and not mandatory. If the universe of potential appeals of certification orders is
that limited, mandatory review would not burden the appellate courts significantly,
and the courts and litigants would avoid the petition process and the various dangers
of discretionary review.
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standards, numerous certification orders that threaten to inflict irreparable harm probably are going unreviewed. Moreover, as discussed
previously, the absence of cases in which circuit courts have agreed to
review denials of class certification andJudge Easterbrook's expressed
skepticism toward class (but not defense) claims of irreparable harm
may be warning signs that discretionary review under Rule 23(f) will
degenerate into review for "intolerable probable error" and that plain295
tiffs will rarely receive review, despite great hardship.
Class counsel generally opposed Rule 23(f) and any interlocutory
review of certification orders.2 96 In hindsight, this opposition seems
warranted; up to this point, Rule 23(f) has largely benefited defendants. Looking forward, however, class counsel should be more concerned about discretionary review than mandatory review. Mandatory
review would impose significant costs on putative classes and class
counsel, but, by requiring review for both grants and denials of certification, it would promote more even scrutiny and avoid the downstream consequences of uneven treatment. 297 Moreover, the costs of
discretionary review will often approach the costs of mandatory review. Parties petitioning for review must, at a minimum, demonstrate
295 See supra notes 267 and accompanying text.
296 See Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1568 (describing how the plaintiffs' bar
generally opposed the rule). The plaintiffs' bar raised the majority of concerns about

the rule. See 1 WORKING

PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CVL RULES ON PRO-

23, at 407-19 (1997) [hereinafter WORKING PASolimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1568-69 (indicating that many lawyers
associated with plaintiffs opposed the rule, while many associated with defendants
supported it). This opposition was primarily based on the fact that the rule would
provide (defendants) an unneeded opportunity for appellate review. See WORKING
PAPERS, supra, at 407, 415-19. Many of those opposed to the rule feared it would
prolong litigation and increase costs. See id. at 407; see also Solimine & Hines, supra
note 69, at 1566. Some commentators did express concern about the unfettered or
unguided nature of the discretion, although not a substantial number. See WORKING
PAPERS, supra, at 407-19; Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1566, 1576 n.234. A few
legal scholars also objected to the rule, arguing that it is unnecessary and would lead
to a large number of additional appeals and increased costs. See WORKING PAPERS,
supra, at 407-19. A small number also suggested that it would disproportionately
benefit defendants. See id.
297 Those who fear that circuit law on class actions will be less friendly to the interests of plaintiff classes should have far greater concern with regard to a discretionary
regime than a mandatory one. Although mandatory review would expose more orders to circuit review, discretionary review appears to tend toward reversing grants of
class certification. Mandatory review would include affirming some grants of certification and reversing some denials. The latter is more likely to lead to even-handed
development of the law. Indeed, a body of circuit law comprised largely of reversals
of class certifications may have a chilling effect on district court judges deciding
whether to certify classes. See supra note 285.
POSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE
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that the district court probably erred. 298 Because much of the fight
over whether there is error will take place in the petition, preparing a
petition or a response may require nearly the same resources as preparing appellate briefs. 299 These investments will rarely result in review; when they do, it may benefit defendants disproportionately.
Thus, plaintiffs and class counsel would be better off in many cases if
certification orders were subject to mandatory interlocutory review.
In sum, category-based discretionary review suffers from many of
the same ills as general discretionary review. Although there are categories of interlocutory orders-including class certification ordersthat are worthy of immediate review, discretionary review will not
serve adequately or appropriately the error correction or lawmaking
functions in these areas. There is a better approach to reform.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Part I demonstrated that the current appealability regimewhich consists of the final judgment rule and a number of exceptions-has become relatively clear and coherent. It produces neither
excessive collateral litigation on the issue of appealability nor arbitrary
results. While this forms a solid foundation, interlocutory review
should be expanded to the extent practicable to reduce error-inflicted
severe irreparable harm and to increase development of the law in
areas that typically evade review.
Part II established that discretionary review is not the way to
achieve these goals. Discretionary review will not result in significant
gains in error correction or clarification of the law, will impose additional costs on courts and litigants, and will pose significant dangers to
the integrity of the error correction and institutional functions.
I propose another approach to reform. It begins with three propositions that I believe, given the previous discussion, are largely uncontroversial. First, the final judgment rule must remain the baseline
principle in any appealability regime; it strikes the proper balance between competing costs, burdens, and benefits in most circumstances.
Second, no exception or set of exceptions to the final judgment rule
298 Defendants faced with forced settlements will have strong incentives and often
the resources to "go all out" in seeking review.
299 In his critique of discretionary review, Professor Carrington offers a similar
observation:
Saying there is no right of appeal in a civil case may be more consonant with
what now happens in our courts of appeals, but it will not reduce their workload or save the time and money of litigants that will be spent in equal
measure however the issue is framed.
Carrington, supra note 230, at 430-31.
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can facilitate review of all or even most interlocutory orders containing errors that cause irreparable harm. Irreparable harm is a typical-and severe irreparable harm is a common-byproduct of delayed
review. Third, the circuit courts have limited resources and a burgeoning caseload; they, therefore, cannot handle significant increases
in the number of appeals.
With these objectives and constraints in mind, I propose that the
rulemakers utilize their authority under § 1292(e) to promulgate
rules that provide for (1) mandatory appellate review of narrowly defined categories of orders addressing "problem areas" and (2) certification review for categories of orders addressing "problem areas" that
cannot be narrowed sufficiently to prevent overburdening the circuit
courts. Although such a reform is less likely, I also propose that Congress amend § 1292(b) to require circuit courts to accept review of
orders certified under § 1292(b) unless certification constitutes an
abuse of discretion. These reforms will enhance error correction, reduce severe irreparable harm, and support development of the law to
the extent practicable, while avoiding the pitfalls of discretion.
A.

Mandatory Review To Address Problem Areas

Expansion of interlocutory appellate review should be limited primarily to mandatory review of narrowly defined categories of orders
within "problem areas." "Problem areas" are areas of the law that are
unclear or underdeveloped, largely because they are usually addressed
in interlocutory orders and tend to evade review. Also, I limit the definition of problem areas to those categories of orders that usually inflict some kind of severe irreparable harm on a party if erroneous and
not immediately correctable. Class certification is a problem area because the standards governing certification are unclear and underdeveloped, and grants or denials of certification often create death knell
or in terrorem effects. Other examples may include certain orders that
deny protection for allegedly privileged or otherwise protected communications or information, and certain types of remand or abstention orders. Problem areas are easy to find; amidst the confusion in
the law and complaints of severe irreparable harm, circuit courts will
utilize-occasionally inappropriately-other exceptions such as mandamus or the collateral order doctrine to reach these kinds of
controversies. 300
300

Much of the controversy in the mandamus context stems from controversial

uses of the writ in class action cases. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. Likewise, class actions gave rise to the death knell doctrine. See supra notes 67-68 and
accompanying text. A significant number of recent decisions issuing writs of manda-
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Such a rule might provide as follows:
Within ten (10) days of a district court issuing in a civil action an order
[describe category, such as "grantingor denying class certification under Rule
23"], a party may appeal that order to the court of appeals. An appeal shall
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district courtjudge or the
court of appeals so orders. If for any reason, an appeal is not taken under this
rule or the court of appeals dismisses the appeal as improper, this does not
extinguish any right to appeal under § 1291 or any other statute.
This type of category-based rule offers the most efficient and reliable way to reduce the number of errors in interlocutory orders that
inflict severe irreparable harm and to enhance development of the
law. Indeed, mandatory review in problem areas ensures that error
correction and development of the law work together. Error-inflicted
severe irreparable harm occurs more frequently in problem areas
since these areas, by definition, are governed by unclear legal standards and encompass orders that usually inflict severe irreparable
harm. Mandatory review will immediately increase error correction
and harm avoidance opportunities, and significant, even-handed appellate attention over time will make governing standards within the
area clearer, thereby reducing the frequency of error.
Furthermore, mandatory review within particular categories
0 1
avoids the waste and dangers associated with discretionary review.
Although a mandatory rule will subject some respondents to the burdens of full appellate review who would not have faced such review in
a discretionary regime, the petition process in a discretionary regime
may impose almost as great a burden. Petitions are likely to contain
full-scale battles over the merits, yet this added burden rarely will result in full appellate review. In addition, because clarity in the law is
likely to emerge more quickly in a mandatory regime, attempted appeals may decline sooner. 30 2 Moreover, mandatory review imposes appropriate and needed constraints absent in a discretionary regime.
mus occur in the remand, abstention, and privilege contexts. See supra notes 165-66
and accompanying text. Finally, two of the three remaining circuit splits in the collateral order doctrine context address orders denying protection to alleged privileged
communications and trade secrets. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
301 Any new mandatory rule will produce some collateral litigation on the issue of
appealability. However, a carefully worded category-based rule is unlikely to spawn
the quantum of collateral litigation that judicially crafted interpretive doctrines or
exceptions governed by broadly defined standards have generated in the past.
302 The low rate of grants of review in a discretionary regime will deter some from
seeking appeal. Yet in problem areas, where severe irreparable harm is common,
many parties will seek review despite the low rate, if the law remains unclear. Greater
certainty in the outcome on appeal-which will emerge sooner in a mandatory regime-is more likely to reduce the number of appeals.
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Courts obligated to undertake review cannot so easily avoid addressing reversible errors or confronting difficult legal issues.
Finally, this approach to reform offers potential flexibility. For
example, at some point, an area of the law may cease to be a problem
area-or become less of a problem than other areas-and interlocutory review can be abandoned. Rulemaking in its current form is a
long process. 303 If, however, the rulemakers were to agree to the
"problem area" approach, perhaps they could develop a limited "fasttrack" process for adding or subtracting categories. The list should
never be long, and categories should be limited-to true problem areas
as previously defined. The rulemakers should feel free to remove a
category if it creates an unanticipated burden for the circuit courts or
unforeseen hardships for litigants or district courts.
The greatest difficulty in promulgating these types of rules is defining the category broadly enough to capture the entire problem
area, yet narrowly enough not to impose an unmanageable additional
burden on circuit courts. However, close attention to the true nature
of the doctrinal problems underlying the problem area often will allow the rulemakers to define the categories narrowly, perhaps even by
specific issue. For example, if the rulemakers were to replace current
Rule 23(f) with a rule providing for mandatory review, they could
lessen the potential impact on circuit court dockets by limiting appeals to certain issues or classes. Perhaps they might determine that
numerosity issues are not so problematic as to justify interlocutory review or that certification issues surrounding Rule 23(b) (1) and (2)
classes have created far fewer problems than those surrounding
(b) (3) class actions. Expressly excluding such issues and classes (and
prohibiting pendent review) will limit the burden and focus the
courts' attention on those issues where error correction and legal de30 4
velopment are most needed.
Although class certification orders are a strong candidate for this
type of mandatory review, I make no proposals regarding particular
problem areas. I simply contend that providing category-based
303 Rule 23(f), for example, was promulgated after years of hearings and deliberation. See Solimine & Hines, supra note 69, at 1562-72 (discussing in detail the history

of Rule 23(f)).
304 The rulemakers would have to decide if such detail is appropriate in the given
circumstance. Finer distinctions may lead to more collateral litigation on appealability. Moreover, parsing categories would be inappropriate if the lines fail to draw
meaningful distinctions between issues and classes. I am less concerned about the
nontransubstantive nature of such rulemaking; although rulemakers have tended to
avoid nontransubstantive rules, the category-based approach to interlocutory review
has a long tradition and, as discussed previously, is not inherently problematic.
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mandatory review for discrete problem areas is the best approach to
reform.
B.

CertificationRules for Categories That Cannot Be Narrowed

Although promulgating narrowly drawn mandatory rules is the
best way to enhance error correction and development of the law
given current docket constraints, there may be circumstances in which
the rulemakers cannot narrow sufficiently the definition of a particular category to ensure that the additional burden on the circuit courts
is acceptable. The rulemakers might conclude, for example, that the
class certification and attorney-client privilege categories cannot be
parsed in any meaningful way. Moreover, the exclusion of some internal issues or classes may not be sufficient to reduce appeals to a manageable level. While the number of appeals is likely to decline as
outcomes become more certain, the resulting burden on the circuit
courts and interference with district courts still may be too great.
If the rulemakers identify a category of orders addressing a problem area that cannot be narrowed meaningfully or sufficiently, I propose that they adopt a category-based certification rule.3 0 5 The rule

might provide as follows:
Within ten (10) days of a district court issuing in a civil action an order
[describe category, such as "grantingor denying class certification under
Rule 23" or "denying a motion for protectionfor allegedly privileged attorney-client communications"], a party may move the court to certify the order
for immediate appellate review.
(a) The district court shall grant the motion for certification ifthe district judge finds that such an order involves a question of law
regarding [e.g., "class certification under Rule 23" or "the attorney-client privilege"] (1) unsettled within the circuit in which the
district is located and (2) the resolution of which is necessary to the
disposition of the order. The districtjudge shall state in writing the
reasonsfor grantingor denying certification.
(b) If the district court denies the motion for certification, the party
seeking certification may, within ten (10) days of such denial, appeal the denial. The court of appealsshall affirm the denial only
305 Section 1292(e) alone would provide the authority to promulgate such rules
except for categories that might contain orders appealable as a matter of right. For
example, the circuits are split on whether orders denying protection for alleged attorney-client privileged communications are immediately appealable final decisions
under the collateral order doctrine. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. For
such a category, the rulemakers also would have to determine, pursuant to their
§ 2072(c) authority that the orders are not, in fact, appealable as of right, and then
promulgate a rule pursuant to § 1292(e) allowing. for a certified appeal.
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upon the express determination that the denial does not constitute
an abuse of discretion.
(c) If the district court grants the motion for certification, the party
seeking certification shall have ten (10) days to file a notice of appeal of the underlying order. The court of appealsshall permit an
appeal to be taken from such an order unless the appellee moves to
dismiss the appealand the court of appeals determines that the certfication constitutesan abuse of discretion, in which case, the court
of appealsshall dismiss the appeal. The court of appeals shall state
in writing the reasons why the grant constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
(d) The applicationfor certification, an appealfrom the denial of certification, and an appealfollowing certificationshall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the districtjudge or the court of
appeals or ajudge thereof shall so order.
(e) If for any reason, an appeal is not taken under this rule or the
circuit court dismisses an appeal under subsection (c) -ofthis rule,
this does not extinguish any right to appealunder § 1291 or any
other statute.
Explanatory commentary might also provide that, for purposes of
this rule, a question of law is "unsettled within the circuit" only if (1)
the Stipreme Court and circuit court have not addressed the question,
(2) the Supreme Court and circuit court have not clearly resolved the
question, or (3) circuit panels have split on the question. If the circuit
court has resolved the question, contrary authority in other circuits
does not make the law "unsettled." The resolution of a question of
law is not "necessary to the disposition of the order" if it is merely an
30 6
alternative or supplemental basis for the disposition.
Such a category-based certification rule offers several advantages
over the type of certification rule contained in § 1292(b) and over
category-based discretionary rules such as Rule 23(f). First, as discussed previously, a district courtjudge is in the best position to determine whether an order is worthy of appellate review. 30 7 The district
court judge is familiar with the issues in the case and the state of the
relevant law and, unlike circuit judges, has no disincentives tied to
appellate workload.
Section 1292(b) certification is relatively ineffective in part because a district court judge usually has a strong disincentive to certify
an order for appeal, and the judge's refusal 'to certify is unreview306 Parties also would be barred from seeking pendent review of other matters
addressed in the underlying order.
307 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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able. 308 Under the proposed category-based certification rule, unlike
under § 1292(b), the district court judge's determination is subject to
abuse of discretion review, which provides some check against this disincentive. Moreover, the two factors the district courtjudge must consider are narrower and arguably clearer than the factors set forth in
§ 1292(b).
Furthermore, the proposed certification rule is preferable to
§ 1292(b) and discretionary review because it does not grant circuit
courts discretion to accept or deny review. Under the proposed rule,
a circuit court is limited to reviewing a district court's decision to certify an appeal for abuse of discretion. This standard of review, along
with the requirement that any decision on reviewability be in writing
and the possibility of en banc or Supreme Court reversal, restrainsboth formally and informally-circuit decisionmaking on whether to
take review far more than the ultimately unenforceable standards for
exercising discretion articulated by the ABA and the circuit courts addressing Rule 23(f). These constraints substantially limit the influence of undesirable considerations, such as the tendency to avoid
difficult questions, biases toward various parties or outcomes, and strategic review choices that may color the law. Yet, the proposed rule
does so while achieving one of the primary goals of discretion-weeding out determinations not worthy of immediate appellate attention.
This type of rule also is better tailored to facilitate the error correction and lawmaking functions. Errors are most likely when the governing law is unclear. Given the "unsettled question within the
circuit" standard, the test for appealability is the lack of clarity in the
applicable law. Also, given that review will occur even when the circuit
court would not perceive error as probable (much less intolerable),
treatment of the area of the law will be more consistent and evenhanded-in terms of affirmances and reversals. Moreover, even the
circuit court's review of the district court judge's certification decision
facilitates development of the law; the circuit court must state why it is
affirming a district court's certification denial or reversing a district
court's certification grant. This review alone may illuminate or clarify
the law on the particular question.
The rule also contains substantial limitations on review. It restricts review to unsettled law within the circuit and, therefore, is not a
vehicle to test possible inter-circuit conflicts. It also ensures that review will only occur when necessary; nondispositive unsettled ques308 District courts are hesitant to certify because an immediate appeal invites delay
and circuit interference, and subjects the order to reversal. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
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tions are not a basis for review. Although the rule will burden the
30 9
circuit courts initially with more appeals than a discretionary rule,
the area will become less unsettled over time, and hence, produce
fewer appeals.
Moreover, the proposed certification process is more efficient
than a petition process. The district would make the initial and usually determinative decision on whether appeal is appropriate. Because the judge is already familiar with the underlying issues, this
process would not be onerous. Likewise, because the parties would be
appearing before the same court at the time, they would not have to
put forth the kind of effort that a petition for review to the circuit
court might entail. 10 Once the district judge makes a determination
on certification, whether a grant or denial, many parties may opt not
to seek appellate review of the certification decision, given that it will
be reversed only for abuse of discretion. The circuit courts need not
address the appropriateness of the district judge's certification decision unless one of the parties pursues further review. Given that the
district judge will have provided his or her reasons for granting or
denying certification, and the factors to consider-unsettled law and
necessary to the disposition-are limited and do not require scouring
the record for probable error, any such circuit review usually will not
be burdensome.
Thus, to the extent mandatory review of all orders in a category is
not feasible, a certification rule like the one proposed above is the
best way to limit review within the category. It strikes the proper balance by facilitating error correction and development of the law,
weeding out orders unworthy of appellate attention, and imposing
constraints that minimize the dangers associated with discretion.
C. Amending § 1292(b)
Finally, the circuit courts should not have the power to reject certified appeals under § 1292(b) unless the district court abused its discretion in certifying the order. Unlike the core components of my
other proposals, this proposal likely would require congressional
action.
309 For example, if such a rule were adopted to replace Rule 23(f), I am confident
that there would be more appeals certified under this standard in the next few years
than accepted under the current rule.
310 I suspect such motions will accompany motions for reconsideration, which
often would be forthcoming anyway, given that the orders we are concerned with
impose some type of significant irreparable harm.

266

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

77:1

Under the current version of § 1292 (b), a district court may, in its
discretion, certify an order not otherwise appealable when it determines that such an order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
appellate review would materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation. 3 11 Once an order is certified by the district court, the
circuit court has discretion to decide whether to hear the appeal.3 12
This discretion offers little or no benefit. District court certification is rare. Likewise, there is little danger of inappropriate certification. The decision of a district court judge to subject his or her own
order to immediate appeal, and the possibility of reversal is inherently
trustworthy.3 1 3 Indeed, the district court judge has strong incentives
to refuse certification; when the judge chooses to certify, the judge is
conceding that the question is a troubling one, and thus, worthy of
appellate attention and possible reversal. Yet circuit courts inexplicably refuse to hear many certified questions.3 14 The district court's de3 15
cision deserves more deference.
Limiting the circuit courts' power of refusal to abuse of discretion
is consistent with such deference while providing circuit courts with
more than enough authority to weed out improper certifications.
Moreover, given the sparse number of certifications each year, the increased burden on circuit courts will be insignificant. 3 16 The number
of certifications is not likely to increase as a result of such an amendment, given that the change would have no effect on the district court
judge's strong incentives to deny certification. 3 17 The increased circuit review of troubling and unsettled issues would facilitate error cor311 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
312 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
313 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
314 See id.
315 Over ten years ago, Professor Solimine advocated that circuit courts should
take a more benign view of interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b) and afford district
court certifications more deference. See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1201-02, 1213.
Indeed, he suggested that circuit courts limit their own discretion.by limiting their
decision whether to take review to the criteria set forth for granting certification. See
id. at 1202. For reasons similar to those given by Professor Solimine, I offer the proposal here, except that I would mandate such deference-circuit courts must take
review unless the district court abused its discretion in certifying the order.
316 See Solimine, supra note 4, at 1203-04 (contending that more broad acceptance of certified appeals will neither lead to significantly more certifications nor unmanageable docket congestion).
317 See id. (stating that district court judges err on the side of reluctance in granting certification and concluding that greater acceptance rates would not compel
judges to certify more decisions for immediate review).
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rection and lawmaking, without imposing significant costs on the
circuit courts.
As a practical matter, § 1292(b) often provides the only opportunity for interlocutory review of orders not falling within categorybased or other exceptions to the final judgment rule. While this opportunity should be subject to a district court judge's determination
about how to manage the litigation, it should not fall prey to the unarticulated preferences of circuit panels once the district court judge
reluctantly concedes that circuit guidance is needed.
CONCLUSION

The rules governing interlocutory appeals are too important to
be free of controversy. Yet, much of the discontent with the current
regime is unwarranted. The final judgment rule and the current exceptions generally draw clear and sensible distinctions between interlocutory orders that are immediately appealable and those that are
not. Indeed, the exceptions with the most troubled history-the collateral order doctrine and mandamus review-no longer create significant application problems or corresponding litigation. Reform
efforts therefore should focus on expanding opportunities for interlocutory review rather than seek to fix that which is not broken.
Any modification of the current regime should have two primary
aims: (1) facilitating correction of errors that cannot otherwise be corrected or would cause severe irreparable harm; and (2) clarifying the
law in areas that often evade appellate review. Fulfillment of these
goals is significantly constrained, however, by the sheer volume of
probable errors and the limited resources of the circuit courts. Under
any viable regime, many errors that inflict irreparable harm will go
uncorrected. The real question then, is how to enhance error correction and development of the law to the greatest extent practicable,
without intolerably burdening the circuit courts or litigants, or otherwise harming the judicial function.
The most popular approach to reform is to grant to circuit courts
the power to decide which interlocutory orders to review. Yet, as I
have demonstrated, the discretionary approach-generally or in category-based rules like Rule 23(f)-is flawed; it will not significantly increase error correction or facilitate clarification in the law and, in fact,
is likely to lead to even less interlocutory review. Moreover, unfettered discretion at the circuit level will impose significant, additional
costs on litigants and the courts, and creates risks to the integrity of
both the error correction and lawmaking functions.
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Category-based mandatory review offers a feasible and superior
alternative to discretion. This approach utilizes scarce appellate resources efficiently by requiring and concentrating review in discrete
areas where probable errors are most likely and greater certainty in
the law is most needed. When a category cannot be narrowed sufficiently to avoid excessively burdening the system, a district court certification procedure-checked by abuse of discretion review-is the
most appropriate means of distinguishing those orders worthy of immediate review from those that are not. This principle should be extended to § 1292(b) appeals as well; there is little to be gained from
allowing circuit courts to reject certified appeals for any reason.
These proposed changes will serve the dual aims of reform while
avoiding the introduction of unacceptable additional costs and risks
into the appellate system.

